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ABSTRACT 
This paper first sets up a theoretical model to describe a credit rating agency’s (CRA) 
two roles, namely rating and monitoring. Through CRA’s monitoring role, bonds no longer 
represent loan contracts without monitoring. In the model, bond issuers have to decide 
whether to go through CRA or borrow directly, and whether to take action to prevent future 
risk or not. CRA’s monitoring ability is shown to be crucial. If CRA can observe 
creditworthiness changes more accurately so as to offer ratings with less noise, there will be 
more issuers willing to signal their qualities and take action. If CRA can attract issuers to 
take action but cannot function in its monitoring role well enough, social welfare will be 
reduced after introducing CRA into the market. 
This paper then examines price adjustments in bond and equity markets according to 
Moody’s bond rating watchlist announcements and actual rating change announcements 
afterwards. Based on different methods of calculating excess returns, we find that asset prices 
react in response to Moody’s rating announcements, suggesting that they convey valuable 
information to both bond and equity markets and investors adjust prices according to both 
upgrading and downgrading directions. When we control for bond rating grades, the evidence 
of market reactions is more significant than without the control; in contrast, controlling for a 
stock’s beta is not so beneficial. Stronger evidence of market reactions is found in bond 
markets than in equity markets. 
Lastly, Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) with fixed and mixed effects are applied 
to describe how an issuer matches with an underwriter for an initial public offering (IPO). 
The study focuses on the issuer's preference over underwriter reputation. From GLM with 
fixed effects, we find that the issuer tends to choose a high-reputation underwriter when the 
IPO’s expected offer size is large, the expected offer price is high, the issuer is a young firm, 
there is venture capital backing, the issuer has more assets, or the issuer’s leverage ratio is 
small. From the random effect in GLM with mixed effects, we find that issuers in the state of 
California or in the Service and Utility industries are more likely to choose high-reputation 
underwriters than issuers in other states or industries. Underwriters with high reputation tend 
to have larger sales forces and have headquarters in New York. Using propensity score 
  
 
x 
matching methods, we find that underwriters with high reputation are generally associated 
with larger underpricings. The subsamples by the location of offer price in the filing range 
confirm such positive relation. However, evidence from subperiods shows that the larger 
underpricing is likely to be both an issuer’s industry effect and an underwriter’s reputation 
effect. 
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CHAPTER 1. THE IMPACT OF CREDIT RATING WATCHLIST 
1.1 Introduction 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) are important for financial markets. They serve as a 
guide for investors to make investment decisions. They have two main roles, namely, rating 
and monitoring. For corporate bonds, they decide ratings based on private and/or public 
information they obtain. It is to be expected that higher credit ratings will lead to lower 
funding costs. Monitoring happens after the initial rating is published. If CRAs find that 
something unusual happens regarding a particular bond issuer, they can decide to put its bond 
on watchlist1 for review. An issuer who is put on watchlist and wants to prevent a downgrade 
or promote an upgrade needs to provide more private information to the CRA. Ultimately, 
the CRA will report an updated rating. For example, on August 27 1990, the Wall Street 
Journal reported that on June 11 1990 S&P placed McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp.’s 
senior debt on its Credit-Watch list for possible downgrade. On August 27 1990, S&P 
downgraded the issues from single-A-plus to single-A-minus and removed the issues from its 
Credit-Watch list. The rating concern cited the corporation’s real-estate and auto loans 
problem, and the negative outlook for its aerospace business. Through the credit watch 
procedure, the CRA can inform investors of potentially enlarged/reduced risk at maturity, so 
that investors can adjust their pricing decisions accordingly. 
Traditionally, bonds have been characterized as direct borrowing without monitoring. 
However, the CRA can put bonds on credit watchlist for review. This means that bonds are 
not monitor-free if issuers choose to go through a CRA. The existence of CRA’s monitoring 
raises the questions of how a CRA monitors bonds, how issuers and investors react to CRA’s 
action, and what is the social welfare impact of such monitoring. Answers to those questions 
are important but still missing from the literature, especially from a theoretical standpoint. 
Therefore, the main objective of the present paper is to analyze the mechanism of CRA’s 
monitoring role and its impact. 
                                                 
1
 There are different terminologies for credit rating watchlist. S&P usually refers to it as "Credit Watch List" and Moody's 
uses "Rating Review List" or "Watchlist (Review)". So we call it "Credit Rating Watchlist" in the paper and use "watchlist" 
for short. 
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Previous theoretical studies can be classified into two strands, based on market 
failures in direct credit markets. One strand shows the role of contractual covenants as a 
method to control agency problems between insiders and outsiders. The second strand 
focuses on specialized monitoring institutions, for instance financial intermediaries, which 
are characterized as delegated monitoring. Diamond (1984) assumes asymmetric information 
and costly monitoring and develops a theory of financial intermediation. Berlin and Loeys 
(1988) consider a firm’s choice between loan contracts with covenants but no monitoring, 
and loan contracts enforced by a monitoring specialist (or financial intermediary). They show 
that the firm’s choice depends on its credit quality, the accuracy of financial indicators of its 
creditworthiness, and the cost of monitoring. Diamond (1991) shows that borrowers with 
median credit qualities rely on loans from banks, which have monitoring function. Borrowers 
with either high- or low-credit quality will borrow directly by issuing a bond without 
monitoring. 
The present study lays out a model of a firm’s choice to issue bonds either directly or 
through the CRA. The model emphasizes CRA’s monitoring role and relates to the literature 
on specialized monitoring institutions. However, CRAs are different from financial 
intermediaries in the literature. Diamond (1984) states that 
"... a financial intermediary raises funds from many lenders 
(depositors), promises them a given pattern of returns, lends to 
entrepreneurs, and spends resources monitoring and enforcing loan 
contracts with entrepreneurs which are less costly than those available 
without monitoring. 
Therefore, for incentive purposes for depositors and entrepreneurs, financial 
intermediaries need to bear repayment risks. However, they do not publish information 
monitored to the lenders. Similarly, CRAs perform rating and monitoring tasks. However, 
unlike traditional financial intermediaries, CRAs charge issuers and then provide ratings to 
the public for free. They do not raise or lend funds, as investors directly lend money to 
issuers. The CRA is a specialized monitoring institution which only signals an issuer’s 
creditworthiness to the public, and the signal helps investors make investment decisions on 
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their own. From the point of signalling, our model relates to the literature on signalling 
games with imperfect information. 
The most closely related contribution is Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006), who 
study the role of credit rating from a theoretical standpoint. They show that a CRA can 
represent a coordination mechanism for investors. They focus on initial ratings and show 
how they affect the market by introducing institutional investors. Boot et al. also model the 
appeal process for initial ratings and attempt to describe the credit watch procedure. Different 
from their interest, our paper focuses on CRA’s monitoring role. We explicitly model the 
credit watch procedure and study its impact on financial markets. Similarly to the "recovery 
effort" in their model, we assume that issuers can take action as an ex ante hedging strategy. 
This relates our model to the literature on risk management (e.g., Leland (1998)2, Smith and 
Stulz (1985)3).4 However, the preference over hedging strategies is not pursued here. 
As reviewed in Ederington and Yawitz (1987), early empirical studies found mixed 
results when examining the market response to rating changes. However, most recent studies 
find a significant market reaction to bond downgrades (e.g., Dichev and Piotroski (2001), 
Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Goh and Ederington (1993), Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1992), Holthausen and Leftwich (1986), Wansley and Clauretie (1985)). Generally, they do 
not find a significant market response to bond upgrades. Except for Hand et al. (1992) and 
Wansley and Clauretie (1985), these studies examine only equity market reactions. The most 
probable reason is that daily bond price data are not easily accessible. Another reason could 
be that it is difficult to get a purely uncontaminated sample to focus solely on the watchlist. 
Here "uncontaminated" means there are no concurrent disclosures from other sources except 
CRAs. 
Wansley and Clauretie (1985) suggest that the placement of firms on watchlist is 
unexpected to investors; there are significant price adjustments caused by placement on 
watchlist with negative reasons. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) find significantly 
                                                 
2
 Leland mainly examines the joint determination of capital structure and investment risk. In the analysis of risk 
management, he shows that the ex ante hedging strategy performs always better than the ex post strategy and the strategy to 
hedge all the time. He also points out that the current understanding of why firms hedge is incomplete. 
3
 Smith and Stulz point out that although ex post hedging is in stockholders' best interest, less hedging will occur than with 
an ex ante hedging strategy. 
4
 Most of the studies in this field support our selection of an ex ante hedging strategy in the model. 
  
 
4 
negative daily excess bond returns (DEBRs) for either unexpected or uncontaminated 
watchlist for downgrades, significantly negative DEBRs for expected watchlist for upgrades, 
and significantly positive DEBRs for unexpected and uncontaminated watchlist for upgrades. 
For actual rating changes after watchlist, they find significantly negative DEBRs for 
downgrades and significantly positive DEBRs for upgrades. These two results are both 
consistent with our assumption that CRAs have limited ability to correctly put bonds on 
watchlist. If investors believe CRAs have perfect ability to put bonds on watchlist, they 
would only react to the watchlist and assume that the actual rating change will be the same as 
watchlist shows. But Hand et al. (2006) emphasize that investors react to both watchlist and 
the following actual rating changes, which implies that these two are not exactly the same for 
investors. 
Following the aforementioned empirical results, we set up a theoretical model and 
analyze the impact of credit rating watchlist on issuers’ equilibrium strategies and social 
welfare. Issuers face two decisions, namely (i) going through a CRA or borrowing directly, 
and (ii) taking action to prevent future risk or not. We mainly explore CRA’s interaction with 
issuers and its credit rating watchlist. The changes in bond prices predicted by our model 
coincide with those obtained by empirical studies. In the model there exist three Pure 
Strategy Nash Equilibria and CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist is crucial. 
The welfare analysis suggests that introducing a CRA into the financial market does not 
always improve social welfare. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the credit 
rating market and the watchlist process. Section 1.3 describes the model setup. Section 1.4 
analyzes the impact of credit rating watchlist on bond prices. Section 1.5 shows the issuer’s 
subgame equilibrium, equilibrium strategy and outcome, and section 1.6 analyses the effects 
on social welfare. Section 1.7 concludes, points out limitations of the model, and suggests 
paths for future study. 
1.2 Credit Rating Market and Watchlist Process 
Many observers accept the CRA as an important component of financial markets. 
S&P states [S&P (2005)] that 
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"Ratings are based on information supplied to Ratings Services by 
the issuer or its agents and information obtained by Ratings Services from 
other sources it considers reliable."  
S&P writes [S&P (2006)] that 
"Ratings Services must comply with securities laws in many 
jurisdictions that limit or in some cases prohibit the improper use of non-
public information...All Confidential Information that is obtained by 
Ratings Services employees in the course of their employment with rating 
services must be kept confidential."  
The aforementioned statements indicate that some of the information provided by 
issuers to a CRA is private. As issuers do not want to make their private information public, 
they use a CRA as an intermediary to signal their quality to the markets. However, there are 
some ratings that are initiated by CRAs and generally do not involve the participation of an 
issuer’s management. In such instances, private information is less likely to be included in 
the rating process. In the present model, we exclude the latter and assume that ratings are 
solely based on private information. 
Many economists are of the opinion that credit rating itself has little information 
value and is more likely to be a method for information release. However, there are 
documents from S&P and Moody’s supporting the view that there is new information 
revealed by the rating. S&P asserts [S&P (2005)] that 
"Ratings are current opinions regarding future creditworthiness of 
issuers or issues...Ratings are not verifiable statements of fact..." 
Moody’s reports [Cantor and Fons (1999)] that 
"...credit rating is by nature subjective. The role of the rating 
committee is to introduce as much objectivity to the process as possible 
by bringing an understanding of the relevant risk factors and viewpoints 
to each and every analysis. For each rating, Moody’s relies on the 
judgment of a diverse group of credit risk professionals to weigh those 
factors in light of a variety of business scenarios for the issuer and then 
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come to a conclusion on what the rating should be...Moody’s rating is an 
opinion forecast of an issuer’s future relative creditworthiness."  
From all of the above, it can be concluded that credit rating is not only a signal for 
existing facts, but also CRA’s subjective opinion about the issuer’s future creditworthiness. It 
seems reasonable for credit ratings to have information value themselves. 
Analysts from CRAs try to inform the issuer immediately after the rating committee 
determined rating and prior to the publication of the rating. It is possible that the issuer is not 
satisfied with CRA’s rating and starts an appeal process. Moody’s states [Hilderman (1999)] 
that 
"An appeal process may be considered for a first-time rating, if the 
issuer is able to provide new and material information that might lead the 
rating committee to reconsider the rating...This (the appeal process) does 
not frequently occur because the analyst works with the issuer throughout 
the original rating process to make sure that all relevant information is 
brought forth and considered prior to the convening of the rating 
committee."  
This implies that the issuer almost always accepts the first-time rating. For the 
purpose of our model, the appeal process will not be considered, by assuming that the CRA 
has perfect rating ability. This assumption can be justified on the grounds that the CRA can 
get a substantial amount of private information about the issuer and can ask for more if 
needed. 
Moody’s reports [Mahoney (2002)] that between 1970 and 2001, about 7.15% of 
‘Aaa’ ratings, 7.44% of ‘Aa’ ratings, 4.68% of ‘A’ ratings and 4.51% of ‘Baa’ ratings were 
downgraded by one grade to the lower adjacent grade on a one- year-average basis. Thus, the 
original investment rating has been downgraded with average probability less than 10% per 
year over 30 years. However, the probability of downgrades can be much higher when 
considering periods of several years. Thus, it is relevant for investors to take possible future 
downgrades into account when making investment decisions. 
The main focus of our model is the impact of CRA’s watchlist, which is expected to 
improve the quality of ratings and also provides a way to help us understand the market 
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reaction to the informational content of watchlist placement. Boot et al. (2006) show the 
fundamental mechanism of CRA’s role of rating in the market by introducing institutional 
investors. We will not focus on that aspect, but rather on CRA’s monitoring role after the 
initial rating is assigned. According to S&P (2005): 
"...once a rating is assigned Ratings Services shall monitor on an 
ongoing basis and update the rating by: a. regularly reviewing the issuer’s 
creditworthiness; b. initiating a review of the status of the rating upon 
becoming aware of any information that might reasonably be expected to 
result in a Rating Action..." 
Similarly, Moody’s states [Fons (2002)] that 
"If changing circumstances contradict the assumptions or data 
supporting the current rating, we will place the rating under review (on 
the watchlist). The watchlist highlights issuers whose rating is formally 
on review for possible upgrade, downgrade, or direction uncertain ... 
between 66%-76% of all ratings have been changed in the same direction 
(and rarely in the opposite direction) as indicated by their watchlist 
review." 
The fact that historically only 66%-76% of watchlist placements were followed by a 
change in rating in the same direction suggests that CRA has a limited ability to observe the 
changing circumstances contradicting the assumptions supporting the current rating. 
Compared to an initial rating, the issuer may not provide detailed private information to the 
CRA for updating purposes. The CRA may suspect of changing circumstances but can not be 
completely sure. Thus, it is possible for the CRA to put an issuer on watchlist by mistake, or 
to not put an issuer on watchlist when it should. Therefore, in our model, it assumes that the 
CRA has limited ability to correctly put an issuer on watchlist. 
Investors are believed to trust the rating. For example, Moody’s reports [Fons (2002)] 
that 
"Investors follow and react to multiple aspects of the rating system--
e.g., rating outlooks and the watchlist--for indications of potential 
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changes in credit quality...rating agency behavior is believed to influence 
security prices..." 
This is Moody’s interpretation of the commentary from meetings with issuer organizations, 
investors, asset management firms, and the like. It suggests that investors base their 
investment decisions on the rating and adjust them following watchlist placement. 
If an issuer is put on watchlist, it may provide further private information to the CRA. 
This allows the CRA to reach an updated conclusion regarding the issuer’s future 
creditworthiness. Based on the new rating, investors may adjust their investment decisions so 
that the market price may change as well. Thus, our analysis also looks at the price change 
after the publication of the updated rating. 
1.3 Model Setup 
To focus on the essential issues regarding CRAs, we assume perfectly competitive 
financial markets, risk neutrality, and a zero risk-free interest rate. There are two types of 
projects in the market, either safe or risky. A safe project has default rate 0 and a risky 
project has default rate 1-γ, 0< γ<1. Both projects have gross rate of return pR  (>1) when not 
in default, and zero otherwise. An issuer raises funds directly from the bond market and 
invests them in the project. Each bond pays investors one dollar at maturity if it is not in 
default, and zero otherwise. 
At the beginning (i.e., t=0), bond issuers can be either initially good (G) with 
probability β or initially bad (B) with probability (1-β). The distribution is common 
knowledge to every player including the issuer, who does not know its initial type5. Initially 
good issuers end up investing in the safe (risky) projects with probability (1-α) (α), whereas 
initially bad issuers invest in the risky projects with probability 1. Later on (i.e., t=2), a 
negative6 shock might happen randomly with probability α to initially good issuers. If a 
                                                 
5
 It may be argued that issuers usually have private information about themselves and they should know their initial types. 
The reason that we employ the assumption that issuers do not know their initial types is laid out in Appendix A. 
6
 We do not model positive shocks because previous empirical work does not support significant market reaction to 
watchlist for possible upgrade. According to Goh and Ederington (1998), possible reasons for this stylized fact are that 
either companies voluntarily release favorable information but are reluctant to release unfavorable information, or that 
CRAs spend more resources in detecting deteriorations in credit quality than improvement. 
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shock happens, the initially good issuer invests in the risky project with probability 17. 
Otherwise, the initially good issuer invests in the safe project for sure. We assume that α is 
common knowledge to all game participants but the shock is private information to the 
issuer. Therefore, the probabilities of issuers investing in safe and risky projects are β(1-α) 
and [(1-β)+βα], respectively. 
Assumption 1: α<1/2. 
The assumption means that the negative shock is not very likely. The reason for 
restricting α<1/2 is that we do not want shocks to dominate the impact of watchlist, and the 
players’ beliefs and actions will not be normal if shocks happen frequently. It is 
straightforward to extend the model to allow for 1/2<α<1. 
If there were no CRA in the market, investors would make investment decisions 
based on market average quality (see figure 1.1). In contrast, in the presence of CRAs with 
both rating and monitoring roles, the timeline8 when issuers choose to go through the CRA is 
extended as shown in figure 1.2. The events at times 1 and 3 correspond to CRA’s rating 
role, whereas events at time 2 relates to CRA’s monitoring role. If issuers do not go through 
the CRA, investors will make investment decisions based on public information (or market 
average quality), which is the same as the game with no CRAs in the market. 
We assume there is only one CRA, as a simplification of many identical CRAs. If an 
issuer chooses to go through a CRA (at t=1), the CRA will charge it a flat-rate service fee Cr, 
which makes the CRA break even. The rating contract requires an issuer to provide enough 
confidential information (at t=1) for the initial rating and also some confidential information 
on a frequent basis for monitoring purposes. The CRA uses the same effort to rate each 
project and gives rating results mainly based on the private information provided by the 
issuers. Ratings can be either high quality (h)9 or low quality (l).10 Once the CRA determines 
the rating, it commits to publicly report it. We assume that the CRA has perfect rating ability, 
                                                 
7
 As there is only a one-time shock by assumption, a project's type will not change afterwards. Thus, it is permanent after the 
shock. 
8
 As a simplification, we assume that issuers are always more sensitive to the rating grades than investors, such that issuers 
always react to the rating grades faster/earlier than investors. 
9
 In the real world, ratings on corporate bonds can vary from a highest quality of Aaa to a lowest quality of C. For example, 
Moody's uses Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, Ca, and C, and there are two modifiers, `+' and `-', in each rating grade. Here we 
restrict ratings to only two categories, `h' and `l', to make the model tractable. 
10
 The same rating grade at different times may have different interpretations. It will be addressed in detail below. 
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so that it can correctly rate an initially good (or bad) issuer as ‘h’ (or ‘l’). Thus, after the 
initial rating, an issuer will know its initial type. As the initial rating is based on current 
available information that the CRA gets (at t=1), the initial rating is a short-term rating (for 
t=1 only). Because there may be negative shocks for initially good issuers, an initial rating 
‘h’ (at t=1) is a signal indicating that the issuer is likely to invest in the safe project, while an 
initial rating ‘l’ (at t=1) is a signal indicating that the issuer invests in the risky project for 
sure. 
 
Figure 1.1. The Timeline of the Game in the Absence of CRA 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The Timeline of the Game when Issuers Go Through the CRA 
  
 
11 
Immediately after an issuer knows its initial rating and before a shock happens, an 
initially good issuer may take action to reduce the probability of the future negative shock. 
The action has private cost Ca and the action’s probability of success is θ. If an issuer’s action 
is successful, it will receive no shock for sure; otherwise, the shock will happen with 
probability α as usual. During the CRA’s monitoring role, we assume that an issuer’s action 
is observable to the CRA and so is the result of the action. 
After the negative shock happens (at t=2), if the CRA finds that changing 
circumstances contradict the assumptions or data supporting the current bond rating, it will 
place that bond on watchlist with rating ‘w’. As a result of our assumption, the rating ‘w’ is a 
signal indicating that the bond is on review for possible downgrade. We assume that the CRA 
has limited ability to correctly put an issuer on watchlist such that with probability (1-η) (or 
η) the CRA will put a non-shocked (or shocked) issuer on watchlist. However, if an issuer’s 
action succeeds the CRA will not put it on watchlist because the CRA can observe the action 
result. Then, the issuer of the bond on watchlist will choose to provide more private 
information or not. As the CRA has perfect rating ability, an issuer who has no shock but is 
put on watchlist will provide more information; otherwise, it will not. 
Assumption 2: 1≥η>1/2.  
 Assumption 2 means that most of the time the CRA makes correct decisions when 
putting issuers on watchlist. It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for 1/2≥η≥0. 
Finally (at t=3), the CRA will report the rerating result for each bond on watchlist, 
either downgrading to rating ‘l’ or reaffirming its initial rating ‘h’. Because of CRA’s perfect 
rating ability, a rerating of ‘h’ (or ‘l’) is a signal indicating that the issuer invests in the safe 
(or risky) project for sure. 
1.4 Impact of Credit Rating Watchlist on Bond Prices 
The impact of credit rating watchlist on bond prices can be shown by comparing bond 
prices at t=1, t=2 and t=3. The price change from t=1 (initial rating) to t=2 (being put on 
watchlist) shows the market reaction to watchlist placement. The price change from t=2 
(watchlist) to t=3 (rerating) shows the market reaction to the actual rating change after being 
put on watchlist. 
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The repayment from a safe project is Fs=1, and from a risky project is Fr=γ, where 1-γ 
is the default rate and 1>γ>0. It is obvious that hP3 =1 and lP3 =γ. 
As we assume the CRA has perfect rating ability, issuers who receive initial ratings 
‘h’ at t=1 are good types at that time. We call them initially good issuers. Similarly, we name 
issuers who receive initial rating ‘l’ as initially bad issuers. As shocks only happen to good 
type issuers, only initially good issuers have an incentive to hedge the risk. Therefore, issuers 
initially rated ‘l’ will not take action, and only issuers initially rated ‘h’ will decide to take 
action or not. 
There are two cases that we will not consider to conform with the existing empirical 
evidence. One case is when issuers choose not to be rated by the CRA so that good issuers 
are mixed up with bad issuers sharing the same price. Thus, the bond price at date t=1 is 
1P  = β(1-α)Fs+[1-β(1-α)]Fr = β(1-α)+γ(1-β)+γβα, 
where the proportion of issuers investing in the safe projects is β(1-α), and the proportion of 
issuers investing in the risky projects is [1-β(1-α)]. As there is no CRA and investors decide 
repayment based on expected average market quality, there is no price change after t=1. The 
other case occurs when an issuer chooses the CRA and it is initially bad. As there is no shock 
for initially bad issuers, lP1 =γ and there is no price change afterwards. Thus, the only case 
we discuss below is when issuers choose the CRA and they are initially good. 
1.4.1 Bond Prices 
1.4.1.1 Issuers Go Through the CRA and Take Action 
There are three types of issuers receiving rating h at t=2, namely, (a) initially good 
issuers with successful action, (b) initially good issuers with unsuccessful action and no 
shock for which the CRA makes correct decision of not putting them on watchlist, and (c) 
initially good issuers with unsuccessful action and shock happening for which the CRA 
makes incorrect decision of not putting them on watchlist. Thus, the price for rating h at t=2 
is  
a
hP2  = {[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ]/[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)]} Fs  
 +{[(1-θ)α(1-η)]/[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)]} Fr 
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       =(η-αη-ηθ+ηθα+θ+αγ-αγη-αγθ+αγηθ)/(η-2αη-ηθ+2ηθα+θ+α-θα),  
where the superscript ‘a’ means initially good issuers who take action. 
There are two types of issuers placed in watchlist at t=2, namely, (a) initially good 
issuers with unsuccessful action and no shock for which the CRA makes incorrect decision of 
putting them on watchlist, and (b) initially good issuers with unsuccessful action and shock 
happening for which the CRA makes correct decision of putting them on watchlist. Thus, the 
price for bonds in watchlist at t=2 is 
a
wP2 = {[(1-α)(1-η)]/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]} Fs +{(αη)/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]} Fr 
      = (1-η-α+αη+αγη)/(1-η-α+2αη). 
An issuer with rating h at t=1 may have future price ahP2 , 
a
hP3  or
a
lP3 . Thus, ahP1  is the 
weighted average of those three prices, where 
a
hP1 = [(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)] ahP2 +(1-θ)(1-α)(1-η) ahP3 +(1-θ)αη alP3  
      = αγ-αγθ+1-α+θα. 
By comparing prices ahP3 , 
a
hP2 , 
a
hP1 , 
a
wP2 and lP3 , it is straightforward to obtain the 
following Lemma. 
Lemma 1. When issuers go through the CRA and those who receive rating ‘h’ take action, 
bond prices are characterized by the following ordering: ahP3 > ahP2 > ahP1 > awP2 > alP3 . 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
1.4.1.2 Issuers Go Through the CRA and Take No Action 
There are two types of issuers receiving rating h at t=2, namely, (a) initially good 
issuers with no shock for which the CRA makes correct decision of not putting them on 
watchlist, and (b) initially good issuers with a shock happening for which the CRA makes 
incorrect decision of not putting them on watchlist. Thus, the price nahP2  is given by 
na
hP2  = {[(1-α)η]/[(1-α)η+α(1-η)]} Fs +{[α(1-η)]/[(1-α)η+α(1-η)]} Fr 
        = (-η+αη-αγ+αγη)/(-η+2αη-α). 
where the superscript ‘na’ means initially good issuers who take no action. 
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There are two types of issuers placed on watchlist at t=2, namely, (a) initially good 
issuers with no shock for which the CRA makes incorrect decision of putting them on 
watchlist, and (b) initially good issuers with a shock happening for which the CRA makes 
correct decision of putting them on watchlist. Thus, the price na
wP2  is 
na
wP2  = {[(1-α)(1-η)]/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]}Fs +{(αη)/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]} Fr 
        = (1-η-α+αη+αγη)/(1-η-α+2αη).
 
 
As an issuer with rating h at t=1 may have price nahP2  at t=2 or
na
hP3 and 
na
lP3  at t=3, the 
price at t=1 ( nahP1 ) is given by the weighted average of those three future prices, where 
na
hP1 =α[η nalP3 +(1-η)
 
na
hP2 ]+(1-α)[η nahP2 +(1-η) nahP3 ]=αγ-α+1. 
The following Lemma can be obtained by comparing prices nahP3 , hP2 , nahP1 , nawP2  and 
na
lP3 。 
Lemma 2. When issuers go through the CRA and nobody takes action, bond prices are 
characterized by the following ordering: nahP3 > nahP2 > nahP1 > nawP2 > nalP3 . 
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
1.4.2 Comparison with Empirical Results 
By comparing Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can easily obtain the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 3. Under both strategies, prices satisfy the ordering hP3 > hP2 > hP1 > wP2 > lP3 , in 
which 
wP2 < hP1  shows the price drop after putting on watchlist for potential downgrade, and 
lP3 < wP2  shows the price drop after the actual downgrade. 
Proof. See Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. 
No matter which strategy issuers choose, those two price changes are consistent with 
the empirical results from Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich(1992) and Wansley and 
Clauretie(1985). One of the reasons may be that the setup of our model matches one of their 
important sample specifications that all of the actions of watchlist are unexpected (e.g., the 
weight of Fr in 
wP2  is ( αη/((1-α)(1-η)+αη) ), which is substantially different from zero). 
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The consistency of the present price changes with empirical results shows that the 
proposed model replicates the empirical literature findings about watchlist for negative 
reasons and actual downgrades. 
1.5 Equilibrium Results 
We use backward induction to solve this model. First, we solve for subgame pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium at the decision node for initially good issuers to decide whether to 
take action or not. Then, based on the subgame pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we solve for 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium at the decision node for issuers to decide to go through the 
CRA or not. 
1.5.1 Subgame Equilibrium 
The players of this subgame are those issuers who receive initial rating ‘h’ and the 
decision is whether to take action or not. As a simplification, we assume that only the final 
price of a bond will impact an issuer’s payoff from a project. It is the same as setting a 
weight 1 to the final price of a bond and 0 to other prices. Thus, it is easy to extend the 
current assumption to other types of weighted average over all bond prices. 
1.5.1.1 Subgame Equilibrium Utilities 
When issuers take no action, there are four possibilities: shock and on watchlist (with 
probability αη), shock and not on watchlist (with probability α(1-η)), no shock and on 
watchlist (with probability (1-α)(1-η)), and no shock and not on watchlist (with probability 
(1-α)η). Therefore, the subgame utility of this strategy is 
Una = (1-α){ pR [η nahP2 +(1-η) nahP3 ]-1}+αγ{ pR [η nalP3 +(1-η) nahP2 ]-1}- Cr, 
where nahP2 =(-η+αη-αγ+αγη)/(-η+2αη-α), nahP3 =1 and nalP3 =γ. 
When issuers take action, there is one more possibility compared to the strategy of 
‘no action’, which is successful action and then neither shock nor watchlist. Therefore, the 
subgame utility of this strategy is 
Ua = θ( pR ahP2 -1)+(1-θ)(1-α){ pR [η ahP2 +(1-η) ahP3 ]-1} 
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        +(1-θ)αγ{ pR  [η alP3 +(1-η) ahP2 ]-1}- Ca - Cr, 
where ahP2  = (η-αη-ηθ+ηθα+θ+αγ-αγη-αγθ+αγηθ)/(η-2αη-ηθ+2ηθα+θ+α-θα), ahP3 =1 and 
a
lP3 =γ. 
1.5.1.2 Subgame Equilibrium Condition 
Clearly, initially good issuers will take action when the utility from doing so (Ua) is 
greater than the utility from no action (Una). Otherwise, they will take no action. 
Proposition 4. In the subgame equilibrium, there exists a threshold aθ  for the probability 
that the action is successful, such that 
1. If θ> aθ  (effective action), issuers who receive initial rating ‘h’ will take action. 
2. If θ< aθ  (ineffective action), nobody will take action. 
Proof. See Appendix A.3. Note that we need aC  < Ca < aC to get aθ ∈ [0, 1].  
The intuition is straightforward. When initially good issuers decide whether to take 
action, they have to compare the gain and the loss. The gain is the reduction in the 
probability of a shock happening and then having lP3 . That is, the larger probability of the 
action to succeed, the smaller the risk from shocks and the higher the bond price. The loss is 
given by the private cost Ca, which is too high to afford when there is no credit rating 
watchlist by assumption. Therefore, there is a threshold value for θ, at which issuers will be 
indifferent between taking action or not. When θ is higher than the threshold value, the gain 
exceeds the loss so that initially good issuers will take action. Otherwise, taking action is not 
worthwhile. 
As the threshold aθ  is a function of η, it is useful to explore their relation. 
Lemma 5. The threshold value aθ  for the probability that the action is successful, which 
makes initially good issuers indifferent to take action or not, is decreasing in CRA’s ability to 
correctly put issuers on watchlist (i.e., ∂ aθ /∂η<0). 
Proof. See Appendix A.3.  
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This Lemma states that the greater the ability of the CRA to correctly put issuers on 
watchlist, the smaller the threshold value aθ  needs to make initially good issuers take action. 
Intuitively, when the CRA can find larger proportion of shocks happening, there will be more 
risk for an issuer when a shock happens. Then initially good issuers have more incentive to 
escape from the shock and the watchlist. The only way to be shock-free is to take action. As 
they are more eager to reduce the risk from potential shocks, they care less about the 
probability of action to be successful. 
Another effect of greater CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist is that it 
will give initially good issuers higher bond price if they are not put on watchlist. As the CRA 
is less likely to make mistakes of leaving shocks unnoticed (e.g., 1-η is smaller), there will be 
fewer bad issuers with risky projects sharing rating h at t=2 with good issuers. This higher 
bond price will increase issuers’ utilities so that it will make no action more attractive. This 
will let issuers care more about the probability of successful action. 
From the above Lemmas, we can conclude that the second effect is dominated by the 
first one. The intuition is that we have assumptions α<1/2 and η>1/2. Thus, the price for an 
issuer with rating h at t=2 (e.g., hP2 ) is closer to 1 than to γ. The expected loss of price 
decreasing from hP2  to γ if shock happens is much more important than the expected gain of 
price increasing from hP2  to 1. Then, the most important things issuers worry about are 
possible shocks and watchlist, so that the effect of higher hP2  is dominated. 
Lemma 5 tells us that if the CRA can improve its ability to correctly put issuers on 
watchlist, it will be easier to induce initially good issuers to take action. Thus, CRA’s 
monitoring ability plays an important role. 
1.5.2 Equilibrium 
The utility formula of an issuer investing in a safe project is GU =( pR P-1)-C, whereas 
it of an issuer investing in a risky project is BU =γ( pR P-1)-C, where P is the corresponding 
bond price and C is the cost depending on issuer’s selection of the CRA and the decision of 
taking action or not. There are four possibilities for an issuer, namely (a) hit by shock and put 
on watchlist, (b) no shock but put on watchlist, (c) hit by shock but not put on watchlist, (d) 
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no shock and not put on watchlist. With the probabilities and bond prices for those four 
cases, the issuer’s expected utility can be calculated. 
To solve the model, we make the following assumptions. If issuers do not go through 
the CRA, they will not take action as the cost of taking action is very high (i.e., Ca > aC , 
proof see Appendix A.2).11 If issuers go through the CRA and the CRA has perfect (or no) 
ability to put issuers on watchlist, initially good issuers will always (or never) take action. If 
issuers go through the CRA and the action is always successful (or unsuccessful), initially 
good issuers will always (or never) take action. 
1.5.2.1 Equilibrium Utilities 
1.5.2.1.1 Issuers Go Through the CRA 
The utility for initially bad issuers is the same, regardless of whether initially good 
issuers take action or not: 
BU =γ( pR γ-1)- Cr, 
where the superscript ‘B’ means ‘for initially bad issuers’. The bond price is γ, as the bond 
pays $1 with probability γ and $0 with probability (1-γ). 
If issuers take no action, the    utility for initially good issuers who take no action is 
G
naU = naU  - Cr, 
where the subscript ‘na’ means ‘no action’ and its superscript ‘G’ means ‘for initially good 
issuers’, Una has the same functional form as in Subgame Equilibrium. Thus, the issuer’s 
expected utility is 
 E( naU )=β GnaU +(1-β) BU . 
If issuers take action, the utility for initially good issuers who take action is 
G
aU = aU  - Cr, 
                                                 
11 As we focus on CRA's monitoring role, our model wants to show that watchlist can attract issuers to take action. If 
issuers take action even when there is no rating, watchlist is not particularly interesting. Therefore, in the present paper we 
assume Ca > aC is always true. It is straightforward to extend the model from assumption Ca > aC  to Ca≥0. 
  
 
19 
where the subscript ‘a’ means ‘taking action’, aU has the same functional form as in 
Subgame Equilibrium. Thus, the issuer’s expected utility is 
E( aU )=β GaU +(1-β) BU . 
1.5.2.1.2 Issuers Do Not Go Through the CRA 
Under our assumption that an initially good issuer will not take action if it does not go 
through the CRA, its expected utility is 
E( nrU )=[1-β(1-α)]γ( pR naP1 -1)+β(1-α)( pR naP1 -1), 
where the subscript ‘nr’ means ‘no rating’, and naP1 =β(1-α)+γ(1-β)+γβα. 
1.5.2.2 Equilibrium Condition 
Comparing expected utilities, E( naU ), E( aU ) and E( nrU ), we can get conditions for 
equilibrium strategies as reported in the following proposition. 
Proposition 6. There exist three Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria and two thresholds aη  and 
naη  for CRA’s probability of correctly putting issuers on watchlist, (and combine the result 
from proposition 4) such that 
1. If η> aη  and θ> aθ , issuers will go through the CRA and issuers who receive initial 
rating ‘h’ will take action. 
2. If η< naη  and θ< aθ , issuers will go through the CRA and nobody will take action. 
3. Otherwise, issuers will not go through the CRA. 
Proof. See Appendix A.4. Note that we need constraint arC < Cr < arC  to get aη ∈ [0,1] and 
na
rC < Cr < 
na
rC to get naη ∈ [0,1]. 
According to proposition 6, the CRA plays an important role for issuers to decide 
their strategies. There are two primary factors for issuers to consider, η and θ. Clearly, η is 
directly related to the CRA’s monitoring ability and θ is indirectly related to the CRA as its 
threshold value aθ  is decreasing in η. If we use β to define the equilibrium, we will get 
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results similar to Diamond (1991)12. However, the present paper focuses on the interaction 
between issuers and the CRA, especially credit rating watchlist. We choose η to define the 
equilibrium, instead of β. 
Intuitively, in the first equilibrium CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist 
is good (η> aη ) and the action is likely to succeed (θ> aθ ). Therefore issuers trust the CRA to 
signal their types and are willing to take action to reduce the risk from possible shocks if they 
are initially good. As aθ  is decreasing in η, the larger η is, the smaller aθ  is, which augments 
the region for issuers to choose this strategy. 
The first equilibrium strategy also includes the condition that the cost of rating should 
be neither too high nor too low. It is straightforward to understand that cost of rating should 
not exceed the benefit to issuers from going through the CRA to signal their types. However, 
the lower bound of cost of rating shows that the rating should not be free and has to cost 
something to keep some potential quality or standard. This attracts us to explore the 
relationship between arC and β. 
Lemma 7. The lower bound of the cost of rating arC  in strategy condition for issuers going 
through the CRA and taking action is increasing in the probability of issuers to be initially 
good (i.e., ∂ arC /∂β>0). 
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
Lemma 7 indicates that the larger proportion of initially good issuers in the market, 
the more issuers can gain from the strategy of going through the CRA and taking action. The 
gain comes from two effects. One effect is that issuers can signal their initial qualities to the 
market. The second effect is that initially good issuers can take action to help prevent 
themselves from possible shocks. When the probability of issuers to be initially good is 
small, the effect of the initial rating dominates the effect of taking action. When the 
probability of issuers to be initially good is large, the effect of the initial rating is dominated 
by the effect of taking action. Thus, arC  is always increasing with β. 
                                                 
12
 When market quality is median, issuers will go through the CRA and issue bonds under monitoring. In contrast, when 
market quality is high or low, issuers will not go through the CRA but borrow directly without monitoring. 
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For a given value of arC , define β( arC ) such that issuers will go through the CRA and 
take action if β>β( arC ). Because, when the average market quality is sufficiently bad, the 
lower bound on the cost of rating (i.e., arC ) prevents issuers from choosing the CRA. Then, 
a
rC  requires a market quality for the case when issuers go through the CRA. In other words, 
when the average market quality is bad enough, issuers would rather take pooled prices than 
signal their qualities. 
According to the second equilibrium strategy stated in Proposition 6, issuers still trust 
the CRA to signal their types but they are no longer willing to take action. The conditions are 
that CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist is poor (η< naη ), and the action is 
unlikely to succeed (θ< aθ ). Intuitively, as the CRA has low ability to correctly put issuers on 
watchlist, issuers have little risk of being put on watchlist. Then, it is worthy to go through 
the CRA and signal their initial types to the market. However, the action is unlikely to 
succeed now and the private cost of taking action is relatively high. Thus, it is a waste of 
money to take action. As aθ  is decreasing in η, a larger η will result a smaller region for 
issuers to choose the second equilibrium strategy. 
The third equilibrium strategy states that, if either CRA’s ability to correctly put 
issuers on watchlist is bad (η< aη ) and the action is likely to succeed (θ> aθ ), or CRA’s 
ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist is good (η> naη ) but the action is unlikely to 
succeed (θ< aθ ), issuers would rather mix up with others and ignore their own types. There 
are two effects stemming from a greater CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist. 
One effect is that an issuer will have less risk if no shock happens and higher price if not on 
watchlist. As the CRA can observe potential shocks with more precision, it is less likely for a 
no-shock-hit issuer to be put on watchlist. As there will be a larger proportion of good issuers 
sharing price hP2 , investors anticipate that and are willing to pay more for the bond with 
rating h at t=2. Thus, the price hP2  will be larger and closer to 1. The second effect is that an 
issuer will have more risk if a shock happens and lower price if put on watchlist. As the CRA 
can observe potential shocks with more precision, it is more likely for a shock-hit issuer to be 
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put on watchlist. Then the price 
wP2  will be lower and closer to γ, as there will be a larger 
proportion of bad issuers sharing price
wP2 . When the action is likely to succeed, the first 
effect dominates the second one, such that the worse the monitoring ability, the greater the 
probability for issuers to not go through the CRA. When the action is unlikely to succeed, the 
first effect is dominated by the second one, such that the better the monitoring ability, the 
more probable for issuers to not go through the CRA. As aθ  is decreasing in η, the higher η 
is, the smaller is aθ , which makes larger region of the first condition and smaller region of the 
second one. Whether the whole region for issuers not going through the CRA changes or not 
depends on the relative sizes of aη  and naη . 
1.5.3 Value of Thresholds 
One interesting question derived from the third equilibrium in Proposition 6 is 
whether threshold aη  is larger than naη  or not. It is mathematically difficult to compare them 
directly, but different parameter values can be used to compare them numerically. 
Conjecture 8. When action is more likely to succeed and issuers take action, issuers will 
demand more for CRA’s ability to correctly put shock-hit issuers on watchlist, that is 
aη > naη . 
This conjecture is consistent with our equilibrium analysis that when issuers’ actions 
have more chance to succeed, they care more about CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on 
watchlist. The intuition is that if issuers are attracted to take the costly action, they expect the 
CRA to be able to observe shocks more accurately. If the CRA can reduce the probability of 
not putting shock-hit issuers on watchlist, the price with rating ‘h’ after the shock will be 
higher and closer to 1. Only this can give issuers enough incentive/benefit to take action, 
besides the action being likely to succeed. Thus, the threshold value of η to make issuers 
indifferent to take action or not is larger when the probability for action to be successful is 
larger. 
  
 
23 
We set θ= aθ , γ=0.67, β=0.5
13
, pR =2, η=0.7 and let α take values of 0.05, 0.1, 0.2 and 
0.3. For Cr and Ca, we use 75% quantile of the constraint in calculation. The results are 
shown in table 1.1. 
From three sets of trial values, we can get an approximate idea of how large the 
parameters would be. Take α=0.1, γ=0.67, β=0.5, pR =2 as an example, the threshold value θ 
for action to be successful is 50%, the value for aη  and naη  is 0.757 and 0.341, respectively. 
We need the cost of rating to be between 0.054 and 0.081. The cost of action needs to be 
positive and smaller than 0.579. Thus, under these values, if η>0.757 and θ>0.5, issuers will 
go through the CRA and initially good issuers will take action. If η<0.341 and θ<0.5, issuers 
will go through the CRA and nobody will take action. Otherwise, issuers will not go through 
the CRA. 
Table 1.1 Trial Values for Parameters 
 
 
 
 
 
Moody’s states [Fons (2002)] that "Between 66%-76% of all ratings have been 
changed in the same direction (and rarely in the opposite direction) as indicated by their 
watchlist review." Compared to the historical range of η, the trial value 75.7% when α=0.1 
is a higher standard for the CRA in reality. Maybe one of the reasons is that the values of 
other deep parameters we choose are not realistic enough. It could be that shock happens 
more than 10% of the time. 
                                                 
13
 The value for β is selected based on the initial issuer ratings collected from Fitch Ratings, Inc. during 1/1/2004 and 
6/20/2007 in table 2 in Appendix A. There are 5,515 initial issuer ratings in the sample, 77.4% of which are investment 
grades and 22.6% of which are speculative grades. Since there are more initially good issuers, we assume β=0.5 as a fair 
game. 
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All of the above shows that CRA’s monitoring ability is important. If the CRA can 
provide more precise ratings, there will be larger region for the favorable case that issuers go 
through the CRA and take action to reduce risk from possible shocks. 
1.6 Social Welfare Analysis 
The social welfare analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we compare the social 
welfare of two setups, CRA without the monitoring role and CRA with the monitoring role. 
Second, we compare the social welfare according to issuer’s strategy in the setup that CRA 
has the monitoring role. We call them ‘Inter-setup’ and ‘Intra-setup’ analyses, respectively. 
As we assume investors and the CRA break even, social welfare is solely about issuers. 
1.6.1 Inter-setup Analysis 
Comparing the social welfare of those two setups, we can obtain the result stated in 
Proposition 9. 
Proposition 9. As long as the CRA can monitor issuers’ creditworthiness after initial ratings, 
when issuers choose to go through the CRA and take no action the social welfare will be 
increased compared to the CRA without the monitoring role. 
Proof. See Appendix A.5. 
This proposition establishes that when issuers choose to go through the CRA and take 
no action, no matter how good/bad the CRA is at monitoring, social welfare will be increased 
as long as the CRA has a monitoring role. This indicates that the benefit of CRA’s 
monitoring role is greater than its cost. The benefit is that the signals of watchlist and the 
rating changes afterwards give investors more information about the issuer’s future 
creditworthiness. Based on more information, investors are able to price bonds more 
precisely so as to invest more in safe projects and less in risky projects. This will increase the 
social welfare by having a larger proportion of safe investment in the market. However, the 
cost of monitoring is negligible compared to initial rating. As the CRA regularly monitors the 
general market situation and the individual industry development, there is no significant 
additional cost associated with monitoring bonds. The benefit dominates the cost, so that 
CRA’s monitoring role can improve social welfare when issuers choose to go through the 
CRA and take no action. This shows that even if CRA’s monitoring cannot attract issuers to 
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take action, it can still improve the social welfare by providing more information to the 
market. However, this case may not be efficient and is discussed below. 
1.6.2 Intra-setup Analysis 
According to section 1.5, we know that issuers have three types of equilibrium 
strategies when the CRA has a monitoring role. If issuers choose the strategy corresponding 
to the equilibrium condition, social welfare will be maximized. However, not all of the 
equilibria are efficient. The equilibrium when issuers go through the CRA and take action is 
an "Efficient Equilibrium". As issuers are willing to not only signal their initial types and 
accept CRA’s monitoring but also take action to prevent future risk, CRA’s rating role and 
monitoring role are both effective. The equilibrium when issuers go through the CRA and 
take no action is a "Semi-Efficient Equilibrium", as CRA’s rating role is effective but its 
monitoring role is not attractive for issuers to take action. The equilibrium when issuers do 
not go through the CRA is an "Inefficient Equilibrium", as none of CRA’s roles is effective. 
Obviously, going through the CRA is not always the optimal choice for issuers. When 
CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist is relatively low and the action is likely to 
succeed, or CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist is good and the action is 
unlikely to succeed, issuers should choose direct borrowing instead of going through the 
CRA. Some policies that always force issuers to have ratings before issuing may reduce 
social welfare. For example, institutional investors can only invest in bonds with investment 
grades. Thus, the rating service from the CRA does not necessarily improve social welfare. 
However, if the CRA can improve its monitoring ability, the threshold aθ  will be 
smaller. There will be a larger range for the "Efficient Equilibrium" and a smaller range for 
the "Semi-Efficient Equilibrium". Thus, we will have greater probability of having a 
favorable equilibrium. 
 1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter primarily sets up a theoretical model to describe CRAs’ rating and 
monitoring roles. As a CRA is a specialized monitoring institution, bonds can also be 
monitored by a CRA, which is different from bonds’ characteristics in the literature. In the 
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proposed model, issuers have to choose between going through the CRA (issuing bond with 
monitoring) and direct borrowing without monitoring, and they need to decide whether to 
take action to prevent future risk or not. Bond price changes due to watchlist implied by the 
model are consistent with previous empirical studies. There exist three Pure Strategy Nash 
Equilibria. The results show that CRA’s ability to correctly put issuers on watchlist is crucial. 
If the CRA can monitor creditworthiness changes more effectively so as to offer ratings with 
less noise, there will be more issuers willing to choose credit rating service and take action. 
From a social welfare standpoint, we find that even when CRA’s watchlist cannot attract 
issuers to take action, CRA’s monitoring role can still improve social welfare by sending 
more information to the market. However, when issuers are attracted to take action, having 
the CRA in the market may not improve welfare, unless it can observe creditworthiness 
changes well enough. Thus, it is vital for the CRA to improve its ability to monitor issuers’ 
carrying on after initial ratings, especially the ability to observe creditworthiness changes. 
Some limitations of our model are that we only consider an uncontaminated 
environment and issuer-requested bond ratings. Also, our focus is on watchlist for negative 
reasons, actual downgrades afterwards and reconfirmation of initial ratings afterwards. Some 
potential fruitful extensions of the present model are the following. 1) People can introduce 
positive shocks to the model, such that there will be watchlists for positive reasons and actual 
rating upgrades as well. 2) If people assume that good issuers can access not only safe 
projects but also risky ones, there will be additional moral hazard problem to consider. 3) If 
the CRA is assumed to have imperfect rating ability, the equilibrium strategies will be more 
complicated. Another interesting topic for future research is the comparison of the efficiency 
of firms’ choices between issuing bonds through a CRA with a monitoring role and 
borrowing through financial intermediation with delegated monitoring. 
1.8 References 
Analytics Policy Board (2006), "Confidential Information Policy", Standard & 
Poor’s document. 
Berlin, Mitchell and Jan Loeys (1988), "Bond Covenants and Delegated Monitoring", 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 43, No. 2. (Jun., 1988), pp. 397-412. 
  
 
27 
Boot, Arnoud W. A., Todd T. Milbourn, and Anjolein Schmeits (2006), "Credit 
Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms", The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1., pp 
81-118. 
Cantor, Richard, and Jerome S. Fons (1999), "Rating Methodology-The Evolving 
Meaning of Moody’s Bond Ratings", Moody’s Investors Services. 
Diamond, Douglas W. (1984), "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring", 
The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, No. 3. (Jul., 1984), pp. 393-414. 
Diamond, Douglas W. (1991), "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between 
Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt", The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 4. 
(Aug., 1991), pp. 689-721. 
Dichev, Ilia D. and Joseph D. Pistroski (2001), "The Long-Run Stock Returns 
Following Bond Ratings Changes", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 56, No. 1., pp 173-203. 
Ederington, Louis H. and Jeremy C. Goh (1998), "Bond Rating Agencies and Stock 
Analysts: Who Knows What When?", The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
Vol. 33, No. 4., pp 569-585. 
Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Eloic Peyrache, and Lucia Quesada (2005), "The 
Ownership of Ratings", Working Paper. 
Fons, Jerome S. (2002), "Rating Policy-Understanding Moody’s Corporate Bond 
Ratings and Rating Process", Moody’s Investors Services. 
Glascock, John L., Wallace N. Davidson, and Glenn V. Henderson, Jr. (1987), 
"Announcement Effects of Moody’s Bond Rating Changes on Equity Returns", Quarterly 
Journal of Business and Economics, Vol. 26, pp 67-78. 
Goh, Jeremy C. and Louis H. Ederington (1993), "Is a Bond Rating Downgrade Bad 
News, Good News, or No News for Stockholders?", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 5., 
pp 2001-2008. 
Griffin Paul A. and Antonio Z. Sanvicente (1982), "Common Stock Returns and 
Rating Changes: A Methodological Comparison", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 37, No. 1., 
pp 103-119. 
  
 
28 
Hand, John R. M., Robert W. Hlothausen, and Richard W. Leftwich (1992), "The 
Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices", The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 47, No. 2., pp 733-752. 
Hilderman, Mara (1999), "Rating Methodology-Opening the Black Box: The Rating 
Committee Process at Moody’s", Moody’s Investors Services. 
Holthausen, Robert W. and Richard W. Leftwich (1986), "The Effect of Bond Rating 
Changes on Common Stock Prices", The Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp 
57-89. 
Larrymore, Norris L., Pu Liu, and James N. Rimbey, "Asymmetric Information and 
Bond Rating Downgrade Announcements", Working Paper. 
Leland, Hayne E. (1998), "Agency Cost, Risk Management and Capital Structure", 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp 1213-1243. 
Mahoney, Christopher (2002), "Special Comment-The Bond Rating Process in a 
Changing Environment", Moody’s Investors Services. 
Mahoney, Christopher (2002), "Rating Methodology-the Bond Rating Process: A 
Progree Reprot", Moody’s Investors Services. 
Smith, Clifford, and Rene Stulz (1985), "The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging 
Policies", The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 28, pp 391-405. 
Standard & Poor (2005), "Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services to Expand Notification 
on Certain Ratings-18 March 2005". 
Standard & Poor (2005), "Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services-Code of Conduct: 
October 2005". 
Standard & Poor (2005), "Standard & Poor’s Analytic Firewall Policy: November 
2005". 
Wansley, James W., and Terrence M. Clauretie (1985), "The Impat of Creditwatch 
Placement on Equity Returns and Bond Prices", The Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 8, 
No. 1., pp 31-42. 
  
 
29 
CHAPTER 2. MARKET RACTIONS TO MOODY’S RATING 
ANNOUNCEMENTS: TESTS ON BOND AND EQUITY 
MARKETS 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper examines the reaction of bond and equity markets to two types of credit 
rating announcements, namely, watchlist placement and actual rating changes after watchlist 
placement. Here is an example of the two announcements.14 On January 31st 2005, Moody’s 
placed the 'Baa2' senior unsecured debt rating of AT&T Corp. (AT&T) on rating watchlist 
for possible upgrades following the announcement for SBC's proposed acquisition of AT&T 
for approximately $15 billion in SBC common stock and the assumption of approximately $6 
billion of net debt. Including a $1 billion special dividend to be paid to AT&T shareholders 
at the close of the transaction, the total value of the transaction is approximately $22 billion. 
On December 19th 2005, Moody’s upgraded the “Baa2” senior unsecured debt rating to 
“A2” following the acquisition by SBC Communications, Inc. of AT&T Corp. The 
upgrading also reflects the December 16th, 2005, AT&T Inc. announcement that it has 
unconditionally and irrevocably guaranteed the payment of interest and principal on three 
issues of its subsidiary AT&T Corp. 
 Previous studies suggest that there are significant price adjustments in equity markets 
to rating announcements. For example, Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) examine the stock 
price adjustment according to the rating change announcement from 1960 through 1975. 
They control public information around announcement and get return differences by 
matching a control group of stocks based on beta, industry, and key financial variables. They 
also employ a two-factor model to get return residuals. Both of the two measures support the 
hypothesis that rating downgrade announcements release new information to the equity 
markets. However, for rating upgrade announcements, equity markets show no significant 
reaction in the month of the event.  
                                                 
14
 This information is collected from the Business News section in the LexisNexis Academic Search database. 
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Goh and Ederington (1993) separate announcements for bond rating downgrades15 
from 1984 through 1986 into those due to financial prospect deterioration, and those due to 
leverage increases. They find negative equity market reactions to downgrades in the former 
group but no reaction in the latter group. This finding shows that equity markets are generally 
sensitive to the new information associated with future performance but not sensitive to past 
known information. 
Ederington and Goh (1998) analyze forecast revisions around the announcement and 
find that equity markets react to downgrades but not to upgrades. Their explanations are that 
companies voluntarily release positive information but hesitate to release negative 
information, and rating agencies spend more time and resources in finding deterioration in 
future credibility than improvements in it. 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) examine abnormal long-run stock returns through a 
matching beta and market-to-book ratio portfolio in the first three years following Moody’s 
bond rating change announcements between 1971 and 1997. They find no reliable mean 
abnormal returns following upgrades, but a negative mean abnormal return following 
downgrades. Also, downgrades underperform on average in the long-run and in all years of 
the sample period, which indicates that there is an under-reaction to the announcement for 
rating downgrades. 
Larrymore, Liu and Rimbey (2003) examine the announcement for rating downgrades 
of 40 firms from 1974 through 1999. They find a significantly negative average cumulative 
abnormal return based on a market model. 
Studies about bond markets are much fewer and the evidence is mixed. However, 
equity markets are generally found to react more strongly to the rating announcements than 
bond markets.  Two studies directly examining bond market reactions and comparing them to 
equity market reactions are Wansley and Clauretie (1985), and Hand, Holthausen and 
Leftwich (1992). Wansley and Clauretie (1985) use a sample of 164 watchlist 
announcements from Standard and Poor’s between November 1981 and December 1983. 
                                                 
15
 The rating change announcements they focus on are not the same as the ones we focus on. Theirs have only information 
about rating change announcements, regardless of whether there is a watchlist placement before it or not. However, we look 
at rating change announcements following watchlist placement. So, our study can separate the market reaction to watchlist 
announcements from the market reaction to rating change announcements afterwards. 
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They use bonds with the same rating grades by Standard and Poor’s but which have been 
rerated without being placed on watchlist as control. They show that the average monthly 
bond price change after watchlist placement is significantly negative compared to the control 
group, and there is a significant adjustment lag for negative watchlist placement and actual 
downgrades. For positive watchlist placement and actual upgrades, there are relatively 
negative price changes which contradict intuition. They argue that maybe investors cannot 
separate rating agency’s announcements and treat each announcement as new negative 
information. They also find a significant average monthly price change associated with actual 
downgrades but no reaction to actual upgrades or affirmation of previous rating. For equity 
markets, they calculate the daily abnormal return based on a market model and find that there 
is a significantly negative (positive) average abnormal return for companies that are placed 
on watchlist for possible downgrades (upgrades). However, there is no evidence related to 
other announcements.  
Hand et al. (1992) separate watchlist (rating change) announcements 16  between 
November 1981 and December 1983 (1977 and 1982) into two types of groups, contaminated 
(with one or more other concurrent disclosures) versus noncontaminated (without any 
concurrent disclosures), and expected (the yield-to-maturity of a bond is greater (less) than 
the benchmark for downgrades (upgrades)) versus unexpected (the yield-to-maturity of a 
bond is less (greater) than the benchmark for downgrades (upgrades)). For watchlist 
announcements for possible downgrades, unexpected announcements for both contaminated 
and noncontaminated groups have significantly negative average excess returns in bond and 
equity markets. For watchlist announcement for possible upgrades, only unexpected 
announcement for the noncontaminated group has a significantly positive average excess 
return in the bond market. For rating downgrades (upgrades), only stock (bond) markets 
show a significantly negative (positive) average excess return. There are some asymmetric 
results associated with the rating change announcements, but when they control for prior 
expectations they find symmetric results. Hence, they conclude that there are reactions in 
both bond and equity markets to rating announcements. 
                                                 
16
 It is clear that watchlist announcements in their sample are not related to rating change announcements. 
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In contrast to the aforementioned literature, the present study examines market 
reactions to a complete watchlist action of Moody’s including placement and removal, from 
January 2005 through June 2006. For the bond market, we calculate bond excess returns 
based on T-bond rates and excess bond rating returns based on Standard and Poor’s 
composite bond rates. For equity markets, we calculate stock excess returns based on a 
market model and stock excess beta returns based on the corresponding beta portfolio. 
We find that there are no statistically significant average excess returns associated 
with either rating announcement for either direction in either market. However, if we focus 
on the association between rating announcements and signs of excess returns, both bond and 
equity markets show significant reactions to watchlist announcements for both possible 
downgrades and upgrades, watchlist announcement in general, and rating change 
announcement in general. Additionally, there is a significant bond market reaction to rating 
downgrade and upgrade announcements, while no evidence is found in equity markets. 
Results also suggest that controlling for a bond’s default risk premium is a better way to 
exclude the noise that is not associated with the rating announcement, while controlling for a 
stock’s beta coefficient is not so beneficial. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the sample and 
section 2.3 explains the methodology. Section 2.4 shows the empirical results and section 2.5 
concludes. 
2.2 Sample Description 
We collect Moody’s credit watchlist and rating change announcements from January 
2005 through June 2006 from Moody’s Investors Service. The sample includes only parent 
companies domiciled in the United States at all rating levels (investment grades and 
speculative grades). The sample includes three sectors, Industrial, Utility, and Finance.17 
Within the above criteria, we get the complete data set for the period. 
Because the sample data do not specify whether there is a watchlist placement before 
a rating change, we match rating change announcements with watchlist announcements by 
                                                 
17
 The sample that Moody’s Investors Service provides includes only those three sectors. It is a limit for this study. 
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event dates and rating grades18. Our intention is to focus on events related to watchlist 
actions, so that we exclude rating change announcements for firms that have not been placed 
on watchlist for review. The matched sample consists of 262 complete watchlist events 
including placement and removal, 175 of which are in 2005 and 87 are from January 2006 
through June 2006.  
Daily bond prices are collected from TRACE in Wharton Research Data Services. 
Bond information, such as maturity date, coupon payment date, priority (senior or junior), 
and redemption features (callable, puttable, or convertible) are collected from NASD 
BondInfo database. Because bonds are traded Over-the-Counter and their market is less 
active than the stock market, some events are lost if no daily bond transaction prices are 
available during a specified event window. Also, if there is a coupon payment during an 
event window, we delete the event to minimize noise. The entire sample having daily bond 
prices contains 166 events19 with complete watchlist action (see summary in table 2.1). The 
majority of actual rating changes are consistent with watchlist directions and most of the 
companies are in the Industrial sector. When placed on watchlist, most of the companies have 
ratings A, Baa (investment grades), and Ba and B (speculative grades). 
Daily stock prices, market indexes, and daily excess beta returns are collected from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Because some firms do not have either 
stock prices or excess beta returns in CRSP during a specified event window or some firms 
are privately held, some events are lost. The entire sample having either daily stock prices or 
daily excess beta returns consists of 192 events (see summary in table 2.2). The sample 
characteristics are very similar to the bond market sample reported in table 2.1, as the 
majority of the events for the two samples overlap. 
 
 
                                                 
18
 The rating change announcement following a watchlist placement should be the first rating change after watchlist 
placement. So its event date should be the closest after the date of watchlist placement. Also, since we match by rating 
grades, the old rating grade of a rating change announcement should be the same as the rating grade of a watchlist 
announcement. 
19
 A few events have daily bond prices for only one announcement, either watchlist placement or actual rating changes. 
Since the sample size is not large, we keep them in the study. We adopt the same approach to construct the sample for equity 
markets.  
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Table 2.1. Bond Market Sample Description 
  Actual Downgrades Actual Upgrades 
Possible Downgrades 99 7 
Direction Uncertain 3 2 
Possible Upgrades 1 54 
   
Sector    
Finance 15  
Industrial 131  
Service 20  
   
Old rating1    
Aa 2  
A  22  
Baa 56  
Ba  31  
B 41  
Caa 9  
None 5  
1Old rating is the company's rating when it is placed on watchlist. 
Table 2.2. Equity Market Sample Description 
  Actual Downgrades Actual Upgrades 
Possible Downgrades 112 3 
Direction Uncertain 3 1 
Possible Upgrades 0 73 
   
Sector    
Finance 19  
Industrial 150  
Service 23  
   
Old rating    
Aa 2  
A  24  
Baa 68  
Ba  43  
B 41  
Caa 11  
None 3  
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2.3 Methodology  
2.3.1 Estimation of Bond Gross Returns 
We define the event date to be day 0, such that each announcement date is day 0. As 
bond trading is not as active as stock, we set up an event window larger than the event day 
and the following day to calculate the “window-spanning” bond gross return. The event 
window for watchlist placement (WL) is (-36, 56) and for rating changes (RC) is (-37, 76). 
We use the last price before day 0 in the event window as 0P and the first price on or after day 
0 in the event window as 1P . Then we calculate the bond gross return as
0
01
P
PP −
. The 
following example illustrates the calculation of the gross return of a bond with trading 
activities on days -10, -5, +3, and +6. The last pre-event transaction date before day 0 is day -
5 and the first post-event transaction date on or after day 0 is day +3. Hence, the bond gross 
return is calculated as the difference of the prices on day -5 and day +3 divided by the price 
on day -5. 
The summary statistics of event window reported in table 2.3 indicates that 95% of 
our sample events fall into either WL window (-17, 19) or RC window (-20, 24), and 70% of 
our sample events fall into either WL window (-11, 11) or RC window (-13, 14). As the 
power to statistically test the market reaction of announcement will be larger for a shorter 
event window, considering the inactive trading in the bond market our event windows are 
sufficiently qualified for the tests. 
Table 2.3. Summary Statistics of Event Window for Bond Market 
WL Mean Median STD MIN MAX 
Pre-event -4.7 -3 6.3 -36 -1 
Post-event 3.2 0 7.8 0 56 
      
RC Mean Median STD MIN MAX 
Pre-event -5.7 -3 7.3 -37 -1 
Post-event 4.1 0 9.7 0 76 
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Usually a company has more than one bond issued in the market. In such instances, 
we use an equal-weighted average gross return for the test of a company. The selection and 
calculation follow three steps. If a company has issued at least one straight-debt bond20, then 
first we choose corporate straight-debt bonds from all the issues that the company has. 
Second, we choose maximum three (if available) bonds from the set of bonds obtained in the 
first step, which have the longest time until maturity than all other bonds that we select in the 
first step.21 Third, if there are at least two bonds obtained in the second step, we take the 
average bond gross return of selected bonds in the second step as a single observation for the 
company. If there is only one straight-debt bond selected in the second step, we utilize that 
bond’s gross return for the company. However, if there is not a single straight-debt issue, we 
choose corporate non-straight-debt bonds22 instead in the first step. The second and third 
steps are the same. 
2.3.2 Estimation of Bond Excess Returns 
We measure the bond excess return as the bond gross return less the return on a risk-
free bond matched by the maturity year. We use U.S. Treasury bonds (T-bonds) as a 
substitute for the risk-free bond. The return of the T-bond is calculated as the difference 
between the estimated post-event23 and pre-event T-bond prices divided by the estimated pre-
event T-bond price.  
The daily U.S. Treasury rates are collected from the website http://www.ustreas.gov/. 
As reported U.S. Treasury rates have fixed maturities, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 20 years during the 
sample period (January 2005 through June 2006); we use linear interpolation to get yield 
curve rates for the missing maturity years up to 19 years. If the maturity year of a corporate 
bond is longer than 20 years, the corporate bond is compared to a U.S. T-bond with 20 years 
maturity as a long-term risk-free match. 
                                                 
20
 Corporate straight-debt bonds have no redemption features such that they are neither callable/puttable nor convertible. 
21
 If a company issues at least four straight-debt bonds, we choose three bonds with the longest time until maturity from the 
selected bonds in the first step. If a company issues less than four straight-debt bonds, we choose all of them in the second 
step. 
22
 Corporate non-straight-debt bonds have redemption features such that they are at least callable, puttable or convertible.  
23
 The post-event date for the T-bond is matched as the first transaction day after the event of the sample corporate bond. So 
is the pre-event date for the T-bond. 
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We convert daily Treasury yield rates into daily T-bond prices by the following 
formula24: 
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where; 
dP is the dirty price of the bond; 
rm is the yield to maturity; 
tcN is the number of days between the current date and the next coupon date; 
C is the value of each coupon payment; 
n  is the number of coupon payments before redemption; 
M is the face value of the bond; 
Daily Treasury yield rates are commonly referred to as “Constant Maturity Treasury” rates 
(CMTs), which provide estimated yields for various maturity years starting from the current 
date. Hence, “ tcN =182.5” and “n = 2 * maturity years” for all U.S. T-bonds with semi-
annual coupon payments. The yield to maturity of a T-bond with a specific maturity year is 
assumed to be the average yield of that T-bond during the sample period. 
2.3.3 Estimation of Bond Excess Rating Returns 
We measure the bond excess rating return as the bond gross return less the average 
return for all the bonds with the same rating grade. We use Standard and Poor’s Corporate 
Bond Rates (CBRs) based on Industrial and Utility bonds of different ratings as the control 
for the default risk premium. The CBR is expressed in terms of yields and is released from 
the weekly edition of Standard and Poor’s Creditweek. Following the same formula in 
section 2.3.2 to convert bond yields to bond prices, the return of the CBR is calculated as the 
difference between the estimated post-event and pre-event composite bond prices divided by 
the estimated pre-event composite bond price. 
                                                 
24
 The formula is in page 9 of the book “Analysing and Interpreting the YIELD CURVE” by Moorad Choudhry, John Wiley 
& Sons (Asia) Pte ltd. 
  
 
38 
We collect CBRs from January 2005 through June 2006 from the Bloomberg 
database. The available CBRs have ratings AA, A, and BBB for 5, 10, 15, and 20 maturity 
years, and rating BB for 5, 10, and 15 maturity years.25 Because the CBR is available every 
Tuesday during the sample period, we take steps to estimate daily rates for different ratings 
with different maturity years. First, we calculate the composite default risk premium on each 
Tuesday as the yield difference between the available CBRs and T-bonds with matched 
maturity years. Second, we assume that the change of the composite default risk premium is 
smooth between consecutive Tuesdays. By linear interpolation, we calculate the daily 
composite default risk premiums during the whole period for available ratings (AA, A, BBB, 
and BB) and available maturity years (5, 10, 15, and/or 20). Third, we assume that the 
change in composite default risk premium is smooth between adjacent rating grades for 
available maturity years. By linear interpolation, we get daily composite default risk 
premiums for other rating grades (B and CCC) with 5, 10, 15, and/or 20 maturity years. 
Fourth, for each rating grade we assume that the change of the composite default risk 
premium is smooth between adjacent maturity years. By linear interpolation, we complete the 
CBRs for all rating grades (AA, A, BBB, BB, B and CCC) with all maturity years (1 to 20 
years), after adding back the corresponding T-bond rates. 
2.3.4 Estimation of Stock Excess Returns 
We measure the stock excess return as the average prediction errors calculated from 
the market model on days 0 and +1 for each event. As trading in equity markets is frequent, 
the event window can be set up narrowly as (0, +1). We include day +1 in the event window 
because sometimes the rating news is released in the Wall Street Journal the day after 
Moody’s announcement. We take the equity market index as the CRSP value-weighted New 
York, American and NASDAQ stock exchange index. The market model parameters (alpha 
and beta) are estimated using the combined data of pre-event window (-214, -31) and post-
event window (+31, +214). Because previous studies show that there is a negative average 
excess return before downgrades and a positive average excess return before upgrades, 
                                                 
25
 Standard and Poor’s uses a similar but different rating grade as Moody’s. AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC from Standard 
and Poor’s are equivalent to Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B, Caa, respectively, from Moody’s. 
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researchers have recently utilized post-event data for the estimation of market parameters. 
However, post-event data are associated with the rating announcements, either watchlist 
placement or a new rating, which are different from pre-event data representing the situation 
before/without the event. Hence, we use both of them as controls. 
2.3.5 Estimation of Stock Excess Beta Returns 
Similar to controlling bond returns by rating grades discussed in section 2.3.3, stock 
returns can be controlled by means of beta coefficients. We collect daily excess beta returns 
from the CRSP, which is measured as the excess return of a specific issue less the average 
return of all issues in its beta portfolio for each trading day. We measure the stock excess 
beta return as the average excess beta return of day 0 and day +1 for each event.  
2.3.6 Tests 
Besides the t-test for a variety of mean returns with one degree of freedom fewer than 
the number of announcements in the sample, we also employ other tests, i.e. sign tests, 
Pearson’s chi-square tests, Goodman and Kruskal's gamma statistics, and first order 
stochastic dominance tests. 
2.3.6.1 Sign Tests 
The null hypothesis for a sign test is that the probability of observing successes in all 
trials is 0.5. For watchlist announcement with possible downgrades/upgrades, success is an 
observed negative/positive excess return. Success is similarly defined for rating change 
announcements. We report a one-sided p-value in each test, showing the probability of 
observing more than the current number of successes in the sample if success and failure 
happened with equal probability. The smaller the one-sided p-value is, the more significant 
the evidence that announcements affect prices. 
2.3.6.2 Pearson’s Chi-square Tests 
The Pearson’s chi-square test is used to test whether the relative frequency of 
occurrence of observed events follows a specified frequency distribution. The events are 
assumed to be independent and have the same distribution, and the outcomes of each event to 
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be mutually exclusive. The null hypothesis is the same as the sign test explained above. The 
chi-square statistic, which has 1 degree of freedom26 in our case, is defined as: 
∑
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where  
 iO  is the frequency of an observed event i; 
 iE  is the theoretically expected frequency of an event i under the null hypothesis. 
For a given degree of freedom, the larger the chi-square statistic is, the more confident we are 
in rejecting the null hypothesis of equal probability. 
2.3.6.3 Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma Statistics 
Goodman and Kruskal’s Gamma is a symmetric measure based on the difference 
between the concordant pairs27 and the discordant pairs28, and is defined as follows: 
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The gamma statistic shows the proportionate reduction in error when the independent 
variable is used to predict the rank of the dependent variable. For this matter, the larger the 
absolute value of gamma, the stronger the evidence of association between the two variables. 
In the analysis, the rank of credit rating announcement for (possible) upgrades is set higher 
than for (possible) downgrades and the rank of associated positive returns is set higher than 
the rank of associated negative returns. So the contingency table which is used to record the 
relationship between two or more variables, is as follows: 
                                                 
26
 The degree of freedom is (m-1)(n-1), where m is the number of rows of the contingency table and n is the number of 
columns. In our case, m=n=2. 
27
 A concordant pair is a pair of a bivariate observation (m, n) and (s, t), such that in a contingency table if m ranks higher 
(lower) than s, n ranks higher (lower) than t as well. 
28
 A discordant pair is a pair of a bivariate observation (m, n) and (s, t), such that in a contingency table if m ranks lower 
(higher) than s, n ranks higher (lower) than t. 
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Table 2.4. Example of the Contingency Table 
  
Direction of rating 
announcements 
  Downgrades Upgrades 
Negative 11n  12n  Sign of returns 
Positive 21n  22n  
 
where ijn denotes the number of events falling into the i
th
 row and the jth column of the 
contingency table. Obviously, 11n and 22n are set as concordant pairs, while 21n and 12n are set 
as discordant pairs. Under multinomial sampling, γˆ  has an asymptotically normal 
distribution29. The values forγ range from -1 to 1, with 1±=γ  indicating a perfectly linear 
positive/negative relationship between the two variables. When the two variables are 
statistically independent, gamma equals zero. 
2.3.6.4 First Order Stochastic Dominance Tests 
 Tests for stochastic dominance are used to compare the distributions between pairs of 
random variables with application in asset management and welfare economics. The 
advantage of this approach is that it utilizes the entire density function rather than a few 
moments such as the mean, the variance, and the skewness. In the present study, we test for 
the first order stochastic dominance of rating announcements with upgrades over downgrades. 
 Suppose that we have a random sample of n independent observations yi, i = 1,…,n, 
from a population with distribution function Fy(.), and a random sample of m independent 
observations zi, i = 1,…,m, from another population with distribution function Fz(.). The 
probability function fz(x) is said to stochastically dominate the probability function fy(x) by 
first-order, if and only if, Fz(x)≤Fy(x) for all values of x with strict inequality for at least one 
value of x. We follow Davidson and Duclos (2000) that the test statistic is as follows: 
 
)(ˆ
)(ˆ)(ˆ)(
xV
xzdxyd
xT −= , 
                                                 
29
 For reference information about the mean and the variance, see Liebetrau, Albert M. (1983), Measures of association. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences Series No. 32. 
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 ∑
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 The null hypothesis is )()( xdzxdy = under which T(x) is asymptotically distributed as 
a standard normal variate. It is empirically impossible to carry the test over the full support. 
So we follow Bishop, Formby and Thistle (1992) by taking the union-intersection test at 
fixed values x1, x2 ,...xk that are evenly spread out in the range of the sample. There are four 
hypotheses as defined: 
1. H0: )()( ii xdzxdy =  for all ix , 
2. HA: )()( ii xdzxdy ≠ for some ix , 
3. HA1: Y first order stochastically dominates Z, 
4. HA2: Z first order stochastically dominates Y. 
The conclusions are made based on following rules: 
1. If iMxT ki ∀< ∞ α,|)(| , do not reject H0, 
2. If ki MxT α,)( ∞>− for some i and iMxT ki ∀< ∞ α,)( , accept HA1, 
3. If ki MxT α,)( ∞> for some i and iMxT ki ∀<− ∞ α,)( , accept HA2, 
4. If ki MxT α,)( ∞> for some i and iMxT ki ∀>− ∞ α,)( , accept HA, 
where kM α,∞ is the studentized maximum modulus statistic with k and infinite degrees of 
freedom with (1-α ) percentile and the corresponding table is in Stoline and Ury (1979). 
 In our event, Y is the return associated with rating (possible) downgrade 
announcements and Z is the return associated with rating (possible) upgrade announcements. 
We are expected to accept HA2 in most of the cases that the return associated with rating 
downgrades are stochastically dominated by the return associated with rating upgrades by 
order 1. 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Reactions of Bond Markets 
We employ three bond returns in the present section, namely, gross returns, excess 
returns, and excess rating returns. We perform tests in two samples, one consisting of the 
entire sample with both straight-debt and non-straight-debt bonds, and the other one 
containing straight-debt bonds only. As we select non-straight-debt bonds as a substitute 
when there are no straight-debt bonds available, the size of the former is larger than the size 
of the latter. 
2.4.1.1 Moody’s Credit Watchlist Announcements 
2.4.1.1.1 Entire Sample 
Detailed results for bond market reactions to watchlist placement for the entire 
sample are reported in tables 2.5 and 2.6. The sign tests in table 2.5 show significant bond 
price adjustments for watchlist with possible downgrades, but little evidence of adjustment 
for watchlist with possible upgrades. The bond market exhibits significant reactions to 
watchlist announcements, when we consider the effect of possible downgrades and upgrades 
together (see table 2.6). 
In the case of watchlist for possible downgrades, table 2.5 shows that none of the 
three returns has significant t-statistics (-0.440 for gross return, -0.401 for excess return, and -
0.403 for excess rating return), even though each mean (-1.10% for gross return, -1.05% for 
excess return, and -1.23% for excess rating return) and median (-0.46% for gross return, -
0.52% for excess return, and -0.79% for excess rating return) are negative as expected. 
However, the sign test shows significant evidence of more negative gross returns, excess 
returns, or excess rating returns in the entire sample, and the significance level (1.4% for 
gross return, 0.8% for excess return, and 0.5% for excess rating return) is increasing when we 
control for the risk-free rate and the default risk premium in succession. Taking excess rating 
return as an example, the sign test indicates that there is a 0.5% chance of observing 64 
negative excess rating returns in a total 101 events if the actual probability of negative excess 
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rating returns is 50%. Then at the 0.5% significance level, we reject the null hypothesis of 
equal probability, and conclude that it is much more likely to observe negative excess rating 
returns when watchlist placement is for possible downgrades. 
In the case of watchlist for possible upgrades, the mean for each of the three bond 
returns is positive (0.20% for gross return, 0.21% for excess return, and 0.51% for excess 
rating return), but none of them is significantly different from zero (t-statistics are 0.099 for 
gross return, 0.082 for excess return, and 0.218 for excess rating return). Two of the three 
bond median returns are negative (-0.10% for gross return, -0.0004% for excess return, and 
0.27% for excess rating return). The sign test shows more significant evidence when we 
control for the risk-free rate and then the default risk premium; however, the smallest one-
sided p-value is 0.284 (with excess rating return). Hence, there is no significant evidence to 
be observed of a positive bond return when watchlist placement is for possible upgrades. 
When we consider the effect of watchlist announcements (regardless of the possible 
direction), the joint tests reported in table 2.6 show that there is a significant reaction in bond 
markets. All three gammas (0.2438 for gross return, 0.2477 for excess return, and 0.3714 for 
excess rating return) are positive. Gamma increases from gross returns, to excess returns, to 
excess rating returns, and the associated z-statistics (9.39 for gross return, 9.45 for excess 
return, and 14.87 for excess rating return) increases as well. These indicate that the 
association between watchlist announcements and bond returns is significantly positive and 
the significance level increases as we control for the risk-free rate and the default risk 
premium in succession. Taking the excess rating return as an example, the gamma statistic is 
0.3714, which shows that if we know the possible direction of a watchlist announcement, it 
can help us forecast the sign of an excess rating return by reducing 37.14% of the prediction 
error. Since the variance is only 0.0006 and the z-statistic is 14.87, the significance level is 
less than 0.01%. On the other hand, Pearson’s Chi-square statistics (19.81 for gross return, 
19.70 for excess return, and 26.04 for excess rating return) indicate that all of them are 
significant at a level less than 0.01%, and that excess rating return is more significant than 
the other two. For example, the significant chi-square statistic 26.04 for excess rating return 
indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal probability and conclude that 
watchlist announcements and the sign of excess rating returns are highly correlated. 
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Table 2.5. Results Summary for Watchlist Announcements for the Entire Sample in the 
Bond Market 
t-test:            
  Raw return  Excess return  Excess rating return 
  DOWN1 UP2  DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Mean -1.10% 0.20%  -1.05% 0.21%  -1.23% 0.51% 
Median -0.46% -0.10%  -0.52% -0.0004%  -0.79% 0.27% 
Std. Dev. 2.40% 2.00%  2.61% 2.59%  3.06% 2.35% 
Max 5.60% 8.70%  5.88% 8.76%  5.88% 9.01% 
Min -7.22% -6.10%  -7.18% -6.67%  -11.52% -5.62% 
t-statistic -0.440 0.099  -0.401 0.082  -0.403 0.218 
One-sided p-value 0.331 0.461  0.345 0.468  0.344 0.414 
         
Sign Test:               
  Raw return  Excess return  Excess rating return 
  DOWN UP  DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Sample size 101 55  99 54  101 49 
No. of Negatives 62 28  62 27  64 22 
No. of Positives 35 26  36 26  36 27 
No. of Zeros 4 1  0 1  1 0 
One-sided p-value 0.014 0.606  0.008 0.554  0.005 0.284 
1DOWN denotes the watchlist announcement is for possible downgrades.    
2UP denotes the watchlist announcement is for possible upgrades.    
 
Table 2.6. Results of Joint Tests for Watchlist Announcements for the Entire Sample in 
the Bond Market 
Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma Gross Return Excess return Excess rating return 
Gamma 0.2438 0.2477 0.3714 
Variance 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 
z-statistic 9.39 9.45 14.87 
Pearson's Chi-square Gross Return Excess return Excess rating return 
Chi-square 19.81 19.70 26.04 
p-value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
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2.4.1.1.2 Straight-debt Bonds Only 
When we limit the bond sample to U.S. corporate straight-debt bonds, the sample size 
is reduced from 156 events to 102. We find as strong reactions for this reduced sample as for 
the entire sample. (See table 2.7 and 2.8) 
For watchlist with possible downgrades, both the mean and median of the three bond 
returns are negative as expected, but none of the means is significantly different from zero. 
The sign tests show that all three bond returns have significantly more negative than positive 
observations. Taking the excess rating return as an example, the sign test indicates that there 
is a 1.2% chance of observing 42 successes in 65 events if the probability of observing 
success is 50%. Then at the 1.2% significance level we reject the null hypothesis and can 
conclude that it is more likely to observe a negative bond return when the watchlist 
announcement is for possible downgrades. 
For watchlist with possible upgrades, the means of the three bond returns are all 
positive, but none of them is statistically significant. For the sign tests, only excess rating 
return shows a significant reaction at the 10% level. There is only a 7.5% chance of 
observing 20 positive excess rating returns in 31 events if equal probability is true, from 
which we can conclude that there are more positive excess rating returns associated with 
watchlist placement for possible upgrades. However, gross returns and excess returns can not 
reject the null at the 10% significance level. 
In the case of the joint tests reported in table 2.8, all three gammas are significantly 
positive (all z-statistics are greater than 1.96), which indicates that bond returns are 
significantly associated with watchlist placement. For example, the gamma of excess rating 
returns (i.e. 0.5371) indicates that the information of the watchlist direction can reduce by 
53.71% the prediction error in forecasting the sign of an excess rating return. In the case of 
Pearson’s chi-square test, we find that all three returns show a significant correlation between 
watchlist announcements and signs of bond returns at the 0.05% significance level. 
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Table 2.7. Results Summary for Watchlist Announcements for Straight-debt Bonds 
t-test:         
      
  Gross return  Excess return  Excess rating return 
  DOWN1 UP2   DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Mean -1.22% 0.83%  -1.02% 0.33%  -1.13% 0.88% 
Median -0.50% -0.06%  -0.51% -0.001%  -0.86% 0.66% 
Std. Dev. 2.42% 2.47%  2.63% 3.04%  2.90% 2.79% 
Max 2.99% 8.66%  4.89% 8.76%  5.49% 9.01% 
Min -6.65% -1.70%  -6.47% -6.67%  -11.32% -5.62% 
t-statistic -0.503 0.337  -0.386 0.110  -0.389 0.315 
One-sided p-value 0.308 0.369   0.350 0.457   0.349 0.378 
         
Sign Test:             
  Gross return  Excess return  Excess rating return 
  DOWN UP   DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Sample size 67 35  67 35  65 31 
No. of Negatives 43 16  41 18  42 11 
No. of Positives 24 18  26 17  23 20 
No. of Zeros 0 1  0 0  0 0 
One-sided p-value 0.014 0.5   0.043 0.5   0.012 0.075 
1DOWN denotes the watchlist announcement is for possible downgrades.    
2UP denotes the watchlist announcement is for possible upgrades.    
 
Table 2.8. Results of Joint Tests for Watchlist Announcements for Straight-debt Bonds 
Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma Gross Return Excess return Excess rating return 
Gamma 0.3368 0.1966 0.5371 
Variance 0.0014 0.0016 0.0011 
z-statistic 8.97 4.91 16.21 
Pearson's Chi-square Gross Return Excess return Excess rating return 
Chi-square 15.98 13.24 23.92 
p-value 0.0001 0.0003 <0.0001 
2.4.1.2 Moody’s Rating Change Announcements Following Watchlist Placements 
2.4.1.2.1 Entire Sample 
For rating change announcements after watchlist placement, there is no significant 
evidence of effects on bond returns from the t-test on mean returns. However, other tests 
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indicate significant bond market reactions to rating upgrade announcements and rating 
change announcements regardless of the direction. (See tables 2.9 and 2.10) 
For rating downgrade announcements, the three mean and median returns are all 
negative, but the mean returns are not significant in value. Only gross returns show a 
significant reaction in sign test at the significance level 0.2%. The significance levels of the 
sign tests for excess return and excess rating return are 21.1% and 24.0%, respectively. For 
rating upgrade announcements, the means of the three returns are positive but they are not 
statistically significant. However, at the significance level 0.4% excess rating returns show a 
significant reaction according to the sign test. This indicates that there are more positive 
excess rating returns observed when the rating change announcement is for upgrading. 
For rating change announcements regardless of directions, the gammas are all 
significantly positive. This supports the hypothesis that the association between rating change 
announcements and signs of bond returns is positive. For example, the gamma 0.4369 for 
excess rating returns means that the prediction error when forecasting the sign of the return 
can be reduced by 43.69% if we know the direction of rating changes. All three chi-square 
tests are significant, as well, which rejects hypothesis that there is no correlations between 
rating change announcements and signs of returns. 
It is interesting to notice that for the above analysis, the gross return usually shows a 
more significant reaction than the excess return, and that the excess rating return is always 
the most significant one among the three. Hence, it seems important to control for the default 
risk premium in addition to the risk-free rate when testing for bond market reactions. 
2.4.1.2.2 Straight-debt Bonds Only 
The sample of straight-debt bond reaction following rating changes consists of 108 
events; which is considerably smaller than entire sample of 162 events. However, the results 
reported in tables 2.11 and 2.12 suggest that the detected market reaction is somewhat more 
significant for the reduced sample. 
  
 
49 
Table 2.9. Results Summary for Rating Change Announcements for the Entire Sample 
in the Bond Market 
t-test:             
  Raw return  Excess return  Excess rating return 
  DOWN1 UP2  DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Mean -1.00% 0.10%  -0.40% 0.20%  -0.37% 0.89% 
Median -0.50% 0%  -0.18% 0.25%  -0.19% 0.69% 
Std. Dev. 2.30% 1.50%  2.14% 1.81%  2.35% 1.97% 
Max 4.10% 4.50%  3.97% 6.28%  5.69% 6.28% 
Min -9.30% -4.90%  -7.29% -3.28%  -7.89% -3.50% 
t-statistic -0.409 0.053  -0.188 0.109  -0.160 0.452 
One-sided p-value 0.342 0.479  0.426 0.457  0.437 0.327 
         
Sign Test:               
  Raw return  Excess return  Excess rating return 
  DOWN UP  DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Sample size 99 63  99 62  98 57 
No. of Negatives 64 31  54 30  53 18 
No. of Positives 30 32  43 32  45 39 
No. of Zeros 5 0  1 0  0 0 
One-sided p-value 0.002 0.5   0.211  0.450   0.240  0.004  
1DOWN denotes the rating changes announcement is for downgrades.    
2UP denotes the rating changes announcement is for upgrades.    
 
Table 2.10. Results of Joint tests for Rating Change Announcements for the Entire 
Sample in the Bond Market 
Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma 
Gross 
Return Excess return Excess rating return 
Gamma 0.3754 0.1451 0.4369 
Variance 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 
z-statistic 16.59 5.77 19.22 
Pearson's Chi-square 
Gross 
Return Excess return Excess rating return 
Chi-square 17.47 9.31 28.62 
p-value <0.0001 0.0023 <0.0001 
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For rating downgrades, the means of all three returns are insignificantly negative but 
all sign tests reject the null of equal probability at the 10% significance level. Taking the 
excess rating return as an example, there is an 8.8% chance of observing 39 negative excess 
rating returns in 66 events if they were equal probable. So, there are significantly more 
negative excess rating returns associated with rating downgrades. For rating upgrades, all 
three returns are insignificantly positive at the mean, and only sign test for excess rating 
returns reject the null of equal probability at the 8.8% significance level. The conclusion is 
that more positive excess rating returns are observed with rating upgrade announcements. 
Considering general rating change announcements, all gammas are significantly 
positive and all chi-square statistics are significantly nonzero (see table 2.12). For example, 
the gamma of excess rating returns shows that the information of the direction of a rating 
change announcement can reduce the prediction error by 41.94% in estimating the sign of an 
excess rating return. Its chi-square statistic 16.98 also indicates a significant correlation 
between rating change announcements and signs of excess rating returns.  
2.4.1.3 Summary 
 The t-tests show negative/positive average returns associated with watchlist 
announcements for possible downgrades/upgrades or with rating change announcements for 
actual downgrades/upgrades following watchlist placements. However, none of them is 
statistically significant. Figures 2.1-2.4 show the density and cumulative density plots of 
bond excess rating returns of straight-debt bonds. Plots of other results are displayed in 
appendix B. As straight-debt bonds’ excess rating returns associated with watchlist 
announcements for either possible downgrades or upgrades are well spread out, the size of 
the standardized mean returns are too small to reject the t-tests. Comparing for different 
directions of watchlist placement, it appears that the two cumulative distributions (in figure 
2.3) are clearly different from each other, but the area of overlapping of the two density 
distributions (in figure 2.1) is not small. The situation is similar for straight-debt bonds with 
rating change announcements and for the entire sample with both announcements.  
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Table 2.11. Results Summary for Rating Change Announcements for Straight-debt 
Bonds 
t-test:         
      
  Gross return  Excess return  Excess rating return 
  DOWN1 UP2   DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Mean -0.51% 0.04%  -0.42% 0.03%  -0.42% 0.63% 
Median -0.85% 0.07%  -0.22% -0.04%  -0.39% 0.64% 
Std. Dev. 2.47% 1.49%  2.10% 1.77%  2.40% 1.89% 
Max 4.11% 3.44%  3.97% 5.09%  5.39% 5.55% 
Min -9.25% -4.86%  -7.29% -3.28%  -7.89% -3.50% 
t-statistic -0.343 0.049  -0.199 0.016  -0.176 0.330 
One-sided p-value 0.366 0.481   0.421 0.494   0.430 0.372 
         
Sign Test:             
  Gross return  Excess return  Excess rating return 
  DOWN UP   DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Sample size 69 39  69 39  66 35 
No. of Negatives 43 19  42 21  39 13 
No. of Positives 24 20  26 18  27 22 
No. of Zeros 2 0  1 0  1 0 
One-sided p-value 0.027 0.5   0.046 0.625   0.088 0.088 
1DOWN denotes the rating change announcement is for downgrades.    
2UP denotes the rating change announcement is for upgrades.    
 
Table 2.12. Results of Joint Tests for Rating Change Announcements for Straight-debt 
Bonds 
Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma Gross Return Excess return Excess rating return 
Gamma 0.3070 0.1613 0.4194 
Variance 0.0013 0.0015 0.0012 
z-statistic 8.60 4.23 11.89 
Pearson's Chi-square Gross Return Excess return Excess rating return 
Chi-square 12.15 11.61 16.98 
p-value 0.0005 0.0007 <0.0001 
 
The sign tests report significant associations between the signs of three types of bond 
returns and credit rating announcements, i.e., for watchlist placement, rating changes, 
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watchlist for possible downgrades, and rating downgrades. However, only when we control 
for the default risk premium, we find such associations significant for watchlist 
announcements with possible upgrades or rating upgrade announcements. The frequency 
plots of bond returns associated with credit rating announcements shown in figures 2.5-2.8 
explicitly display the results. Watchlist with possible downgrades in all four figures and 
rating downgrades in figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.8 show clear frequency differences between 
negative and positive returns, while only watchlist with possible upgrades in figure 2.8 and 
rating upgrades in figures 2.7 and 2.8 show such clear differences.  
The bond market reaction to the announcements for both watchlist placement and 
removal indicates that bond investors consider Moody’s watchlist placement as new 
information; however it appears they do not fully trust it. If investors believe that the 
watchlist is correct for sure, they will fully adjust bond prices after watchlist placement, 
without any reactions to rating changes afterwards. However, they save a part of the price 
adjustment until Moody’s confirms the watchlist direction in the rating change 
announcement.  
Even though the average bond excess return and the average bond excess rating 
return are not significantly different from zero, we can still get the relative size of each price 
adjustment. Taking excess rating returns for straight-debt bonds as an example, its average 
for watchlist placement with possible downgrades (upgrades) is -1.13% (0.88%), and for 
rating downgrades (upgrades) is -0.42% (0.63%). The absolute size of price adjustments for 
watchlist announcements is larger than for rating change announcements, supporting the 
conclusion that bond investors do trust the watchlist announcements, but not fully so.  
Interestingly, we find that for corporate straight-debt bonds the relative size of mean 
returns associated with watchlist announcements to mean returns associated with both 
watchlist and rating change announcements, is close to the probability of the watchlist 
announcement with a correct direction. From the results in tables 2.7 and 2.11, computed 
relative sizes are 70.54% for gross returns, 70.83% for excess returns, and 72.72% for excess 
rating returns. In Moody’s report, Fons (2002) states that “…between 66%-76% of all ratings 
have been changed in the same direction (and rarely in the opposite direction) as indicated by 
their watchlist review.” All three relative sizes fall into the range of 66%-76%, which 
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suggests that bond investors have rational expectations regarding the likelihood of watchlist 
announcements being followed by rating changes in the same direction. 
 Comparison of the entire sample and the one with only corporate straight-debt bonds 
reveals that the former shows a gradually decreasing significance level with watchlist 
announcements when we control for the risk-free rate and the default risk premium in 
succession. However, for watchlist announcements in the latter sample, the significance level 
for gross returns is smaller than for excess return, and that for excess rating return is always 
the smallest. For rating changes, the significance level is even gradually increasing. The 
inconsistency between the reactions of different types of bonds to two types of 
announcements is difficult to interpret. However, the size of the average excess rating return 
is always the largest among the three averages for each type of announcement. All three 
returns associated with watchlist announcements for possible downgrades reject the null 
using sign tests in both samples, and average excess rating returns show the most significant 
evidence. Also, Figures 2.5 and 2.6 depict more negative excess returns associated with 
watchlist for upgrades or rating upgrades, which contradict intuition, while the frequencies of 
excess rating returns in figures 2.7 and 2.8 are consistent with prior expectations. Hence, we 
argue that controlling for the risk-free rate is not sufficient and that it is necessary to also 
consider the default risk premium. 
2.4.2 Reactions of Equity Markets 
We employ two types of returns in equity markets, i.e. excess returns based on a 
market model and excess beta returns based on a beta portfolio. 
2.4.2.1 Moody’s Credit Watchlist Announcements 
There is no significant evidence of equity market reactions to watchlist 
announcements by the t-test on mean returns, but other tests report strong associations 
between announcements and equity returns. Excess beta returns indicate somewhat more 
significant reactions than excess returns. (See table 2.13 and 2.14) 
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Figure 2.1. Density of Bond Excess Rating Returns of Straight-debt Bonds Associated 
with Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Density of Bond Excess Rating Returns of Straight-debt Bonds Associated 
with Rating Change Announcements 
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Figure 2.3. Cumulative Density of Bond Excess Rating Returns of Straight-debt Bonds 
Associated with Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Cumulative Density of Bond Excess Rating Returns of Straight-debt Bonds 
Associated with Rating Change Announcements 
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Figure 2.5. Frequency of Negative and Positive Bond Excess Returns of the Entire 
Sample Associated with Credit Rating Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Frequency of Negative and Positive Bond Excess Returns of Straight-debt 
Bonds Associated with Credit Rating Announcements 
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Figure 2.7. Frequency of Negative and Positive Bond Excess Rating Returns of the 
Entire Sample Associated with Credit Rating Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Frequency of Negative and Positive Bond Excess Rating Returns of Straight-
debt Bonds Associated with Credit Rating Announcements 
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In the case of watchlist placements for possible downgrades, the average excess 
return and the average excess beta return are insignificantly negative. However the sign test 
reports that there are significantly more negative excess (beta) returns. The significance level 
of excess beta returns is 5.4%, which is smaller than the 11.0% level according to excess 
returns. 
For watchlist announcements for possible upgrades, the averages are positive but not 
significant for both excess returns and excess beta returns. However, sign test reports a strong 
relation between such announcements and signs of excess (beta) returns at the 8.1% (4.9%) 
significance level.  
The results in table 2.14 indicate that for watchlist announcements in general, equity 
market reaction is significant at the 0.01% level using the chi-square statistics. If the possible 
direction of watchlist placement is known, the excess beta return reports a 38.3% reduction 
of prediction error when forecasting signs of associated returns, while the excess return 
reports a 29.5% reduction.  
Table 2.13. Results Summary for Watchlist Announcements in the Equity Market 
t-test:         
  Excess return  Excess beta return 
  DOWN1 UP2  DOWN UP 
Mean -0.53% 0.50%  -0.47% 0.60% 
Median -0.07% 0.19%  -0.18% 0.14% 
Std. Dev. 3.02% 2.08%  3.01% 2.04% 
Max 10.09% 11.47%  10.23% 10.98% 
Min -16.65% -3.31%  -17.36% -2.44% 
t-statistic -0.176 0.239  -0.156 0.293 
One-sided p-value 0.430 0.406   0.438 0.385 
      
Sign Test:       
  Excess return  Excess beta return 
  DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Sample size 112 68  99 62 
No. of Negatives 63 28  58 24 
No. of Positives 49 40  41 38 
One-sided p-value 0.110 0.091   0.054 0.049 
1DOWN denotes the watchlist announcement is for possible downgrades. 
2UP denotes the watchlist announcement is for possible upgrades. 
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Table 2.14. Results of Joint Tests for Watchlist Announcements in the Equity Market 
Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma Excess return Excess beta return 
Gamma 0.295 0.383 
Variance 0.0004 0.0005 
z-statistic 13.92 17.18 
Pearson's Chi-square Excess return Excess beta return 
Chi-square 16.42 16.58 
p-value 0.0001 <0.0001 
2.4.2.2 Moody’s Rating Change Announcements Afterwards 
There is no significant evidence of equity market reactions from either the t-test or 
sign test (see table 2.15). However, both Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma and Pearson’s chi-
square report significant evidence (see table 2.16). 
For rating downgrade or upgrade announcements, the signs of the two average excess 
returns are consistent with expectations, but none is significantly different from zero at any 
reasonable level. 
However, considering rating change announcements as a whole, the gamma of excess 
returns shows that the direction of rating changes can reduce 7.53% of prediction error in 
forecasting signs of returns at the 5% significance level. Similarly, the gamma of excess beta 
returns reports a 4.08% reduction, which is significant at the 0.05% level. Both chi-square 
statistics are significant at the 1% level, rejecting the null hypothesis of no relation between 
such announcements and signs of returns. 
2.4.2.3 Summary 
The equity market shows a strong reaction to watchlist announcements, regardless of 
directions, while no significant reactions are found to rating downgrade/upgrade 
announcements except when we take rating change announcements in general.  
Figures 2.9-2.12 show the density and cumulative density distributions of stock 
excess beta returns associated with the events. The cumulative density distributions of stock 
excess beta returns (in figures 2.11 and 2.12) can be clearly differentiated by announcement 
directions, but density distributions (in figures 2.9 and 2.10) have substantial overlapping.  
  
 
60 
Table 2.15. Results Summary for Rating Change Announcements in the Equity Market 
t-test:         
  Excess return  Excess beta return 
  DOWN1 UP2  DOWN UP 
Mean -0.15% 0.21%  -0.55% 0.21% 
Median 0.06% -0.07%  -0.06% 0.01% 
Std. Dev. 0.92% 1.56%  2.36% 1.84% 
Max 2.69% 3.79%  4.92% 5.53% 
Min -2.24% -1.83%  -12.78% -8.39% 
t-statistic -0.163 0.137  -0.232 0.112 
One-sided p-value 0.435 0.446   0.409 0.456 
      
Sign Test:       
  Excess return  Excess beta return 
  DOWN UP  DOWN UP 
Sample size 105 72  98 66 
No. of Negatives 55 35  51 33 
No. of Positives 50 37  47 33 
One-sided p-value 0.348 0.453   0.381 0.5 
1DOWN denotes the rating changes announcement is for downgrades. 
2UP denotes the rating changes announcement is for upgrades. 
 
Table 2.16. Results of Joint Tests for Rating Change Announcements in the Equity 
Market 
Goodman and Kruskal's Gamma Excess return Excess beta return 
Gamma 0.0753 0.0408 
Variance 0.0005 0.0006 
z-statistic 3.29 1.64 
Pearson's Chi-square Excess return Excess beta return 
Chi-square 6.63 6.61 
p-value 0.010 0.010 
 
However, all of them are better than the plots of stock excess returns (in appendix 
B.13-B.16). Watchlist announcements for both directions in figures 2.13 and 2.14 show 
considerably different frequencies of negative and positive returns. However, the evidence 
for excess beta returns is somewhat stronger. Hence, controlling for a stock’s beta is 
recommended in such studies. 
  
 
61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9. Density of Stock Excess Beta Returns Associated with Watchlist 
Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Density of Stock Excess Beta Returns Associated with Rating Change 
Announcements 
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Figure 2.11. Cumulative Density of Stock Excess Beta Returns Associated with 
Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Cumulative Density of Stock Excess Beta Returns Associated with Rating 
Change Announcements 
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Figure 2.13. Frequency of Negative and Positive Stock Excess Returns Associated with 
Credit Rating Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. Frequency of Negative and Positive Stock Excess Beta Returns Associated 
with Credit Rating Announcements 
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2.4.3 Results of First Order Stochastic Dominance Tests 
We assign a unique case number to each of the total 12 cases in our study as in table 
2.17. For example, bond excess return with the entire sample associated with watchlist 
placements is case number 1. We test for the first order stochastic dominance by considering 
k = 5 and 1030, and the significance levels of accepting HA2 in each case are reported in table 
2.18. When k = 5, all cases indicate that upgrades are first-order stochastically dominant over 
downgrades at least at 20% significance levels, except case 11 which accepts HA1 at 5% 
significance level. The results are consistent with the cumulative density plots in that, except 
for case 11, the cumulative density curves associated with upgrades are always to right of the 
cumulative density curves corresponding to downgrades. For case 11, the cumulative density 
curve of rating upgrades in figure B.16 intersects with rating downgrades three times. When 
k = 10, only 5 cases accept HA2 at least at 5% significance level, while others cannot even at 
20% significance level. Compared to other studies using thousands of observations, esp. 
Monte Carlo simulations, the difference between the results of k = 5 and k = 10 is expected 
to be the small sample size in the present paper. Hence, we can conclude that rating 
announcements with (possible) upgrades are stochastically dominant over (possible) 
downgrades by order 1. That is to say, investors in both bond and equity markets treat 
Moody’s rating (possible) upgrading/downgrading announcements as valuable 
positive/negative signals. 
Table 2.17. Description of Defined Cases’ Numbers 
     Watchlist placements 
Rating 
changes 
Entire sample 1 3 Excess return Straight-debt bonds 5 7 
Entire sample 2 4 Bond Excess rating 
return Straight-debt bonds 6 8 
Excess return 9 11 Stock 
Excess beta return 10 12 
 
                                                 
30
 Limited by the sample size, we prefer not to try large K values but 5 and 10. 
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Table 2.18. Significance Levels of First Order Stochastic Dominance Tests 
Case No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
k=5 5% 1% 10% 5% 5% 5% 20% 20% 20% 1% Note 2 10% 
k=10 1% 1% - 5% - 1% - - - 1% - - 
Note 1: "-" represents that the significance level is greater than 20%. 
Note 2: Case 11 accepts HA1 at 5% significance level. 
2.4.4 Comparison of Bond and Equity Markets 
In general, we find stronger evidence of reactions to credit rating announcements in 
the bond market, than in the equity market. Both bond excess returns and bond excess rating 
returns show significant evidence of market reactions to watchlist announcements for 
possible downgrades, watchlist announcements in general, rating downgrade announcements, 
and rating change announcements in general. Bond excess rating returns also report strong 
evidence of bond market reactions to watchlist announcements for possible upgrades and 
rating upgrade announcements. However, stock excess returns and excess beta returns only 
show significant evidence of equity market reactions to watchlist announcements for possible 
downgrades/upgrades, watchlist announcements in general, and rating change 
announcements in general. Compared to the bond market, the equity market provides weaker 
evidence of reactions to rating downgrade/upgrade announcements. In addition, the 
significance level of the evidence in the bond market is typically smaller than in the equity 
market.  
However, none of the markets reports an average return significantly different from 
zero as a reaction to credit rating announcements by the t-test. That is to say, comparing to no 
rating announcements, the average returns associated with rating announcements are not 
statistically different. But if we compare the distribution of returns associated with rating 
upgrade announcements with the distribution of returns associated with rating downgrade 
announcements, they are statistically different by the first order stochastic dominance test. 
The different results come from the testing method itself. The t-test only employs two 
moments of the distribution (i.e., the mean and the variance), while stochastic dominance test 
utilize the entire distribution. Hence, we conclude that rating upgrade/downgrade 
announcement is a valid good/bad signal for the company in the market.  
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Wansley and Clauretie (1985) and Hand et al. (1992) find significant bond market 
reactions to watchlist placements only. In contrast, the present study finds strong evidence to 
both watchlist and rating change announcements. The literature on equity market reactions 
find significant evidence to rating downgrades but not to rating upgrades, while there are not 
many studies for watchlist placements. Our findings are consistent with the literature for 
rating upgrades. However, we do not find any strong evidence of reactions to rating 
downgrades. In addition, we find strong equity market reactions to watchlist placements.  
Previous studies usually find more evidence of reactions in equity markets than in 
bond markets, by reporting significant average returns. However, we fail to reject t-tests that 
mean returns are not significantly different from zero. The possible reason for this is that our 
sample size is not large enough. On the other hand, our study reports more evidence of bond 
market reactions by other analyses, i.e. sign tests, Pearson’s chi-square tests, Goodman and 
Kruskal's gamma statistics, and first order stochastic dominance tests, which have seldom 
been used before. Also, previous studies usually control for the risk-free rate in bond returns 
but we also control for the default risk premium. Bond excess rating returns in our sample 
show stronger and more consistent evidence than excess returns. However, researchers 
usually control for a stock’s beta, market-to-book ratio and other financials; we are only able 
to control for beta. This could be a reason why we find less evidence in equity markets. The 
evidence of market reactions for stock excess returns and excess beta returns is similar, while 
that for excess beta returns is somewhat stronger. Hence, controlling for default risk premium 
is beneficial for bond market studies, while controlling for beta coefficients does not appear 
to make much of a difference for equity market studies. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examines bond and equity market reactions to Moody’s credit rating 
announcements, namely, watchlist placement and actual rating changes following such 
placements. We employ three returns in bond markets, namely, bond gross returns, bond 
excess returns (controlling for risk-free rate), and bond excess rating returns (controlling for 
the default risk premium), and two returns in equity markets, which are stock excess returns 
based on a market model and stock excess beta returns based on a beta portfolio. The t-tests 
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of average returns do not find any significant evidence of market reactions to either 
announcement. However, other tests (i.e., sign tests, Pearson’s chi-square tests, and 
Goodman and Kruskal's gamma statistics) report significant bond and equity market 
reactions to watchlist placement for possible downgrades/upgrades, watchlist placement 
general, and rating changes general. The bond market also shows a significant reaction to 
rating upgrade/downgrade announcements. The results suggest that we find stronger 
evidence of bond market reactions to credit rating announcements because we control for 
both the risk-free rate and the default risk premium. In addition, the returns associated with 
rating downgrades are first order stochastically dominated by the returns corresponding to 
rating upgrades. It shows that rating downgrades/upgrades are truly valuable information for 
investors and this conclusion is more reliable than it from the t-test, especially with a small 
sample size. 
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CHAPTER 3. MATCHING IPO ISSUERS AND 
UNDERWRITERS AND EFFECT OF UNDERWRITER 
REPUTATION ON IPO UNDERPRICING  
3.1 Introduction 
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) is an effort made by a private firm to raise external 
capital in a public equity market. As there is asymmetric information between the issuing 
firm and the market, the former usually chooses an underwriter to help it sell the offered 
shares to the public. This begs an answer to the question of how an issuing firm chooses an 
underwriter. Do different types of issuing firms have any preference over specific 
underwriters? As it is difficult to gather information about each issuer’s selection set of 
underwriters before an IPO, we can only show the matched evidence from observed offerings.  
A related issue of interest regarding IPOs is the relation between an underwriter’s 
reputation and an IPO’s underpricing. Intuitively, high-reputation underwriters should be 
more knowledgeable in evaluating the offerings, so that they should be associated with 
smaller underpricings than low-reputation underwriters. Hence, we examine this hypothesis 
by looking at the entire sample and two types of subsamples. 
The present paper has three primary objectives. First, the study examines the potential 
preference of issuing firms over underwriter reputation, with issuers grouped by the state of 
incorporations or the industry they belong to. Second, the analysis tries to find how an 
underwriter’s characteristics are associated with its reputation. Third, the paper examines the 
effect of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing. 
3.1.1 Literature Review 
The empirical literature on IPOs focuses on three major areas of inquiry. The first one 
investigates the reasons why firms go public. Theories trying to answer such a question 
include life-cycle theories (Zingales (1995), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), and 
Maksimovic and Pichler (2001)) and market-timing theories (Lucas and McDonald (1990), 
and Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993)). Empirically testing the determinants of the decision to 
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go public is difficult because only the firms actually going public are observed. However, 
using data from Italian firms, Pagano et al. (1998) apply a probit model to analyze the 
decision to go public by comparing the ex-ante characteristics of IPO firms and other private 
firms. They find that the two primary factors affecting the probability of going public are the 
average market-to-book ratio in the industry and the size of the company. Comparing the ex 
post characteristics of IPO firms and other private firms by nonparametric methods, they 
examine the consequences of the decision to go public on the company’s investment and 
financials, especially the cost of bank credit and profitability after IPO. Analysing one 
industry in the U.S., Lerner (1994) confirms Pagano et al.’s finding (1998) that market-to-
book ratio is an important determinant of the IPO decision. 
The second focus of the IPO literature is the allocation of shares and IPO short-run 
and long-run performance. The allocation of shares examines how IPOs are allocated to 
investors and how their shares trade. Increasing attention on share allocation is related to IPO 
short-run underpricing and long-run underperformance, especially the relation between IPO 
underpricing and underwriter reputation. There is ample evidence that IPOs managed by 
prestigious banks are less likely to exhibit short-run underpricing than IPOs managed by less 
prestigious banks, and that prestigious banks tend to be associated with less-risky IPOs than 
their nonprestigious counterparts. Most previous empirical studies in this area have used OLS 
regression models, such as Logue (1973), Johnson and Miller (1988), Carter and Manaster 
(1990), Carter, Dark and Singh (1998), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001), Cooney, Singh, Carter 
and Dark (2001), Bradley, Cooney, Jordan and Singh (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
Logue (1973) shows that the average short-run underpricing measure associated with 
prestigious underwriters is 40% of that associated with nonprestigious underwriters during 
March 1965 and February 1969. Johnson and Miller (1988) find a negative relation between 
banker prestige and IPO underpricing during the 1981-1983 period; however, such relation 
disappears when initial returns are adjusted for risk. Carter and Manaster (1990) find a 
significantly negative coefficient on underwriter reputation in the regression of the price run-
up from 1979 to 1983, which indicates that IPOs managed by prestigious banks should be 
associated with a smaller price run-up. Carter et al. (1998) report that the estimated 
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coefficients on three underwriter reputation measures31 in the regression of market-adjusted 
initial return are all significantly negative during the 1979 to 1991 period. Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) control for the issuer’s endogenous choice of underwriters and report a 
negative32 relation between underpricing and underwriter reputation during 1991 through 
1995. Cooney et al. (2001) examine whether there is a flipped relation between IPO initial 
return and underwriter reputation in the 1990s. They report such a significantly negative 
relation in the 1980s and an insignificantly positive relation in the 1990s. In addition, they 
show that such inverse relation is consistent only for those IPOs priced within the filing 
range in both subperiods. However, Bradley et al. (2002) show that high-reputation 
underwriters are associated with smaller (larger) underpricing in the 1980s (during 1991 
through 1998), while no significant relation is found during the internet bubble. Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) argue that IPO’s underpricing has changed over time. High-reputation 
underwriters are associated with greater underpricing in the 1990s (i.e. the internet bubble 
years), than in the 1980s, which is consistent with the results from OLS and two-stage 
procedures that control for the endogeneity of the issuer’s selection of a lead underwriter. 
The third focus of the IPO literature concerns the development of suitable measures 
of underwriter reputation. Logue (1973) is among the first to develop a measure of 
underwriter reputation. Carter and Manaster (1990) use underwriters' relative placements in 
the stock offering announcement to rank their reputation. As the Carter-Manaster (CM) 
method requires a substantial amount of work to check the impact of each tombstone 
announcement on every underwriter reputation ranking, Johnson and Miller (1988) and 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) use modifications of the CM method. The Johnson-Miller (JM) 
method sorts underwriters into four categories according to several measurements, whereas 
the Megginson-Weiss (MW) method takes the relative market share as a proxy for the 
underwriter reputation. Carter et al. (1998) report that in the context of short-run and long-
run IPO performance, the CM measure is the most significant underwriter reputation index 
among the three measures CM, JM, and MW. Recently, Carter and Dark (2007) introduced 
                                                 
31
 For each regression equation, a different reputation measure is included but all other independent variables are the same. 
32
 When they directly apply an OLS regression on underpricing without controlling for that endogeneity, the estimated 
coefficient of underwriter reputation rank is positive, which is counterintuitive. 
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an adjusted CM method, which is obtained by adjusting the CM measure by the average offer 
price of IPOs that an underwriter has managed during each 5-year period. 
3.1.2 Issuer’s Choice of Underwriter 
Interestingly, the literature has paid relatively little attention to the issuing firm's 
choice of underwriters. Johnson and Miller (1988), Carter and Manaster (1990) and Fernando 
Gatchev and Spindt (2005) are among those few who have investigated this issue. Johnson 
and Miller (1988) find that prestigious banks are associated with less risky IPOs than 
nonprestigious banks. Carter and Manaster (1990) find a significantly lower average 
aftermarket return for IPOs associated with the prestigious underwriter group, compared to 
the nonprestigious underwriter group. Both empirical results support the hypothesis that 
higher underwriter reputation is associated with the marketing of lower risk IPOs. In contrast 
with the above two studies, Fernando et al. (2005) start from a theoretical standpoint. They 
set up a model assuming that issuers and underwriters associate by mutual choice, and 
underwriter ability and issuer quality are complementary. They derive a condition under 
which issuers and underwriters will have a positive assortative matching, such that 
underwriter ability and issuer quality have a positive correlation. Using OLS regression, they 
find that reputable underwriters are associated with firms that are less risky and larger in size. 
However, they include IPO proceeds as an explanatory variable into the regression, which is 
ex-post information. It is under debate whether it is appropriate to include ex-post 
information as a regressor. 
In the present study we assume that the issuer chooses from a set of possible 
underwriters, as a one-sided selection. It may be argued that underwriters can choose to 
participate in the offering or not, which means they may have influence on the matched 
evidence. Since we are only interested in examining how issuer’s characteristics are 
associated with underwriter reputation, we assume that issuers are rational and they can 
correctly predict whether high-reputation underwriters will reject them. In other words, the 
present paper analyzes how issuers form their beliefs about which level of underwriter 
reputation to go with. Since we only observe issuers’ actual choices of underwriters, we can 
only examine issuing firms' preferences over underwriters in the context of the matched 
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evidence. However, we only use ex-ante information in order to mimic the real selection 
environment. Different from the methods used in the literature, we apply the Generalized 
Linear Model (GLM) with fixed and mixed effects to examine whether an issuer’s choice of 
a lead underwriter is affected by its characteristics, or whether there are state- or industry-
specific effects.  
Then we examine how the market ranks underwriters. As the CM measure is derived 
from the relative placement of underwriters in the tombstone announcement, there is no 
direct explanation of how underwriters are placed in order. This brings the question of 
whether we can explicitly find a relationship between an underwriter’s characteristics and its 
reputation measure. 
3.1.3 Underwriter Reputation and IPO Underpricing 
Lastly, we examine the effect of underwriter reputation on IPO short-run 
underpricing. The main problem to analyze this issue is that we observe the outcome where 
each IPO is associated with a specific underwriter, but we cannot observe the counterfactual. 
That is to say, if an issuer chooses a high-reputation underwriter, we cannot observe the 
underpricing that would have resulted from choosing a low-reputation underwriter. Because 
we can observe only one underpricing for each issuer, some degree of speculation is needed 
to find a counterpart for calculating the difference in underpricing if the issuer changed the 
choice of underwriter to a different reputation level. In addition, direct comparison of IPO 
underpricings associated with high-reputation and low-reputation underwriters in a non-
experimental setting is contaminated by the process of issuers selecting underwriters, which 
needs to be controlled for. 
Previous studies typically use OLS regressions of IPO underpricing with underwriter 
reputation as a dummy variable, ignoring the unobserved counterfactual problem. They test 
whether underwriter reputation can help explain the variation of the associated IPO 
underpricing, and arrive at conclusions based on the sign of the estimated regression 
coefficient on underwriter reputation. Nonparametric analyses are also sometimes employed, 
by performing t-test of the mean underpricing. Some other studies control for the 
endogeneity of the issuer’s selection of the lead underwriter by a two-stage OLS regression 
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model. However, the empirical results are mixed. Most of the earlier studies show a 
significant negative relation between IPO underpricing and underwriter reputation. However, 
more recent studies find a flipped relation in 1990s. [See Logue (1973), Johnson and Miller 
(1988), Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter, Dark and Singh (1998), Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001), Cooney et al. (2001), Bradley et al. (2002), and Loughran and Ritter (2004).]  
    In contrast to the literature, we consider the unobserved counterfactual problem and 
the underwriter selection process, by matching issuers who choose high-reputation 
underwriters with those who choose low-reputation underwriters. We find issuers matching 
as close as possible so that we can use the matched IPO underpricings to estimate the 
unobserved counterfactual underpricings. This method is often called estimating treatment 
effect, and the treatment and the effect in our case are the high reputation of an underwriter 
and the associated IPO underpricing, respectively.  
Early studies applying this method used plain matches, where the treatment group is 
matched with the control group directly by their characteristics. This procedure is helpful 
when there are only a few observed variables, e.g., categorical variables, but not when the 
number of variables is large, as in the case of continuous variables. In order to overcome the 
dimensionality problem, the propensity score matching method has been utilized more 
recently. Propensity score matching matches observations by the estimated conditional 
probability of them receiving/choosing the treatment given their observed characteristics. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove that the propensity score is sufficient to remove the bias 
due to the unobserved counterfactual problem. In our case, we match issuers by the estimated 
conditional probability of them choosing high-reputation underwriters based on the observed 
characteristics of issuers and IPOs before the offerings. There are several matching methods, 
such as nearest neighbor matching, nearest K neighbors matching, caliper matching, 
stratification matching, and kernel matching. Here we employ the most popular two, namely, 
nearest neighbor matching and caliper matching. In order to examine whether IPO 
underpricing is sensitive to other characteristics, such as time periods33 or location of the 
                                                 
33
 This idea is motivated by Bradley et al. (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
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offer price to the filed price range in the prospectus34, we stratify the entire sample into 
different subsamples and analyze the treatment effects separately. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model 
specification and methodology, and section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 presents the 
empirical results and section 3.5 concludes. 
 3.2 Model Specification and Methodology 
As mentioned in section 3.1.2, we employ GLM with fixed and mixed effects to 
match issuers and underwriters by their respective ex-ante characteristics. In addition, an 
OLS regression is applied to examine the relation between underwriter reputation measures 
and underwriters’ characteristics. The final objective discussed in section 3.1.3, i.e., the 
treatment effect of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing, is examined by propensity 
score matching methods. 
3.2.1 Generalized Linear Model  
If data are collected in clusters, e.g., the issuer’s state and industry, the assumption 
that iy  is independently distributed in the natural exponential family will be violated. In 
order to examine the inter-cluster effect, we introduce a random effect into GLM. However, 
we need to find out whether the random effects we are interested in are large enough to 
impact our model selection between GLM with fixed effects and GLM with mixed effects. 
Hence, we match issuers and underwriters first by GLM with fixed effects and then by GLM 
with mixed effects. 
Let 1=iy  if an issuer chooses a high-reputation underwriter and 0=iy  if an issuer 
chooses a low-reputation underwriter. In GLM, )(⋅E denotes the expectation operator, ijx  is 
the ex-ante characteristics of issuers and IPOs, jβ  is the coefficient of the fixed effect, iα  is 
the random effect. 
                                                 
34
 Cooney et al. (2001) and Bradley et al. (2002) examined this topic. 
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3.2.1.1 GLM with Fixed Effects 
A generalized linear model with fixed effects for binary data has three components, a 
random component, a systematic component, and a link function. The random component iy  
has a distribution in the natural exponential family, such that we can define the expectation of 
iy  as iiyE π=][ . The systematic component iη  consists of a linear combination in ix , such 
that ∑=
j
jiji x βη . Finally the link function )(⋅g  builds the connection between the systematic 
and the random component, such that iig ηπ =][ . 
In our case, iy is a binary variable assumed to follow a binomial distribution. Thus, 
we employ a logit link to restrict the estimated probability in the range of [0, 1], which is 
better than the identity link (i.e. ππ =)( ig ), such that: 
∑==− j jijii
i x βη
π
π
1
log . 
Following Maximum Likelihood Estimation, the estimation equation is obtained as follows: 
∑ =−∗∗=∂
∂
i
iiiji
j
yxnL 0)( π
β
. 
As iπ is a function of jβ , we get estimates of jβ  by solving the estimation equation above. 
3.2.1.2 GLM with Mixed Effects 
Similar to GLM with fixed effects, a generalized linear model with mixed effects for 
binary data also has three components. The GLM with mixed effects has 
iiiyE πα =][ , ∑+=
j
jijii x βαη  and iig ηπ =][ , with the random term iα  being the difference 
between the mixed-effect and the fixed-effect models. We assume that ),0(~ 2δα Ni , which 
indicates that we are only interested in the standard deviation of the random effect. The 
random effects we focus on are the issuer’s state and industry, respectively.  
Following our application of the GLM with fixed effects, for the mixed-effect model 
we also employ a logit link: 
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Estimates for both fixed effects jβ  and random effects iα  can be computed by means of 
Penalized Quasi-Likelihood estimation. 
3.2.2 OLS Regression 
To examine the relation between underwriter reputations and underwriter’s 
characteristics, we employ the OLS regression method as follows 
εβ += ∗∗ XY , and ),0(~ 2δε N , 
where ∗Y  is the underwriter reputation measure (CMOP), and *X is the vector containing 
underwriter’s characteristics. Instead of the binary choice variable iy , in this OLS regression 
we use the continuous underwriter reputation measure CMOP as the dependent variable. As 
the CMOP measure is adjusted by the average offer price of IPOs that an underwriter has 
managed during the 5-year period which includes the year of the offering, an underwriter’s 
IPOs performance is included in the dependent variable. Hence, we limit independent 
variables to underwriters’ characteristics. 
3.2.3 Estimating Treatment Effect by Propensity Score Matching 
3.2.3.1 Estimating Treatment Effect 
Let 1U  and 0U  be the IPO underpricing with a high-reputation underwriter and with a 
low-reputation underwriter, respectively. We define IPO underpricing as: 
 U = (Close price of the first trading day – Offer price) / Offer price. 
The treatment here is the high reputation of an underwriter that an issuer selects for its 
offering. The so-called control group consists of the issuers that select low-reputation 
underwriters. The propensity score )(XP  is the estimated conditional probability of issuers 
choosing high-reputation underwriters. 
Typically, there are three treatment effects considered in the literature, namely, the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE), the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT), and 
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the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE). As our interest is to find that how much underpricing 
is related to underwriter reputation if an issuer chooses a high-reputation underwriter, in our 
study we focus on ATT. The ATT is defined as follows: 
  )1,|( 01 =−= YXUUEATT , 
and the bias is: 
)1,|()]0,|()1,|([)( 0101 =−−=−== YXUUEYXUEYXUEATTBias  
        )0,|()1,|( 00 =−== YXUEYXUE . 
ATT is the mean difference between the observed and the matched outcomes for the treated. 
The bias of ATT is the mean difference between the matched outcome for the treated and the 
observed outcomes for the control.  
 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show in Theorem 4 that if the treatment assignment is 
strongly ignorable and the propensity score is a balancing score, the estimated ATT is 
unbiased, i.e. 0)( =ATTBias . The strongly ignorable treatment assignment indicates that 
even though the treatment effect might be correlated with the treatment assignment, once we 
control for the units’ characteristics they are not correlated. This is to say,  
)|()]0,|()1,|( 111 XUEYXUEYXUE ==== , 
and  
)|()]0,|()1,|( 000 XUEYXUEYXUE ==== . 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove in Theorem 3 that if the treatment assignment is strongly 
ignorable given the units’ characteristics, it will be also strongly ignorable given any 
balancing propensity score based on the units’ characteristics.  
Under the assumption of one-sided selection stated in section 3.1.2, our case satisfies 
the above condition because each issuer has a chance to choose from high-reputation 
underwriters and low-reputation underwriters before the offering. Based on their 
characteristics, they might select to send proposals to underwriters with reputation in one 
level only or both. Finally, they select one lead underwriter, based on their endogenous 
decision. Hence, if we can observe enough information about issuers and IPOs, we can get a 
good estimation of the selection process. Even though the propensity score function is 
unknown in a nonrandomized case, people can estimate it from the observed information. In 
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this paper, the choice of treatment is assumed to be determined in the fashion of a standard 
GLM with fixed effects and a logit link, which is the same model as the one already 
presented in section 3.2.1. However, the linear component iη  will depend on the best-fit 
model developed later in section 3.4.1. 
A balancing propensity score is a function of the observed information regarding 
units, such that the conditional distribution of the observed information of units based on the 
propensity score is the same for the treated group as for the control group. This is more 
concerned for a nonrandomized case where it is more likely for the treated and control units 
to have significantly different characteristics, which could make the direct comparison of the 
treatment effect less useful. The notation for this condition is: 
  )(| XPYX ⊥ , 
where ⊥  means independence and | means conditional on. We need to test the balancing of 
the best-fit logit model reported in section 3.4.1 before estimating the treatment effect. 
 If the strong ignorable treatment assignment and the balancing propensity score are 
both satisfied in our sample, the estimation of treatment effect will generate an unbiased 
estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated. We already explain that our case 
satisfies the former condition such that we only need to test and choose a balancing 
propensity score to get an unbiased ATT estimate. 
3.2.3.2 Propensity Score Matching Estimators 
There are several methods for propensity score matching and the estimator takes the 
generalized form for ATT: 
∑ −==−=
i
ii
i
UU
n
YXUUEATT ]ˆ[1)1,|( 0101 , 
with 
 j
j
i UjiWU 01 ),(ˆ ⋅=∑ , 
where ),(ˆ jiW is the weight that depends upon the distance between the propensity scores for 
i and j, and is different for different estimation methods. For convenience of calculation, we 
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employ the nearest matching method. For a more precise estimation, we employ the caliper 
matching method.  
The nearest matching method matches the conditional probability of an issuer 
choosing a high-reputation underwriter in the treated group with the closest such probability 
in the control group. It ensures that the distance of the propensity scores between the treated 
and the matched is smallest; however, it does not place restrictions on how large the distance 
has to be. It is defined as follows: 


 −=
=
otherwise
XPXPjjiW ji
,0
|)(ˆ)(ˆ|minarg,1),(ˆ , 
where the weight is 1 for the matched propensity score and 0 otherwise. 
 The caliper matching method matches the conditional probability of an issuer 
choosing a high-reputation underwriter in the treated group with such probabilities in the 
control group that are at a smaller distance than a specified radius. This method ensures that 
we use only good matches and as many as there are available, which increases the precision 
of the estimation at the cost of increasing bias. It is defined as follows: 



 <−
=
otherwise
cXPXP
njiW jii
,0
|)(ˆ)(ˆ|,1),(ˆ , 
where in  denotes the number of caliper matches in the control group for unit i, and c denotes 
the specified radius. The weights are equally distributed among the caliper matches. 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 Data Description 
The initial sample of IPOs is collected from the Thomson Financial SDC database35 
with all U.S. domestic IPOs for the years 1981 through 2000. After removing unit offerings, 
closed-end funds, REITS, limited partnerships, and stocks with offering prices of less than 
$2, the sample has 5,077 IPOs left. The data include the issuing firm's name, offering date, 
                                                 
35
 We obtain the data from Professor Richard Carter, who obtained the data originally from the subscribed database, 
Thomson Financial SDC. 
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offer price, highest and lowest filed price, number of shares offered, total shares after 
offering, lead underwriter's name, underwriting fee, exchange market, SIC code, and issuer's 
state. 
The issuing firm's financial statement variables, such as total sales, net income, cash 
flows and total assets in the year prior to the IPO, are obtained from the Standard and Poor's 
Compustat database36. Because there is often insufficient time to accumulate annual data 
prior to the IPO and data from some firms were either purged from or never included in the 
Compustat database, we only have financial statement data for a limited number of firms. 
Wherever partial year data are reported, we annualize them to facilitate comparisons. 
After removing IPOs without issuer's financial statement variables, the final sample 
consists of 3,201 offerings. The average size of these 3,201 offerings is $61.33 million. The 
largest size is $1,425 million and the smallest size is $1.5 million. 
Underwriter headquarter location is hand-collected from various issues of the 
Security Year Book. Underwriter’s total capital and number of institutional sales force are 
also collected from the Security Year Book37. The final sample for the OLS regression 
consists of 77 underwriters from 1980 to 1996. 
3.3.2 The Underwriter Reputation Variable 
The CM measure is calculated from the tombstone announcement, which is a listing 
of pending public security offerings. This announcement shows the offer price and the 
investment banks in the underwriting syndicate from the lead to the co-lead. The 
position/order of an investment bank in the announcement reflects its reputation. Usually, the 
most prestigious underwriters are listed first, followed by the second most prestigious banks, 
and finally the least prestigious underwriters are listed. The CM measure is determined by 
underwriters' relative positions in these tombstone announcements. The CM measure ranges 
from zero to nine, with a higher value indicating a higher reputation. Underwriters with CM 
measure nine were never dominated in the tombstone announcements, whereas underwriters 
with CM measure zero never ranked above any other underwriters. 
                                                 
36
 We get the data from Professor Richard Carter and he gets it originally from the subscribed database, S&P's Compustat. 
37
 We get underwriter’s total capital and the number of institutional sales force from Professor Carter, who gathered the 
information from the Security Year Book. 
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Loughran and Ritter (2004) point out that a potential flaw of the CM measure is that 
penny-stock 38  underwriters might never be assigned low CM values, as they are never 
allowed to participate in a syndicate of prestigious underwriters. This problem is 
systematically and objectively accounted for in Carter and Dark (2007) by the CMOP 
measure, which is calculated as: 
CMOP = CM * (Average offer price of underwriters' IPOs) / 100. 
Because the CMOP measure decreases the ranking of the penny stock underwriters through 
their low average offer prices, we use the CMOP measure of underwriter reputation in this 
paper. 
The CMOP measures in our sample range from a minimum of 0.02 to a maximum of 
1.70 (see summary in table 3.1). So we use the median CMOP measure 1.11 as the threshold 
to classify underwriter reputation as high or low. If the CMOP measure of an underwriter is 
greater than 1.11, it is classified as a high reputation. If the CMOP measure of an underwriter 
is less than or equal to 1.11, it is classified as a low reputation. We denote the variable "UW" 
to represent reputation, as follows: 



≤
>
=
1.11,0
1.11,1
CMOPif
CMOPif
UW . 
3.3.3 Other Variables 
Other variables included in the model (see summary in table 3.1) are issuer’s age 
(AGE), issuer’s assets (AST), expected offer size (EOS), expected offer price (EOP), issuer's 
leverage ratio (LE), issuer's Standard Industry Code (SIC), state where the issuer is 
headquartered (ST), underwriter’s total capital (CAP), underwriter’s headquarter location 
(HQ), size of underwriter’s institutional sales force (INST) and IPO’s underpricing (U). 
These variables are measured as follows. 
                                                 
38
 Penny-stock underwriters are underwriters associated with IPOs which have low offer prices, usually less than five 
dollars, and are not traded on NASDAQ or listed on a stock exchange. Under federal securities laws, a penny stock is 
defined generally as: an equity security that is not listed on NASDAQ or a national securities exchange and either (a) has a 
price per share that is less than $5 or (b) whose issuer has net tangible assets that are less than $2 million, if the issuer has 
been in continuous operation for at least three years; or a market capitalization less than $5 million, if the issuer has been in 
continuous operation for less than three years; or whose average revenues are less than $6 million for the last three years. 
See Section 3(a)(51) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(51), and Rule 3a51-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.3a51-1. 
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AGE is the number of years the issuer has been in the industry a year prior to the IPO. 
AGE is a proxy for issuer’s reputation in the industry. Alternatively, AGE can be interpreted 
as an indicator of difficulties in evaluating the issuer.  
AST is total assets of an issuer a year prior to IPO, in millions of dollars.  
CAP is the underwriter’s total capital at the year of the offering, in billions of dollars. 
It is defined as the sum of equity and liabilities. 
EOP is a proxy for expected offer price of an IPO, in dollars. It is the mid-point of the 
highest and the lowest filed price written in the contract.  
EOS is a proxy for expected offer size of an IPO, in millions of dollars. It is EOP 
times the expected offering shares written in the contract. 
HQ is a dummy variable of underwriter headquarter location. We define HQ=1 if 
underwriters have headquarters in New York, otherwise HQ=0. 
INST is the number of people in the underwriter’s institutional sales force that the 
investment bank has during each five-year period that includes the offering year. The 
institutional sales force is not owned by the investment bank, but contracted by it to engage 
in the sales for the investment bank. 
LE is the issuer’s leverage ratio defined as total liabilities over total assets. It 
represents the risk of the issuing firm before IPO.  
SIC is the issuing firm's Standard Industry Code. There are 5 categories. ‘A’ 
represents Manufacturing, ‘B’ represents Utility, ‘C’ represents Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
‘D’ represents Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, and ‘E’ represents Services. 
ST is the state in which the issuing firm has its headquarter. There are 5 categories. 
‘A’ represents New York, ‘B’ represents California, ‘C’ represents Illinois, ‘D’ represents 
New Jersey, and ‘E’ represents other states. 
VC is a dummy variable indicating whether there is venture capital investment in an 
issuing firm before an IPO. VC=1 if there is venture capital, otherwise VC=0. 
U is the IPO’s short-run underpricing, which is calculated as U = (Close price of the 
first trading day – Offer price) / Offer price. 
For estimation purposes, we use the natural logarithm of AGE, AST, EOP, EOS, and 
LE in our model as LN(AGE), LN(AST), LN(EOP), LN(EOS), and LN(LE). The major 
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reason is to adjust variable skewness by normalizing. Also, most of the literature utilizes the 
natural logarithm transformation. 
Table 3.1. Data Summary 
Continuous Variables Mean Median STD Min Max Obs. 
Issuer's age (AGE) 12.91 7 18.44 1 161 3201 
Issuer's total asset (AST) 220.57 62.58 636.11 1.01 8591.80 3201 
Underwriter reputation measure 
(CMOP) 1.07 1.11 0.36 0.02 1.70 3201 
Expected offer size (EOS) 59.24 33.00 98.66 1.50 1500.00 3201 
Expected offer price (EOP) 12.56 12.00 3.84 2.00 33.00 3201 
Issuer's leverage ratio (LE) 1.99 0.50 17.31 0.01 919.14 3201 
IPO's underpricing (U) 24.21% 8.91% 50.56% -34.38% 697.50% 3201 
Underwriter's institutional sales 
force (INST) 398.67 250 411.23 54 2000 77 
Underwriter's total capital 
(CAP) 5.53 1.24 12.31 0.03 56.61 77 
       
Dummy Variables 0 1 Obs.    
Underwriter's headquarter 
location (HQ) 41 36 77    
Issuer's selection of underwriter 
reputation ( iy ) 1552 1649 3201    
Venture Capital backing (VC) 1833 1368 3201    
 
Categorical Variables Manufacturing Utility Trade Finance Service Others Obs. 
Issuer's industry (SIC) 1210 240 398 199 1044 110 3201 
  New York California Illinois New Jersey Others Obs.  
Issuer's state (ST) 220 864 104 104 1909 3201  
  
 
85 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Issuer’s Selection of Underwriter 
3.4.1.1 GLM with Fixed Effects 
The dependent variable is iy , a binary variable denoting whether an issuing firm 
chooses a high-reputation underwriter ( 1=iy ) or not ( 0=iy ). The explanatory variables are 
LN(AGE), LN(AST), LN(EOS), LN(LE), and LN(EOP) 39 . As all individual Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIFs) are less than 4 and the average VIF is 2.15, there is no indication of 
collinearity problems in the linear regression.40 We double check the correlation between 
EOS and EOP, because EOS is generated by EOP times the expected offering shares, which 
may involve a collinearity problem. Since the correlation between EOS and EOP is only 
51%41, combined with the result from VIFs, we are confident to include both EOS and EOP 
as explanatory variables. The intuition for including both of them is that EOS represents the 
expected total value of the offering, which is a mass problem, whereas EOP represents the 
expected offer price, which is a quality problem. It is not necessarily that an offering with a 
larger size has a larger offer price. Hence, EOS and EOP need to be considered at the same 
time.  
We use the forward selection method to fit the model, starting from a null 
specification with the scope of all 2-way interactions. The best-fit model is 
i
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i
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The estimation results are reported in table 3.2. 
 
 
                                                 
39
 As we fit the sample into a mixed model and introduce random effects by issuer's state or Standard Industry Code, we 
cannot include variables ST or SIC into the fixed effects. 
40
 When the individual VIF is greater than 10 or the average VIF exceeds 6, the regression model needs inspection on either 
individual variables or the whole set of variables for collinearity problems. 
41
 When performing a simple test for collinearity, typically the correlation between the two variables is used directly. When 
the correlation is larger than 0.9, we would further inspect the two variables for collinearity problems.  
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Table 3.2. Results from GLM with Fixed Effects 
  Estimates Std. Error 
Intercept -14.00 1.00*** 
LN(AGE) -0.14 0.05*** 
LN(AST) 0.37 0.07*** 
LN(EOS) 4.30 0.46*** 
[LN(EOS)]2 -0.39 0.06*** 
LN(LEV) -0.12 0.04*** 
LN(EOP) 1.00 0.24*** 
VC 0.18 0.09** 
Null deviance 4434.6 on 3200 df 
Residual deviance 3002.5 on 3193 df 
AIC 3018.5   
1. Signif. codes:  0.1% '***', 1% '**',  5% '*'. 
 
All of the coefficient estimates in the best-fit model are significant at the 1% level or 
higher. The best fit model indicates that issuing firms with fewer years in the industry, more 
assets, a larger expected offer size, a smaller leverage ratio, a higher expected offer price, or 
having venture capital backing, tend to choose high-reputation underwriters.  
As the issuer’s age is a proxy for issuer’s own reputation in its industry, it is intuitive 
for an issuer to take its own reputation as a complement of underwriter reputation when 
selling the shares. Another argument is that if an issuer stays longer in the industry, there will 
be more public information in the market to facilitate evaluating the offering by underwriters 
and investors. However, it will be harder to look into all of the complex corporate conditions 
developed over the years (such as structure and culture). From our model, the estimated 
coefficient (-0.14) shows that the overall marginal effect of AGE on the choice of 
underwriter reputation is substitutionary. This indicates that a firm with more years in the 
industry has better reputation and does not need the high reputation of an underwriter for 
marketing purposes. Also, our result supports the hypothesis that historical information of the 
issuing firms reduces the need for the evaluation knowledge of high-reputation underwriters. 
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When an issuer has more assets, a larger expected offer size42, or a higher expected 
offer price, it faces the mass problem of selling a large amount equity to the market, and a 
quality problem of selling each share at a high price. To avoid the mass problem, issuers need 
underwriters with a large sales force. To solve the quality problem, issuers need underwriters 
with better knowledge for evaluation purpose and more reliable ways of signaling. The 
positive coefficients (0.37 for LN(AST), 4.30 for LN(EOS), and 1.00 for LN(EOP)) indicate 
that issuers expect high-reputation underwriters to help them solve mass and quality 
problems. This raises the question of how underwriter reputation matches with underwriter’s 
own characteristics, which is investigated in section 3.4.2. 
If an issuer has a larger leverage ratio a year prior to the IPO, it will tend to choose a 
low reputation underwriter. Because leverage ratio is a proxy for the risk of the offering, a 
risky issuer may expect its offering to disqualify for the quality requirement from high-
reputation underwriters of a relatively steady aftermarket performance. Another argument 
focuses on the underwriter’s ability to identify the potential risk of the offering. Titmand and 
Truemen (1986) show that prestigious underwriters are good at identifying the risk level of 
the offering and they charge a higher fee for riskier IPOs. So it is beneficial only for low risk 
issuers (e.g., with low leverage ratio) to choose prestigious underwriters. Carter and Manaster 
(1990) confirm the above idea by matching underwriters and issuers, and conclude that 
issuers tend to fit underwriter reputation with the risk level of their offerings. Our result is 
consistent with their argument, by showing a negative relation between the risk proxy for 
offerings (LN(LEV)) and the associated underwriter reputation. 
The coefficient on VC is 0.18, indicating that an issuer tends to choose a high-
reputation underwriter if there is venture capital investment in the issuing firm before the 
IPO. Usually venture capitalists have relationships with high-reputation underwriters through 
previous business. Then, when a venture capitalist has a seat in the executive team of an 
issuing firm, it would recommend continuing the business with the high-reputation 
underwriter that it knows already.  
                                                 
42As the size of the coefficient on LN(EOS) is much larger than it on [LN(EOS)]², we only consider LN(EOS) at this stage 
and will consider the square term later in this section. 
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Besides linear terms, the best-fit model includes the square term [LN(EOS)]² as an 
explanatory variable. The coefficient on LN(EOS) is positive and the coefficient on 
[LN(EOS)]² is negative, which means that the positive marginal effect of IPO’s expected 
offer size is decreasing. By using the following formula 
EOS
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we calculate the individual marginal effect of EOS for each observation. When expected 
offer size is larger than 247.85 million dollars, the marginal effect of EOS is negative and 
otherwise positive. Table 3.3 shows that 96.44% for our sample expected offer size has a 
positive marginal effect on the probability of selecting a high-quality underwriter. This is 
because 96.44% of the expected offering sizes in our sample are smaller than 247.85 million 
dollars.  
Table 3.3. Frequency and Cumulative Percentage of the Marginal Effect of EOS in 
GLM with Fixed Effects 
Interval Frequency Cumulative Percentage 
-0.0002 0 0.00% 
-0.0001 94 2.94% 
0 20 3.56% 
0.001 426 16.87% 
0.005 665 37.64% 
0.010 557 55.05% 
0.015 608 74.04% 
0.020 607 93.00% 
0.025 201 99.28% 
0.030 20 99.91% 
0.035 3 100.00% 
 
Figure 3.1 shows an up-side-down U-shape for the marginal effect of EOS, as 
expected. The largest marginal effect is 0.0348, attained when expected offer size is 12.4 
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million dollars43. This means that when IPO’s expected offer size is 12.4 million dollars and 
other variables are the same, the conditional probability of the issuer choosing a high-
reputation underwriter will on average increase by 3.48%, if expected offer size increases by 
1 million dollars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Histogram of Marginal Effect of Expected Offer Size for the Entire Sample 
in GLM with Fixed Effects 
 
We also calculate the marginal effects of other explanatory variables and summarize 
them in table 3.4, using the following formulas: 
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, for variables without logarithm. 
The sign of the estimated coefficient for each variable is consistent with the sign of its 
marginal effect, except for IPO’s expected offer size which has been discussed already. The 
marginal effects show that if an issuer has one more million dollars of assets, expects an offer 
price one dollar higher, expects an offer size one million dollars larger, or has venture capital 
backing, the probability of it choosing a high-reputation underwriter will on average increase 
                                                 
43
 Please note that the formula for calculating marginal effects for a logit model is dependent on all the variables, which is 
different from the case of an OLS model. 
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by 0.12%, 1.30%, 0.91%, and 2.79%, respectively. In contrast, if an issuer increases its 
leverage ratio by 1, or stays in the industry one year longer, such probability will on average 
decrease by 7.73% and 0.47%, respectively.  
Table 3.4. Marginal Effects of Variables from GLM with Fixed Effects 
Variable Estimated Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Issuer's age -0.14 -0.0047 
Issuer's total asset 0.37 0.0012 
IPO's expected offer price 1.00 0.0130 
IPO's expected offer size 4.30 on LN(EOS) 
 -0.39 on [LN(EOS)]2 0.0091 
Issuer's leverage ratio -0.12 -0.0773 
Venture capital backing 0.18 0.0279 
 
The mosaic plots44 presented in figures 3.2 and 3.3 show that GLM with fixed effects 
has a good fit for estimating issuers' preference over underwriter reputation. Comparing the 
mosaic plots for the original sample and for GLM with fixed effects, the width and sub-
division of each rectangle are very similar. However, there are some problems about density 
estimates for all of the states and industries, because the sub-division of rectangles of all 
categories in figures 3.2 and 3.3 are different. Comparisons of figures 3.2A and 3.2B (3.3A 
and 3.3B) shows that the best-fit model always predicts a higher probability of choosing a 
high-reputation underwriter for issuers in all states (industries). In addition, the odds ratio 
estimate for New York and Illinois State is imprecise, because the relative position of the 
sub-division of rectangles of categories A and B in figures 3.2 and 3.3 are different. These 
problems leave room for GLM with mixed effects to improve the fit.We also show the 
residual boxplots45 in figure 3.4 and 3.546. In figure 3.4, the notch of E does not overlap with 
                                                 
44
 Mosaic plots are used to visualize a contingency table, say of X and Y. Mosaic plots are hierarchical displays, such that 
the width of the vertical bars are according to the marginal distribution of X and each of these rectangles is sub-divided 
horizontally according to the conditional distribution of Y given X. 
45
 The Box-and-Whisker plot of residuals helps us to explore residuals and draw informal conclusions. The box shows the 
first quartile, the median and the third quartile by horizontal lines. The width of the box indicates the marginal distribution 
of specified variables. The notch of the box gives roughly a 95% confidence interval for the median. Any residual which lies 
more than 1.5*Interquartile Range (IQR, is the difference between the third quartile and the first quartile) lower than the 
first quartile or 1.5*IQR higher than the third quartile is considered an outliner by an open and closed dot, and is separated 
by a horizontal line.  
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notches of A and B, which indicates the median of category E is statistically different from 
the median of A or B. A, B, E have many observations (i.e. the width of the box is relatively 
large), which shows that the majority of the residuals have different medians in each 
category. Figure 3.5 is similar in that the notches of A or C do not overlap with the notches 
of B or E, and A, B, C, E have many observations. All of the above indicates that there are 
some state- or industry-related properties left in the residuals. 
3.4.1.2 GLM with Mixed Effects 
3.4.1.2.1 Random Effect of Industry 
Estimation results for GLM with mixed effects are reported in table 3.5. The fixed 
effects here are very similar to the results of GLM with fixed effects reported earlier in table 
3.2, as expected. The standard deviation of the random effect introduced by the issuer’s 
industry is about 23.8% (i.e., 0.315/(0.315+1.007)) of the standard deviation of the residual 
that is left from the fixed effects in section 3.4.1.1. This indicates that issuer’s industry is 
highly effective in explaining the unexplained variation of issuer’s selection from the fixed 
effect model. Comparing the values for each industry, we find that issuers in Service (Utility) 
industry are the most (more) likely to choose high-reputation underwriters. Issuers in 
industries other than Manufacturing, Utility, Trade, Finance, and Service are more likely to 
choose low-reputation underwriters. All of the above shows that issuers have industry-related 
preferences over underwriter reputation. 
3.4.1.2.2 Random Effect of State 
 When we introduce the random effect by issuers' state, we get the results reported in 
table 3.6. Compared to table 3.2, the coefficient estimates for the fixed effects are quite 
similar as expected.  
  
                                                                                                                                                       
46
 We include both a complete and a smaller (focus on region (-1, 1)) residual plot. 
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Figure 3.2A. Mosaic Plot over State for Original Sample 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2B. Mosaic Plot over State for GLM with Fixed Effects 
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Figure 3.3A. Mosaic Plot over Industry for Original Sample 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3B. Mosaic Plot over Industry for GLM with Fixed Effects 
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Figure 3.4. Residual Plots over State for GLM with Fixed Effects 
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Figure 3.5. Residual Plots over Industry for GLM with Fixed Effects 
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Table 3.5. Results for GLM with Mixed Effects when Random Effect is by Industry 
Fixed Effect:   
  Estimates Std. Error 
Intercept -14.21 1.03*** 
LN(AGE) -0.13 0.05*** 
LN(AST) 0.41 0.07*** 
LN(EOS) 4.14 0.48*** 
[LN(EOS)]2 -0.37 0.06*** 
LN(LEV) -0.11 0.04*** 
LN(MP) 1.11 0.24*** 
VC 0.18 0.09** 
1. Signif. codes:  0.1% '***', 1% '**',  5% '*'.  
   
Random Effect:     
  Intercept Residual 
Std Dev 0.315 1.007 
Value for SIC Intercept   
Manufacturing -0.049  
Utility 0.217  
Trade 0.096  
Finance -0.161  
Service 0.389  
Others -0.492   
 
The standard deviation of the random term (i.e., the intercept) is 17.5% (i.e. 
0.213/(0.213+1.007)) of the total residual, which shows that issuer's state can explain 17.5% 
of the unexplained variation left by the fixed effects. This indicates that the random effect 
associated with state is significant and the mixed effect model is a good fit. Issuers in the 
state of California are most likely to choose high-reputation underwriters. In contrast, issuers 
in states other than New York, California, Illinois and New Jersey, are least likely to choose 
high-reputation underwriters. All of the above shows that issuers have state-related 
preferences over underwriter reputation. 
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Table 3.6. Results for GLM with Mixed Effects when Random Effect is by State 
Fixed Effect:   
  Estimates Std. Error 
Intercept -14.36 1.03*** 
LN(AGE) -0.13 0.05*** 
LN(AST) 0.36 0.07*** 
LN(EOS) 4.28 0.47*** 
[LN(EOS)]2 -0.39 0.06*** 
LN(LEV) -0.09 0.04*** 
LN(MP) 1.19 0.24*** 
VC 0.17 0.09** 
1. Signif. codes:  0.1% '***',  1% '**',  5% '*'.  
   
Random Effect:     
  Intercept Residual 
Std Dev 0.213 1.007 
Value for ST Intercept   
New York 0.088  
California 0.271  
Illinois -0.074  
New Jersey -0.051  
Others -0.234   
3.4.1.3 Comparison of Fixed- and Mixed-Effects Model 
In order to compare the fixed- and mixed-effects models, we first use a forward 
selection method to fit our sample into a fixed-effects model. Then, we add a random 
variable into the model, which results in very similar estimates of the fixed-effect component 
in the mixed-effects model. So we have a similar standard deviation of residuals from the 
fixed-effects model and from the fixed-effect component in the mixed-effects model. Based 
on these results, we show how much the random effect can help explain the variation of iy  in 
addition to the fixed effects. Since the mixed-effects model by industry (state) can explain 
17.5% (23.8%) of the unexplained variation left by the fixed-effects model, it strongly 
suggests that the mixed-effects model is a better fit for our sample.  
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3.4.2 Market Understanding of Underwriter Reputation 
To find the relationship between underwriter reputation and its own characteristics, 
we use an OLS regression model with CAP, INST and HQ as independent variables as 
follows: 
iiiii HQINSTCAPCMOP εαααα ++++= 4321 . 
The estimation results in table 3.7 show that all the coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant at 5% level or higher, except for INST. The positive coefficient 0.00001 on CAP 
indicates that the marginal effect of underwriter’s total capital on underwriter reputation is 
positive. If an underwriter has $100 billion more capital while keeping INST and HQ the 
same, its reputation measure will increase 0.001. Underwriter’s headquarter location has a 
significantly positive correlation with its reputation measure as well. If two underwriters 
have the same institutional sales force but one has headquarters in New York and the other 
one has headquarters outside New York, the reputation measure for the former underwriter 
will be 0.24 greater than for the latter. The regression results show that HQ has a very large 
impact on CMOP, while CAP has a little effect. 
A possible reason why an underwriter’s headquarter location has a larger impact on 
reputation than its total capital is that having headquarters in New York is a strong positive 
signal of an underwriter’s ability, and there may be more industry relation/connection in New 
York. It could also be that the model specification puts the underwriter’s headquarter location 
into the spotlight. However, the R-square is 0.386, which is empirically large and suggests 
that lacking of information is not that important for this sample.  
Table 3.7. Results for OLS regression of Underwriter Reputation 
  Estimates Std. Error 
Intercept 0.909 0.037*** 
CAP 0.00001 0.000005
*
 
INST 0.00006 0.00009 
HQ 0.237 0.054*** 
R-square 0.386   
Prob>F 0.000   
1. Signif. codes:  0.1% '***',  1% '**',  5% '*'.  
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3.4.3 Underwriter Reputation and IPO Underpricing 
3.4.3.1 Balancing Test for the Entire Sample 
Since the random effect of issuer’s industry in the mixed-effects model can explain 
more of the remaining variation (23.8%) than the model with random effect of issuer’s state 
(17.5%), we add issuer’s industry as dummy variables47 into the logit model for the purpose 
of estimating propensity scores. The remaining part of the logit model is the same as the 
GLM with fixed effects reported in section 3.4.1.1. Taking it as an original model48, the test 
of balancing property shows that variable LN(EOP) is not balanced in two blocks (see 
appendix C.1 for a sample test result). After dropping LN(EOP), the adjusted model 
satisfying the balancing property is as follows: 
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where AI  denotes a dummy variable of issuer’s industry for category A – Manufacturing. 
Dummy variables BI , CI , DI , and EI  are individually defined for other industries. 
The distribution of the estimated propensity scores is reported in figure 3.6 and table 
3.8. Because we define underwriter reputation by the sample median, the treated group (1649 
units) and the control group (1552 units) are about the same size. Figure 3.6 is consistent 
with our expectation that there are a large number of small propensity scores in the control 
group and a large number of big values in the treated group. Table 3.8 shows that there are 
352 treated units in the range [0.9, 1) and only 20 control units, which introduces the 
potential problem of overusing these 20 controls. As a result, we expect caliper matching to 
yield more precise estimates than nearest matching. That is true because caliper matching can 
restrict the distance between the matched and the treated by a radius, whereas nearest 
matching finds the closest match no matter how large the distance is. However, caliper 
                                                 
47
 Because there are six categories in issuers’ industry codes in our sample, we add five dummy variables corresponding to 
categories A, B, C, D, and E. 
48
 The balancing tests for other subsamples start with the same original model specified here. 
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matching has to sacrifice the number of treated that can be matched. The situation is similar 
for the range [0.8, 0.9), but the matching problem is not obvious for other ranges. On the 
other hand, in the range (0, 0.1), there are many more control units than the treated and the 
difference between the two matching methods should be negligible. The situation is similar 
to other small value ranges under 0.5. 
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Figure 3.6. Histogram of Propensity Scores for the Control and the Treated Group 
 
Table 3.8. Distribution of the Estimated Propensity Scores 
Inferior of Block 
of Propensity 
Score 
Control Group Treated Group Total 
0 325 10 335 
0.05 110 12 122 
0.1 196 30 226 
0.2 190 51 241 
0.3 181 94 275 
0.4 167 133 300 
0.5 117 155 272 
0.6 101 204 305 
0.7 77 236 313 
0.8 68 372 440 
0.9 20 352 372 
Total 1552 1649 3201 
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3.4.3.2 The Entire Sample 
After adjusting the model to satisfy the balancing property, we employ the nearest 
matching and caliper matching methods as follows, and we set the OLS regression result as a 
comparison. 
3.4.3.2.1 Nearest Matching Method 
To increase the precision of the estimation, we apply nearest matching without 
replacement. In figure 3.7, the matched propensity score is very close to the treated by eye 
examination. Table 3.9 provides that the average difference of the propensity scores between 
the treated and the matched is only -0.0041% and the median is 0%. Even though the 
minimum value is -1.371% and the maximum value is 0.521%, the standard deviation is only 
0.141%. Figure 3.8 shows the individual propensity score difference between the treated and 
the matched, and most of the data are in the range of (-0.02%, 0.02%). These results suggeset 
that nearest matching is sufficiently good for our entire sample.  
Since the propensity score estimates are balancing and the matched propensity scores 
are sufficiently close, the treatment effect estimated is unbiased (see results summary in table 
3.10). The average treatment effect on the treated is 0.180, which indicates that for an issuer 
who chose a high-reputation underwriter, its IPO’s underpricing on average tends to be 
18.0% larger than if it would have chosen a low-reputation underwriter. There are 1649 
treated units that have been matched by 527 control units. The ATT is significantly different 
from zero by t-test (with t-statistic 7.138) as the standard error is only 0.025.  
3.4.3.2.2 Caliper Matching Method 
We set two radiuses, r=0.001 and r=0.0005, and we also use matching without 
replacement. In figures 3.9 and 3.11, the matched propensity scores are very close to the 
treated units. Table 3.9 reports that when r=0.001 (r=0.0005), the average difference of the 
propensity scores between the treated and the matched is only -0.0011% (0.0003%) and the 
median is -0.001% (0.0010%). The maximum and minimum values are bounded by the 
radius, and when r=0.001 (r=0.0005) the standard deviation is only 0.044%, (0.0256%). 
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Figure 3.7. Comparison of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched for 
the Entire Sample by Nearest Matching Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Difference of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched for 
the Entire Sample by Nearest Matching Method 
 
Figures 3.10 and 3.12 show the individual difference of the propensity score between 
the treated and the matched. Most of the data are in the range of (-0.05%, 0.05%) and (-
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0.03%, 0.03%), respectively. These all indicate that the quality of caliper matching for the 
entire sample is very high. 
The estimated treatment effect is unbiased (see table 3.10), because the propensity 
score estimates are balancing and are sufficiently similar between the treated and the 
matched. For the larger (smaller) radius, i.e., r=0.001 (r=0.0005), the ATT is 0.161 (0.130), 
which indicates that for an issuer who chose a high-reputation underwriter, its IPO’s 
underpricing tends to be 16.1% (13.0%) larger on average than if it would have chosen a 
low-reputation underwriter. There are 1221 (900) treated units that have been matched by 
1008 (766) control units for the larger (smaller) radius. The standard error of the larger 
(smaller) radius is 0.021 (0.022), which yields a t-statistic of 7.829 (5.970). Hence, the ATT 
is significantly different from zero by t-test.  
Table 3.9. Summary Statistics for the Difference of the Propensity Scores between the 
Treated and the Matched for the Entire sample 
  Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Nearest Matching -0.0041% 0.1409% 0% -1.3705% 0.5210% 
Caliper Matching (r=0.001) -0.0011% 0.0435% -0.0010% -0.0990% 0.0990% 
Caliper Matching (r=0.0005) 0.0003% 0.0256% 0.0010% -0.0500% 0.0500% 
 
 
Table 3.10. Results of Estimated Treatment Effect for the Entire sample 
  
No. of Treated1 No. of Controls2 ATT Std. Err. t-statistic 
Nearest Matching 1649 527 0.180 0.025 7.138 
Caliper Matching (r=0.001) 1221 1008 0.161 0.021 7.829 
Caliper Matching (r=0.0005) 900 776 0.130 0.022 5.970 
1No. of Treated is the number of treated units that has been matched. 
2No. of Controls is the number of control units that has been used as a match to a treated unit. 
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Figure 3.9. Comparison of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched for 
the Entire Sample by Caliper Matching Method (r=0.001)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Difference of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched for 
the Entire Sample by Caliper Matching Method (r=0.001) 
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Figure 3.11. Comparison of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched 
for the Entire Sample by Caliper Matching Method (r=0.0005)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Difference of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched for 
the Entire Sample by Caliper Matching Method (r=0.0005) 
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3.4.3.2.3 Comparison 
As the treatment effect estimation method and the OLS regression model are both 
based on observed characteristics, it is argued that the results of the OLS regression should 
fall into the 95% confidence interval of the results of the treatment effect estimation. We run 
the OLS regression of IPO underpricing including underwriter reputation as an explanatory 
dummy variable and other variables, as follows: 
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The estimated coefficient on underwriter reputation ( iy ) is 0.1514 with a standard error 
0.0203 and t-statistic 7.46.49 It shows that the high reputation of an underwriter on average 
increases the associated IPO underpricing by 15.14%, which applies not only to the treated 
but to the entire sample. 15.14% falls into the 95% confidence intervals of all three ATTs 
estimated by propensity score matching in table 3.10. However, nearest matching and caliper 
matching with radius 0.001 both report larger treatment effects than OLS regression.  
From the standpoint of propensity score matching, the precision of the estimate 
decreases form caliper matching with radius 0.0005, to caliper matching with radius 0.001, to 
nearest matching. However, the difference is small such that nearest matching is still very 
popular due to ease of implementation. From the standpoint of the estimated ATT, the 
number of treated that has been matched decreases as the precision of propensity score 
matching increases. Both caliper matching methods use more control units than nearest 
matching and all of the three ATT estimates are significantly positive. The ATT estimated by 
nearest matching has the largest size and the one by caliper matching with radius 0.0005 has 
the smallest. Even though a radius 0.0005 provides a more precise matching, it has a smaller 
number of treated that has been matched, which loses more information than when using 
radius 0.001. Radius 0.001 has fewer treated that have been matched compared to nearest 
                                                 
49
 Since we are only interested in the relation between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing, we will not report other 
estimates. 
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matching, but it uses more control units, which utilizes more information from the sample. 
Hence, caliper matching with radius 0.001 is a preferred method for our sample.  
Since most of the literature does not cover the internet bubble period, its finding of a 
negative relation during 1981 through 1998 is not comparable to our result of a positive 
relation during 1981 through 2000. This is one of the motivations for further analyzing the 
relation in different subperiods, as done in the following section. 
3.4.3.3 Subsamples by Subperiods 
We stratify the sample into three subperiods, 1980-1990, 1991-1998, and 1999-2000, 
such that we can test whether the treatment effect is consistent over different periods. 
Because the subperiod sample sizes are much smaller and the best method that fits our 
sample is caliper matching with radius 0.001, we employ that method only for the remaining 
analysis.  
There are no matching problems for the first two subperiods, except for 1999-2000 
(see table 3.11). There are no issuers selecting low-reputation underwriters during 1999-2000 
that can be control units, which is due to two main reasons. First, during the internet bubble 
period issuers were most likely to prefer high-reputation underwriters. Second, there are 718 
IPO cases during 1999-2000 in the original data, but only 16.6% of which are handled by 
low-reputation underwriters (esp. 119 cases). Because we do not have financial information 
about issuers who select low-reputation underwriters during 1999-2000, 525 IPO cases 
handled by high-reputation underwriters are left after data cleaning. To solve this problem, 
we use the entire 1,552 control units during 1981-1998 as a substitute for the controls during 
1999-2000. 
Table 3.11. Sample Description of iY  for the Subperiod Subsamples 
Subperiod Yi=1 Yi=0 Total Units 
1981-1990 100 583 683 
1991-1998 1,024 969 1,993 
1999-2000 525 0 525 
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We do the balancing test for each subperiod starting from the original model reported 
in section 3.4.3.1. The subperiods 1991-1998 and 1999-2000 are balanced, and after 
dropping LN(AST) the subperiod 1981-1990 is balanced as well. Table 3.12 shows a 
descriptive summary of the matched scores, and caliper matching with radius 0.001 works 
well for different subperiods (see figures in appendix C.2.1-C.2.6). The means of the 
difference between the treated and the matched scores are -0.011%, 0.002% and -0.003% for 
the three subperiods, respectively. The standard deviations are similar, all around 0.05%.   
Table 3.12. Summary Statistics for the Difference of the Propensity Scores between the 
Treated and the Matched for the Subperiod Subsamples 
Subperiod Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
1981-1990 -0.0111% 0.0457% -0.0088% -0.0970% 0.0900% 
1991-1998 0.0017% 0.0469% 0.0030% -0.1000% 0.0980% 
1999-2000 -0.0031% 0.0507% -0.0030% -0.0990% 0.0990% 
 
The treatment effect estimated for 1980-1990 is positive, which means that for an 
issuer who chose a high-reputation underwriter during 1980-1990, its IPO’s underpricing is 
3.0% larger than if it would have chosen a low-reputation underwriter (see table 3.13). 
However, the estimate is not statistically significant and the number of matched treated units 
is very small, i.e., 42. Results are very similar for the insignificant ATT = -1.2% 
corresponding to 1991-1998. 
Since the control units for 1999-2000 are from 1981-1998, the estimated positive 
relation shows that compared to IPOs with low-reputation underwriters during 1981-1998, an 
issuer who chose a high-reputation underwriter during 1999-2000 has a 45.2% larger 
underpricing on average than if it would have chosen a low-reputation underwriter. The t-
statistic is 7.417 with 236 treated that have been matched, so the one-sided p-value is less 
than 0.001%.  
Hence, we find no significant relation between underwriter reputation and IPO 
underpricing during 1981-1990 and 1991-1998, whereas during 1999-2000 the relation is 
positive and statistically (as well as economically) significant. In addition, we carry further 
analysis over subperiod 1981-1998, and the estimated ATT = 0.2% is insignificantly positive 
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with t-statistic 0.193, which is consistent with the findings above. Our conclusion is different 
from most of the literature which supports a significantly negative relation before the internet 
bubble by OLS regressions. Bradley et al. (2002) find that high-reputation underwriters are 
associated with smaller (larger) IPO underpricing in the 1980s (during 1991 through 1998) 
and no significant relation during the internet bubble, which are all different from our 
findings. Loughran and Ritter (2004) report no such significant relation in the 1980s and a 
significant positive relation during the internet bubble, which are consistent with our results, 
except that they also find a positive relation during 1991-1998. The main reason is that we 
employ different estimation methods, due to the use of different measures of underwriter 
reputation, i.e. a binary variable in the present paper and a continuous variable in the 
literature. Since we consider the unobserved counterfactual problem, our treatment effect 
estimates are more appropriate. 
It is clear that the major factor driving the positive relation of the entire sample is 
IPOs during the internet bubble. Since information frictions are more severe with high-tech 
IPOs, it is harder for underwriters to evaluate those IPOs. Also, issuers pay more attention to 
analyst coverage when they choose an underwriter, because an underwriter’s ability to 
precisely forecast a firm’s future profitability is realized to be more important than its ability 
to evaluate current assets. Choosing a high-reputation underwriter can gain more attention 
from the media for marketing purposes, as well. Those are some of the possible reasons why 
issuers during the internet bubble tended to choose high-reputation underwriters. Hence, we 
consider such positive relation as an industry effect as well, besides an underwriter’s 
reputation effect. 
We further test whether the industry effect we propose above is statistically 
significant. Using the same treatment effect estimation method with propensity score 
matching (i.e. caliper matching with radius 0.001), we define the treated units as issuers who 
select high-reputation underwriters during 1999-2000 and the ‘control’50 units as issuers who 
select high-reputation underwriters during 1981-1998 for the purpose of testing the effect of 
issuers’ industry on IPO underpricing. The estimated ATT is 35.0% with a standard error 
                                                 
50
 The definition of control units in this paragraph is different from the rest of the paper and only this paragraph has a 
different definition. Hence, we use ‘control’ with single quotation marks to differentiate it with the rest of the paper. 
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0.047 and the t-statistic 7.45, calculated from 416 treated unites matched by 751 ‘control’ 
units. This significantly positive ATT shows that during internet bubbles issuers who choose 
high-reputation underwriters has a 35.0% larger underpricing than those who choose high-
reputation underwriters during 1981 to 1998. The obtained significantly positive industry 
effect on IPO underpricing confirms that issuers’ industry plays an important role during the 
internet bubble. 
Being motivated by the antecedent explanation in the literature for negative/positive 
relations, our explanation for no significant relation before the internet bubble is that even 
though a high-reputation underwriter has larger analyst coverage, it can effectively offset a 
part of the higher cost by charging a higher fee structure. A low-reputation underwriter, on 
the other hand, has to charge a smaller fee structure to attract clients, but, the cost of its 
smaller analyst coverage is less expensive. Hence, no underwriters need to assess a 
significantly higher/lower level of underpricing as an implicit way of making profit. 
Therefore, before the internet bubble underwriters can maintain similar levels of underpricing 
regardless of their reputation. 
Table 3.13. Results of Estimated Treatment Effect for the Subperiod Subsamples 
Subperiod No. of Treated1 No. of Controls2 ATT Std. Err. t 
1981-1990 42 110 0.030 0.048 0.627 
1991-1998 661 644 -0.012 0.014 -0.863 
1999-2000 236 466 0.452 0.061 7.417 
1No. of Treated is the number of treated units that has been matched. 
2No. of Controls is the number of control units that has been used as a match to a treated unit. 
3.4.3.4 Subsamples by Offer Price and the Filed Price Range 
We stratify the sample into three groups by the location of the offer price in the filing 
range reported in the prospectus. If the offer price is higher (lower) than the highest (lowest) 
price filed in the prospectus, we define it as “Above Range” (“Below Range”). If the offer 
price is written in the range of the filed price in the prospectus, we define it as “Within 
Range”. We test whether the relation between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing is 
consistent over different price ranges. For the same reason explained in section 3.4.3.3, we 
employ only caliper matching with radius 0.001. The sample description in table 3.14 shows 
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that the sample units are well distributed over the treated and the control for the three Price-
Range subsamples. 42% of those 595 Above Range IPOs with Yi=1 were offered during the 
internet bubble, i.e., 249 offerings, which means that the internet bubble period plays an 
important (but not dominant) role in Above Range subsample.  
Table 3.14. Sample Description of iY  for the Price-Range Subsamples 
Price-Range Yi=1 Yi=0 Total Units 
Above Range 595 255 850 
Within Range 702 885 1,587 
Below Range 352 411 763 
 
We test the balancing property for each subsample starting from the original model in 
section 3.4.3.1 and all three subsamples that are already balanced. Table 3.15 reports a 
descriptive summary for the matched propensity scores, suggesting that caliper matching 
with radius 0.001 works well for different Price-Ranges (also see figures in appendix C.2.7-
C.2.12). The means of the propensity score differences between the treated and the matched 
are -0.004%, 0.002% and -0.002% for the three subsamples, respectively. The standard 
deviation for Within Range is smaller than for the other two, mainly because the Within 
Range subsample has more units to facilitate the matching. 
Table 3.15. Summary Statistics for the Difference of the Propensity Scores between the 
Treated and the Matched for the Price-Range Subsamples 
Price-Range Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max. 
Above Range -0.0035% 0.0555% -0.0090% -0.1000% 0.0990% 
Within Range 0.0024% 0.0030% 0.0499% -0.0990% 0.0970% 
Below Range 0.0020% 0.0518% 0.0020% -0.0970% 0.0990% 
 
The treatment effect estimated for Above Range subsample is 0.424, which means 
that when the offer price is above the filing range, the IPO underpricing for an issuer who 
chose a high-reputation underwriter is 42.4% larger than if it would have chosen a low-
reputation underwriter (see table 3.16). This estimate is highly statistically significant with t-
statistic 5.407 and 212 treated units that have been matched. However, for Within Range the 
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relation is insignificantly positive, because the ATT is only 0.6%, with t-statistic 0.387 and 
369 treated units that have been matched. Below Range subsample shows a positive relation 
as well, and it is borderline significant with one-sided p-value 6.86%. The Below Range 
estimate indicates that when the offer price is below the filing range, the IPO underpricing 
for an issuer who chose a high-reputation underwriter is on average 2.0% larger than if it 
would have chosen a low-reputation underwriter. Hence, we find a significantly positive 
underpricing for Above Range and Below Range, and no significant underpricing for Within 
Range. 
An explanation for these results is that during road shows, underwriters may discover 
investors’ interests over the offerings and might later adjust the original filed price according 
to the outcome of the road show. So, if investors have shown stronger interest than expected 
to purchase the IPO shares, underwriters may be short of share supplies and one way to solve 
the problem is to increase the offer price. For the Above Range subsample, the estimated 
ATT is positive, which means that usually high-reputation underwriters can get hot issues but 
they do not necessarily understand exactly how hot those offerings are, even after the road 
show. In addition, the large value of ATT for Above Range offerings, i.e., 42.4%, indicates 
that high-reputation underwriters are very conservative (or risk averse) when increasing the 
offer price to reflect the high market demand. On the other hand, the small but significantly 
positive ATT for Below Range offerings indicates that high-reputation underwriters are risk 
averse, such that they lower the offer price more than what they should when the market 
demand is lower than expected. The insignificant ATT for Within Range is also consistent 
with the intuition that when investors show interest as expected, high-reputation underwriters 
are most likely to choose a suitable offer price within the filed price range in the prospectus. 
Cooney et al. (2001) report a negative relation between IPO’s initial return and 
underwriter reputation for Within Range IPOs, for the 1980s and 1991-1998. They find no 
such significant relation for Below Range IPOs for the 1980s or 1991-1998, or for Above 
Range IPOs in the 1980s, whereas a positive relation only for Above Range IPOs in the 
period 1991-1998. Bradley et al. (2002) find that Above Range (Within Range) IPOs during 
1981 through 2000 generally have the largest (median) underpricings among the three. 
Considering the sample size issue, we do not further stratify the sample by subperiods in each 
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price range. Also, in each subsample we include the internet bubble period and it is likely to 
increase the ATT which is indicated by the results in section 3.4.3.3. Hence, our finding in 
this section is different from Cooney et al.’s (2001) but they are still consistent. Our results 
for Above Range and Below Range IPOs are consistent with Bradley et al.’s (2002), except 
for Within Range IPOs. 
Table 3.16. Results of Estimated Treatment Effect for the Price-Range Subsamples 
Price-Range No. of Treated1 No. of Controls2 ATT Std. Err. t-statistic 
Above Range 212 126 0.424 0.078 5.407 
Within Range 369 355 0.006 0.016 0.387 
Below Range 151 138 0.020 0.013 1.494 
1No. of Treated is the number of treated units that has been matched. 
2No. of Controls is the number of control units that has been used as a match to a treated unit. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The present study matches IPO issuing firms with underwriters to examine an issuing 
firm’s preference over underwriter reputation. We employ two Generalized Linear Models 
(GLMs), with fixed and mixed effects. Our sample consists of 3,201 IPOs issued between 
1981 and 2000.  
From the GLM with fixed effects, we find that expected offer size and expected offer 
price of the IPO, age of the issuer, leverage ratio of the issuer, assets of the issuer, and 
venture capital backing are important aspects when an issuer decides to choose an 
underwriter. The marginal effect of expected offer size has an up side down U-shape. From 
the GLM with random effect, we find that there are significant preferences associated with 
issuer's industry and state. Issuers in the state of California are more likely to choose high-
reputation underwriters. Issuers in the Service industry are most likely to choose high-
reputation underwriters and issuers in the Utility industry are also more likely to choose high-
reputation underwriters. 
We also find that underwriter’s headquarter location is significantly associated with 
its reputation. Total underwriter capital has a statistically significant impact in reputation, 
while the size of institutional sales force does not. 
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Using treatment effect estimation by propensity score matching, we find a 
significantly positive relation between underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing for 
issuers who chose high-reputation underwriters for the entire sample. However, when we 
stratify the sample by subperiods, we find no such significant relation for 1981-1990 or 
1991-1998, but a significantly positive relation during internet bubble 1999-2000. This 
suggests that such positive relation is both an issuer’s industry effect and an underwriter’s 
reputation effect. When we stratify the sample by the location of offer price in the filing 
range reported in the prospectus, we find that high-reputation underwriters are more risk 
averse than low-reputation underwriters, such that they are more reluctant (willing) to 
increase (reduce) the offer price when the market demand is higher (lower) than expected. 
Hence, there is a significantly positive average treatment effect on treated for Above Range 
and Below Range, and the ATT for Above Range is much higher than for Below Range. 
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APPENDIX A. FOR CHAPTER 1 
A.1 Assumption Justification 
The reason for assuming that issuers do not know their initial types is that otherwise 
there are no equilibria where bad issuers go through the CRA. However, historical ratings 
data strongly suggests that bad issuers seek CRA ratings. For example, we collect all the 
initial issuer ratings from Fitch Ratings, Inc. from 1/1/2004 through 6/20/2007 in table A.1. 
There are 5,515 initial issuer ratings in our sample, 77.4% of which are investment grades 
and 22.6% of which are speculative grades. Fitch Ratings, Inc. defines investment grade as 
BBB or above and speculative grade as BBB- or below. As 22.6% of initial issuer ratings 
during that period are speculative grades, it shows strong evidence that not only good issuers 
go to CRA but also bad issuers do. 
Second, we prove that if issuers know their initial types, there are no equilibria where 
initial bad issuers will go through the CRA. Note that there are only two initial types (initial 
good and initial bad) and issuers know their initial types, such that initial good issuers have 
incentive to go through the CRA to signal their qualities to the market and get higher prices. 
However, if initial bad issuers go through the CRA, they will pay the CRA to signal their bad 
quality to the market and finally get lower prices. Thus, if initial bad issuers do not go 
through the CRA but initial good issuers do, initial bad issuers can signal their quality to the 
market without paying the CRA by showing no ratings. When initial good issuers go to the 
CRA, initial bad issuers are better off by not going through the CRA. Because doing so 
reduces rating expenses and results in the same bond price. Therefore, investors will 
anticipate that all initial good issuers will have ratings h and no rating means initial bad 
quality. In the other case when initial good issuers choose not to go through the CRA, there is 
no reason for initial bad issuers to go through the CRA either. Hence, the only possible 
issuers that may go through the CRA in the equilibria with the relaxed assumption are initial 
good issuers, and initial bad issuers will never go though the CRA. This is inconsistent with 
the empirical evidence we show above. However, in section 1.4.2.2 Equilibrium Condition, 
the equilibrium strategies derived from the current assumption are consistent with the 
empirical evidence. 
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Table A.1. Rating Grades Example 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the real world, why do bad issuers go through the CRA? A discussion with rating 
analysts in Fitch Rating, Inc. reveals three major reasons. First, underwriters usually require a 
rating for the ease of marketing. Second, many investors, e.g. institutional investors, cannot 
hold bonds without ratings. Third, the rating system has more than 25 grades, which can 
provide relative advantage to bad issuers compared to even worse issuers. Because we do not 
want to include underwriters in our model, we do not want to limit investor’s behavior, and 
we make the simplified assumption that there are only two rating grades in our model, people 
may frown on the assumption that issuers do not know their initial types. However, 
considering the equilibria derived from the relaxed assumption, the empirical evidence 
supports our current assumption instead of the relaxed one. 
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A.2 Proof for Bond Prices 
Under both cases, ahP3 = 
na
hP3 = F
s
 = 1 and alP3 = 
na
lP3 = F
r
 = γ.  
A.2.1 Go Through the CRA and Take Action 
We want to compare those prices and find the price change. 
a
hP2  = {[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ]/[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)]} Fs 
 +{[(1-θ)α(1-η)]/[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)]} Fr 
       = (η-ηα-ηθ+ηθα+θ+αγ-αγη-αγθ+αγηθ)/(η-2ηα-ηθ+2ηθα+θ+α-θα), 
a
wP2  = {[(1-α)(1-η)]/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]} Fs +{(αη)/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]} Fr 
       = (1-η-α+ηα+αγη)/(-η+2ηα+1-α), 
a
hP1  = [(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)] ahP2 +(1-θ)(1-α)(1-η) ahP3 +(1-θ)αη alP3  
       = αγ-αγθ+1-α+θα, 
where aijP  means the bond price is for issuers with rating j at t=i when initially good issuers 
take action. 
 As ahP2  and 
a
wP2  are both weighted average of F
s
 and Fr and Fs > Fr, we only need to 
compare the conditional weights on Fs. 
[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ]/[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)]-[(1-α)(1-η)]/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη] 
= α[(1-α+θα)(2η-1)+θ(1-η)]/{[η(1-θ)+α+η(1-θ)(1-2α)][(1-η)(1-α)+αη)]}>0 
Thus, we know 1> ahP2 >
a
wP2 >γ. 
Now we compare ahP1  and 
a
wP2 : 
a
hP1 -
a
wP2 =α{(1-α)[(1-γ)(2η-1)+γηθ]+θ[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]}/[(1-η)(1-α)+αη]>0 
Then we substitute ahP2 , 
a
hP3  and 
a
lP3  to ahP1  that 
a
hP1 =[1-(1-θ)α] Fs +(1-θ)αFr, 
and then we compare ahP1  and 
a
hP2  by the weights on F
r
 
(1-θ)α-{[(1-θ)α(1-η)]/[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)]} 
= (1-θ)α{[(2η-1)(1+αθ-α)+θ(1-η)]/[(1-θ)(1-α)η+θ+(1-θ)α(1-η)]}>0. 
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Thus, we get ahP1 <
a
hP2 . 
Hence the price comparison result is ahP3 >
a
hP2 >
a
hP1 >
a
wP2 >
a
lP3 . 
A.2.2 Go Through the CRA and Take No Action 
The prices are as follows, 
na
hP2  = {[(1-α)η]/[(1-α)η+α(1-η)]} Fs +{[α(1-η)]/[(1-α)η+α(1-η)]} Fr 
        = (-η+αη-αγ+αγη)/(-η+2αη-α), 
na
wP2  = {[(1-α)(1-η)]/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]} Fs +{(αη)/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]} Fr 
        = (1-η-α+αη+αγη)/(1-η-α+2αη), 
na
hP1  = α[η nalP3 +(1-η) nahP2 ]+(1-α)[η nahP2 +(1-η) nahP3 ] 
        = 1-α+αγ, 
where naijP  means the bond price is for issuers with rating j at t=i when initially good issuers 
take no action. 
As nahP2  and 
na
wP2  are both weighted average of F
s
 and Fr and Fs > Fr, we only need to 
compare the conditional weights on Fs. 
[(1-α)η]/[(1-α)η+α(1-η)]-[(1-α)(1-η)]/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη] 
= [α(1-α+θα)(2η-1)+θ(1-η)]/{[η(1-θ)+α+η(1-θ)(1-2α)][(1-η)(1-α)+αη]}>0 
Thus, we know 1> nahP2 >
na
wP2 >γ. 
Now we substitute nahP2 , 
na
hP3  and 
na
lP3  to 
na
hP1  that 
na
hP1 =(1-α) Fs +αFr. Then we 
compare nahP1  and 
na
wP2  by their weights on F
r: 
α-{(αη)/[(1-α)(1-η)+αη]}=-{[(2η-1)(1-α)α]/[(1-η)(1-α)+αη]}<0 
Thus, we get nahP1 >
na
wP2 . 
And then we compare nahP1  and 
na
hP2  by the weights on F
r: 
α-{[α(1-η)]/[(1-α)η+α(1-η)]}=[(2η-1)(1-α)α]/[η(1-α)+α(1-η)]>0 
Thus, we get nahP1 <
na
hP2 . 
Hence the price comparison result is nahP3 >
na
hP2 >
na
hP1 >
na
wP2 >
na
lP3 . 
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A.3 Proof for Subgame Equilibrium 
We solve this model by Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium, which means we only 
consider the case that game participants with same information will take same strategies. 
A.3.1 Private Cost of Action 
A.3.1.1 Condition for Costly Action 
We assume that if issuers do not go through the CRA, they will not take action as the 
cost of taking action is very high. In order to define the costly action, we compare the 
expected utility of taking action (i.e., E( anrU )) and taking no action (i.e., E( nanrU )) while no 
ratings. Thus 
E( anrU )  = [1-βθ-β(1-θ)(1-α)]γ( pR aP1 -1)+[βθ+β(1-θ)(1-α)]( pR aP1 -1), 
where aP1 = β(1-α)+γ(1-β)+αβγ+θαβ(1-γ); and 
E( nanrU )=[1-β(1-α)]γ( pR naP1 -1)+β(1-α)( pR naP1 -1), 
where naP1 =β(1-α)+γ(1-β)+γβα. 
The solution to E(U_{nr,na})>E( anrU ) is 
Ca > aC = Ca1 =βαθ(γ-1)(2αβ pR -2γ pR -2β pR +2βγ pR -θαβ pR -2αβγ pR +θαβγ pR +1). 
Therefore, we assume Ca > aC  is always true in the present setup. 
A.3.1.2 Subgame Equilibrium Condition 
Ua - Una =((g(η,θ))/(-η+2αη-α)), 
where g(η,θ)=θ pR η²+2θ pR αγη-2θ pR η²γα-θ pR η-θ pR αη²-2θ pR α²γη+2θ pR η²γα²-
θ pR α+θ pR α²η+θ pR αγ²η+θ pR α²γ²-2θ pR α²γ²η-γθ+αγηθ+θ pR αη+ Caη-2 Caαη+ Caα. 
As -η+2αη-α=(1-α)η+α(1-η)<0, basically we want to know the sign of the numerator 
g(η,θ). The solution of g(η,θ)=0 is  
θ=θ₁,  
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where θ₁=Ca (-η+2αη-α) / (2 pR αγη- pR αη²- 2 pR α²γη+ 2 pR η²γα²- γ+ pR η²- pR α+ pR α²η+ 
pR αγ²η+ pR α²γ²- 2 pR α²γ²η+ αγη+ pR αη- 2 pR η²γα- pR η). 
 We assume that when the action is always successful, good issuers will take action 
for sure. This means g(η,1)<0, so we get  
 Ca < Ca2,  
where Ca2=(-2 pR αγη+ pR αη²+2 pR α²γη-2 pR α²γη²+ pR α- pR α²η- pR αγ²η- pR α²γ²+2 pR α²γ²η-
pR η²+γ-αγη- pR αη+2 pR γη²α+ pR η)/(η-2αη+α)). 
We also assume that when the action is always unsuccessful, there is no action at all. 
This means g(η,0)>0, so we get Ca >0. 
From those two assumptions, we can get that if 0< Ca < Ca2, then 0<θ₁<1 is true. 
A.3.1.3 Restriction for Ca 
Hence, when aC < Ca < aC  is true, if θ< aθ , g(η,θ)>0→No issuer takes action; if 
θ> aθ , g(η,θ)<0→Issuer takes action; where aθ =θ₁,  aC = Ca1 and aC = Ca2. 
A.3.2 Property of the Threshold aθ  
We take first partial derivative of aθ  w.r.t η that 
∂ aθ /∂η=Ca pR f(η)/(-γ+ 2 pR αγη- pR αη²- 2 pR α²γη+ 2 pR η²γα²+ pR η²- pR α+  
    pR α²η+ pR αγ²η+ pR α²γ²- 2 pR α²γ²η+ αγη+ pR αη- 2 pR η²γα- pR η)2,  
where f(η)=(-α²+α-2α²γ+2γα³)η²+(2α+4αγ-4α²γ-2)η-α³γ²-2αγ+2α²γ+1-αγ²-α+2α²γ². 
Thus, we want to know the sign of the numerator f(η). The solution to f(η)=0 is η₁ 
and η₂, where 
η₁=
αγ
ααγ
αα 21
1)1(11
−
−−
+  
and 
η₂=
αγ
ααγ
αα 21
1)1(11
−
−−
− . 
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As 2α²γ-α<0 and 1/α>2, we get η₁>1. 
As the solution to 
αγ
ααγ
21
1)1(
−
−−
=1 (which is (α³-α²)γ²-2α²γ+α=0) is γ ₁
= )1(
1
−αα
<0 and γ₂= )1(
1
+αα
>1, and the parabola is open to the bottom (α³-α²<0), 
so for any γ∈(0,1) we have 
αγ
ααγ
21
1)1(
−
−−
>1. Then we have η₂<0. 
As the parabola of f(η)=0 is open to the top (-α²+α-2α²γ+2γα³=α(1-α)(1-2αγ)>0), we 
get for any (η₂<)0<η<1(<η₁), f(η)<0 is always true. 
Hence, we get ∂ aθ /∂η<0, which means the higher the ability of the CRA to put an 
issuer on watchlist is, the smaller is the threshold of θ needed to make initially good issuers 
take action. 
A.4 Proof for Equilibrium 
There exist three strategies for issuers. One is not going through the CRA. The second 
one is going through the CRA and taking no action if it is initially good. The third one is 
going through the CRA and taking action if it is initially good. We already get utilities of 
those three strategies in section 1.5.2 and by comparing them we can get the equilibrium 
condition. 
A.4.1 Equilibrium Condition for )()( nra UEUE >  
The expected utility of choosing the CRA and taking action if it is initially good, is 
larger than the expected utility of not choosing the CRA, that is E( aU )>E( nrU ). 
←k(η)=A₁η²+B₁η+C₁>0 
where A₁= 2βθ pR αγ- βθ pR - 2 pR γβα- β pR α+ 2β pR α²γ+ βθ pR α+ β pR - 2βθ pR α²γ, B₁= -
βθ pR αγ²- 2 pR γβ²α+ 4β²α² pR γ- 2β²α² pR γ²- 4β pR α²γ- 2β²α³ pR γ- βα- β pR + 
Crα+βα²+γβα+ pR β²α+βθ pR +β pR α²+βCaα-γβα²+β²α³ pR -2β²α² pR pR + pR γ²β²α-βθ pR α-
βθ pR α²-βθαγ+β²α³ pR γ²+4 pR γβα+2βθ pR α²γ²-2βθ pR αγ+2βθ pR α²γ, C₁=2 pR γβα-2 pR γ²βα-
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4 pR γβ²α+2 pR γ²β²α+2β²α² pR γ+βθ pR α+β pR α²γ²+γβα+β-βα-γβ- pR β²- Cr - pR γ²β²-β²α² pR -
2vγβ+ pR γ²β+2 pR γβ²+2 pR β²α-β²α² pR γ²-βCa +β pR -β pR α+βθγ-βθ pR α²γ². 
The solution to k(η)=0 is 
η3,4=
1
11
2
11
2
4
A
CABB −±−
. 
As A₁=β pR  (1-α)(1-θ)(1-αγ)>0, this parabola is open to the top. 
k(1)>0 is true under condition Cr < Cr1, where Cr1=-β² pR α²γ²- β²α² pR + 2β²α² pR γ+ 
2β² pR α+ αβγ+ 2β² pR γ²α- 4β² pR γα+ 2 pR γβα- αβ+ βθ pR α- β pR α- pR γ²βα- βθ pR αγ²+ 
2β² pR γ- βCa - β² pR - β² pR γ²+ θβγ- βγ+ β- 2 pR γβ+ β pR + pR γ²β. 
k(0)<0 is true under condition Cr > Cr2, where Cr2=2 pR γ²β²α+ pR γ²β- pR γ²β²-
βα+β pR - pR β²-γβ+β+γβα-β²α² pR +βθγ-2 pR γ²βα-4 pR γβ²α-2 pR γβ+2β²α² pR γ-β²α² pR γ²-βCa 
+β pR α²γ²+2 pR γβ²+2 pR β²α-β pR α+βθ pR α-βθ pR α²γ²+2 pR γβα. 
Now we compare those two conditions. 
Cr1- Cr2= pR γ²β²α(1-α)(1-θ)>0→Cr1> Cr2. 
Thus, if Cr1 > Cr > Cr2 is satisfied, one of the solutions to k(η)=0 is inside unit interval, say 
1>η₃>0>η₄. 
If Cr > Cr1, we get k(1)<0 and k(0)<0 which means issuers will never go through the 
CRA. 
Hence if η> aη  and 
a
rC < Cr < arC , we get k(η)>0→E( aU )>E( nrU ) that issuers will 
go through the CRA and take action, where arC = Cr1, arC = Cr2 and aη =η₃. 
Also we want to know the relationship between arC  and β. 
∂
a
rC /∂β=2 pR  (-γ²+ 2α²γ- 1+ 2γ- α²γ²- 4γα+ 2γ² α- α²+ 2α)β- 2 pR γ+ pR γ²- γ- α+ pR - 
θ pR α²γ²+ θγ+ 1+ γα+ pR α²γ²- 2 pR γ²α-  Ca + θ pR α+ 2 pR γα- pR α. 
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As the solution to ∂ arC /∂β=0 is β=β ₁ , where β ₁ =(-2 pR γ+ pR γ²-γ-α+ pR -
θ pR α²γ²+θγ+γα+1+ pR α²γ²-2 pR γ²α- Ca +θ pR α+2 pR γα- pR α)/(2(- pR γ²+2α² pR γ- pR +2 pR γ-
pR α²γ²-4 pR γα+2 pR γ²α-α² pR +2 pR α)).  
As β₁>1 is always true, β(<1)<β₁ is also always true. Thus, we know ∂ arC /∂β>0, 
which means when issuers have larger probability to be initially good, the lower bound of 
a
rC  required for this strategy is higher. 
A.4.2 Equilibrium Condition for )()( nrna UEUE >  
The expected utility of choosing the CRA and taking no action, is larger than the 
expected utility of not choosing the CRA, that is E( aU )>E( nrU ). 
←q(η)=A₂η²+B₂η+C₂>0 
where, A₂=β pR - β pR α+ 2β pR α²γ- 2 pR γβα, B₂=-βα+ Crα+ pR β²α+ β pR α²+ γβα- γβα²- 
β pR - 2β²α² pR + β²α³ pR + 4β²α² pR γ- 4β pR α²γ+ βα²+ 4 pR γβα+ β²α³ pR γ²+ pR γ²β²α- 
2β²α² pR γ²- 2 pR γβ²α- 2β²α³ pR γ, C₂=2 pR γβα- 2 pR γ²βα- 4 pR γβ²α+ 2 pR γ²β²α+ 2β²α² pR γ+ 
β pR α²γ²+ γβα+ β- βα- γβ- pR β²- Cr - pR γ²β²- β²α² pR - 2 pR γβ+ pR γ²β+ 2 pR γβ²+ 2 pR β²α- 
β²α² pR γ²+ β pR -β pR α. 
The solution to q(η)=0 is 
η5,6=
2
22
2
22
2
4
A
CABB −±−
 and η₅>η₆. 
As A₂=β pR  (1-α)(1-2αγ)>0 (by assumption α<0.5), this parabola is open to the top. 
q(1)<0 is true under condition Cr > Cr3, where Cr3 = β+ pR β- αβ- βγ- pR αβ- 2 pR βγ+ 
αβγ+ 2 pR αβγ+ 2 pR αβ²+ pR βγ²+ 2 pR β²γ- β² pR - pR αβγ²- 4 pR α β²γ- pR β²γ²+ 2 pR αβ²γ²+ 
2 pR α²β²γ- α²β² pR - pR α²β²γ². 
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q(0)>0 is true under condition Cr < Cr4, where Cr4=2 pR γβα- 2 pR γ²βα- 4 pR γβ²α+ 
2 pR γ²β²α+ 2β²α² pR γ+ β pR α²γ²+ γβα+ β- βα- γβ- pR β²- pR γ²β²- β²α² pR - 2 pR γβ+ pR γ²β+ 
2 pR γβ²+ 2 pR β² α- β²α² pR γ²+ β pR -β pR α. 
Also we get Cr4 > Cr3 so that Cr3 < Cr < Cr4 is true under assumption. Thus, under 
condition η<η₆, issuers will go through the CRA and take action. 
Hence if narC < Cr < narC and η< naη , issuers will go through the CRA and take no 
action, where narC = Cr4, 
na
rC = Cr3 and naη =η₆. 
A.4.3 Summary 
When action cost or rating cost is too high, no issuer will go through the CRA. When 
rating cost is too low, issuers will always go through the CRA. As those are straightforward, 
action cost and rating cost are in their median ranges under our assumptions. Thus, we only 
report the result in their median ranges, as follows. 
1) If θ> aθ , η> aη  and arC < Cr < arC , E( aU )>E( nrU ) and E( aU )>E( naU ) are true. 
Thus, issuers will go through the CRA and initial good will take action. 
2) If θ< aθ , narC < Cr < narC  and η< naη is true, E( naU )>E( nrU ) and E( naU )>E( aU )are 
true. Thus, issuers will go through the CRA and initial good will take no action. 
3) Otherwise, E( nrU )>E( aU ) and E( nrU )>E( naU ) are true. Thus, issuers will not go 
through the CRA. 
A.5 Proof for Social Welfare Analysis 
A.5.1 CRA without Monitoring Role 
A.5.1.1 Go Through the CRA 
If there is CRA but no watchlist, investor has no signal for shock happenings. They 
will make pricing decision based on market average quality that Pr(t₂=G|r₁=h)=1-α. Thus, 
the price is nwhP1 =αF
r
 +(1-α) Fs = αγ+1-α,
 
nw
lP1 =γ and the social welfare is 
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nw
rSW =β(1-α)( pR nwhP1 -1)+(1-β)γ( pR nwlP1 -1)+βαγ( pR nwhP1 -1)- Cr, 
where the superscript means no watchlist and the subscript means issuers go through CRA 
(that there are ratings in the market). 
A.5.1.2 Not Go Through the CRA 
If there is no rating and no watchlist, investor has no signal at all. They will make 
pricing decision based on market average quality that Pr(t₂=G)=β(1-α). Thus, the price 
nwP =[1-β(1-α)] Fr +β(1-α) Fs = γ-γβ+βαγ+β-βα. Thus, the social welfare is 
nw
nrSW =β(1-α)( pR nwP -1)+[1-β(1-α)]γ( pR nwP -1), 
where the subscript means issuers do not go through CRA (that there are no ratings in the 
market). 
A.5.2 CRA with Monitoring Role 
When there is asymmetric information and CRA exists, the social welfare depends on 
issuer’s equilibrium strategy. As break-even for both investors and CRA, we do not need to 
consider investors and CRA in social welfare. Under both cases when issuers go through 
CRA, ahP3 =
na
hP3 = F
s
 =1 and alP3 =
na
lP3 = F
r
 =γ. 
A.5.2.1 Not Go Through the CRA 
It is exactly the same as the case of issuers choosing not go through CRA when there 
is CRA but no watchlist. Thus wnrSW =
nw
nrSW . 
A.5.2.2 Go Through the CRA and Take No Action 
There are four possibilities for initially good issuers: shock and on watchlist and 
downgrade (with probability αη), shock and not on watchlist (with α(1-η)), no shock and on 
watchlist and affirm initial rating (with (1-α)(1-η)), and no shock and not on watchlist (with 
(1-α)η). Thus, the social welfare is 
naw
rSW
,
 = (1-β+βαη)γ( pR γ-1)+β(1-α)η( pR nahP2 -1) 
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      +βα(1-η)γ( pR nahP2 -1)+β(1-α)(1-η)( pR -1)- Cr , 
where nahP2 =(-η+αη-αγ+αγη)/(-η+2αη-α) (refer to section 1.4.1.2), the superscript means there 
are watchlist and issuers take no action. 
A.5.2.3 Go Through the CRA and Take Action 
When issuers take action, compared to the strategy of ‘No action’ here is one more 
possibility, which is successful action and then no shock nor watchlist. Thus, the social 
welfare is 
aw
rSW
,
= [1-β+β(1-θ)αη]γ( pR γ-1)+[βθ+β(1-θ)(1-α)η]( pR ahP2 -1) 
   +β(1-θ)α(1-η)γ( pR ahP2 -1)+β(1-θ)(1-α)(1-η)( pR -1)- Cr - Ca ,  
where ahP2 =(η-ηα-ηθ+ηθα+θ+αγ-αγη-αγθ+αγηθ)/(η-2ηα-ηθ+2ηθα+θ+α-θα) (refer to section 
1.4.1.1), the superscript means there are watchlist and issuers take action. 
A.5.3 Compare 
A.5.3.1 Inter-setup Analysis 
When issuers take no action, the difference of social welfare between the two setups 
is 
naw
rSW
,
-
nw
rSW =[(β pR α)/(η-2ηα+α)] g, 
where g= (γ²+1-α-αγ²-2γ+2αγ)η²-2αγ+αγ²+α-α²γ²-α²+2α²γ+(4αγ-4α²γ+2α²γ²+2α²-2α-2αγ²) η. 
As η-2ηα+α>0 and g>0 is always true as long as η>0, we get that η>0→ nawrSW , -
nw
rSW >0. Thus when issuers choose go through CRA but take no action, no matter how 
good/bad CRA is at monitoring, social welfare will be increased as long as CRA has the 
monitoring role. 
A.5.3.2 Intra-setup Analysis 
aw
rSW
,
-
naw
rSW
,
 is complicated that we cannot get intuitive condition. Thus we 
consider issuer’s strategy directly in section 1.6. 
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However, we do a value trial. When there is watchlist and we set θ=1/2, α=0.1, 
γ=0.67, β=0.5, R=2, Cr =0.15, we get awrSW , - nawrSW , >0. It indicates that social welfare will 
be increased if issuers go through CRA and take action, instead of go through CRA but take 
no action, when CRA has the monitoring role. 
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APPENDIX B. FOR CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1. Density of Bond Excess Returns of the Entire Sample Associated with 
Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.2. Density of Bond Excess Returns of the Entire Sample Associated with 
Rating Changes Announcements 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
-0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09
Bond Excess Return
De
n
s
ity
WL DOWN
WL UP
0%
10%
20%
30%
-0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0 0.02 0.04 0.06
Bond Excess Return
D
e
n
s
ity
RC DOWN
RC UP
  
 
131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.3. Cumulative Density of Bond Excess Returns of the Entire Sample 
Associated with Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.4. Cumulative Density of Bond Excess Returns of the Entire Sample 
Associated with Rating Changes Announcements 
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Figure B.5. Density of Bond Excess Returns of Straight-debt Bonds Associated with 
Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.6. Density of Bond Excess Returns of Straight-debt Bonds Associated with 
Rating Changes Announcements 
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Figure B.7.  Cumulative Density of Bond Excess Returns of Straight-debt Bonds 
Associated with Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.8. Cumulative Density of Bond Excess Returns of Straight-debt Bonds 
Associated with Rating Changes Announcements 
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Figure B.9. Density of Bond Excess Rating Returns of the Entire Sample Associated 
with Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.10. Density of Bond Excess Rating Returns of the Entire Sample Associated 
with Rating Changes Announcements 
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Figure B.11. Cumulative Density of Bond Excess Rating Returns of the Entire Sample 
Associated with Watchlist Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.12. Cumulative Density of Bond Excess Rating Returns of the Entire Sample 
Associated with Rating Changes Announcements 
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Figure B.13. Density of Stock Excess Returns Associated with Watchlist 
Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.14. Density of Stock Excess Returns Associated with Rating Changes 
Announcements 
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Figure B.15. Cumulative Density of Stock Excess Returns Associated with Watchlist 
Announcements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.16. Cumulative Density of Stock Excess Returns Associated with Rating 
Changes Announcement 
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APPENDIX C. FOR CHAPTER 3 
C.1 Balancing Test Sample Results 
A sample test result of a failed balancing test for variable LN(EOP) in block 1 is as 
follows: 
Table C.1.1. Balancing Test Result for Variable LN(EOP) 
 
 
A sample test result of a successful balancing test for variable VC in block 1 is as 
follows: 
Table C.1.2. Balancing Test Result for Variable VC 
Two-sample t-test with equal variances     
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
0 331 0.393 0.489 0.340 0.446 
1 8 0.375 0.518 -0.058 0.808 
combined 339 0.392 0.489 0.340 0.445 
diff   0.018 0.175 -0.327 0.362 
      
diff=mean(0)-mean(1)  t=0.1013   
Ho: diff=0   df=337   
Ha: diff<0  Ha: diff ≠  0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.5403        Pr(T > t) = 0.9194          Pr(T > t) = 0.4597 
      
Conclusion: variable VC is balanced in block 1   
Two-sample t-test with equal variances     
Group Obs Mean Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
0 331 1.917 0.367 1.877 1.956 
1 8 2.264 0.189 2.107 2.422 
combined 339 1.925 0.368 1.886 1.964 
diff   -0.348 0.130 -0.604 -0.091 
      
diff=mean(0)-mean(1)  t=-2.6683   
Ho: diff=0   df=337   
Ha: diff<0  Ha: diff ≠  0 Ha: diff > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0040          Pr(T > t) = 0.0080          Pr(T > t) = 0.9960 
      
Conclusion: variable LN(EOP) is not balanced in block 1   
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C.2 Figures for Subsamples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2.1. Comparison of Propensity Scores for Subperiod 1981-1990 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2.2. Difference of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched for 
Subperiod 1981-1990 
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Figure C.2.3. Comparison of Propensity Scores for Subperiod 1991-1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2.4. Difference of Propensity Scores between Treated and Matched for 
Subperiod 1981-1990 
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. 
Figure C.2.5. Comparison of Propensity Scores for Subperiod 1999-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2.6. Difference of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched for 
Subperiod 1999-2000 
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Figure C.2.7. Comparison of Propensity Scores for Above Range Subsample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2.8. Difference of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched for 
Above Range Subsample 
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Figure C.2.9. Comparison of Propensity Scores for Within Range Subsample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2.10. Difference of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched 
for Within Range Subsample 
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Figure C.2.11. Comparison of Propensity Scores for Below Range Subsample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C.2.12. Difference of Propensity Scores between the Treated and the Matched 
for Below Range Subsample 
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